Bothpre-modernMuslimjuristsandmodernscholarsofIslamiclawhavedevoted animmenseamountofenergytoanalyzingqiyās,whichisusuallytranslatedas
“analogy”notwithstandingthefactthatitsscopeissomewhatwiderthanformsof
inductivereasoning.Hermeneutictechniqueslike‘āmmandkhāṣṣ(restrictedand unrestrictedmeaningofawordorstatement)andmethodsofreasoninglikeistihsān, istisḥāb,andistiṣlāḥalsousearesemblancetojustifytheapplicationofapre-existing rulingtoanothercase.Adetailedsurveyofallofthesereasoningmethodsisbeyondthe scopeofthisstudy,butabriefoverviewofqiyāswillorientateustotheroleofanalogy andresemblancewithindiscussionsofgharar,wherejuristsimplicitlyandexplicitly
drawonqiyās.Justasimportantly,thesetheoreticaldiscussionsaboutqiyāsrevealthe complexityofdefiningavalidresemblancebetweentworeferents.
Juristsgenerallydistinguishbetweenthreetypesofanalogies:1)causalanalogy (qiyāsal-‘illa),2)inferentialanalogy(qiyāsal-dalāla),and3)analogyofresemblance (qiyāsal-shabah).320 Juristsdevotethemajorityoftheirdiscussionsofanalogytothe causalanalogy.Withthisanalogy,ajuristisolatestherationale(‘illa)forthelawthat
necessitates(‘illa)thelegalruling(ḥukm)intheoriginalcase(aṣl)andthenappliesthis rulingtothederivativecase(far‘).Thejuristthusextendstherulingonthebasisthatboth
casessharethesamequalitythatnecessitatestherulingintheoriginalcase.Theclassic exampleofthisanalogyistheprohibitionofdatewine.JuristsextendtheQur’ān’s prohibitionongrapewinetodatewineonthebasisoftherationalethattheQur’ān prohibitsgrapewineduetothefactthatitintoxicants.
Withtheinferentialanalogy,oneextendstherulingoftheoriginalcasetoa derivativecaseonthebasisofsomesharedlegaltraitwithoutsearchingforthe
underlyingrationalebehindthelaw.Forexample,theShāfi‘īsarguethataminormust
payzakātonwealthsincehemustpaythetithe(‘ushr)onlandthatheowns.Sincea minoristreatedlikeamajorforoneformoftaxation,heshouldbetreatedassuchforall formsoftaxation.321Withtheanalogyofresemblance,onejustifiesananalogybetween severalcompetinganalogiesonthebasisofwhichanalogyencompassesthegreatest numberofsimilaritiesbetweentheoriginalcaseandnewcase.Forexample,aslaveis analogizedtofreemansinceaslaveislikeafreemaninfourrespectsbutlikeananimalin onerespect.322
Notwithstandingthedifferencesbetweenthesethreeformsofanalogy,theroleof resemblancecreatestwointerconnectedproblems:1)toidentifyaresemblancethat necessitatesasharedjudgmentbetweencases,and2)torestrictthescopeofa
resemblance.Inhislengthycritiqueoftheuseofanalogyinlaw,Ibn Ḥazmsumsupthese problemsbyremarkingthat,“Theequalityofthingsdoesnotnecessitatetheapplication ofthesamejudgmenttothem,”and,“Everythingintheworldissimilarinsomeway!”323
Withthecausalanalogy,juristsemployanumberofmethodstovalidatea claimedresemblancebetweentwocases.Inhisstudyofuṣūlal-fiqh,Zysowdividesthe methodsintoformalist,whichdonotacceptuncertaintyintheelaborationoflaw,and materialist,whichacceptuncertaintyintheelaborationoflaw.AccordingtoZysow,the materialistmethodsincludetheShāfi‘ī methodofpositingoftheappropriatenessofthe sharedrationaleandthe Ḥanafimethodofpositingtheeffectivenessoftheshared rationale.
321Shīrāzī,Luma,pp.208-209. 322Shīrāzī,Luma,p.209.
Inordertovalidatearesemblancebetweencasestoextendalegaljudgmenttoa newcase,Ghazālī developedthemethodofappropriateness(munāsaba),whichlater Shāfi‘ī adopted.Withappropriateness,juristsexaminewhetheracauseisconsistentwith thefiveuniversalprinciplesofthelaw;namely,theprotectionofreligion,life,thought, lineage,andproperty.324AlthoughGhazālī claimsthattheidentificationof
appropriatenessisnotsubjecttocapriciouswhimsofitspractitioners,otherjurists disagreeandarguethatitcouldleadtouncertainty.The Ḥanafī doctrineofeffectiveness (ta‘thīr)relatesanewlydiscoveredcausetothosecauseswithacertainbasisinScripture orconsensus.Somejuristsevencreateaphylumofcauses.325However,themethodof effectivenessinscribesanalogieswithinanalogieswiththeresultthatonefirstneedsto determinearesemblancebetweenthetwosetsofcausesbeforethenrelatingthemtoeach otheranalogically.Suchaprocedureineffectshouldleadtoaninfiniteregressof
analogies.
AccordingtoZysow,theformalmethodsconsistprimarilyofconsistencyand conversion(ṭardwa’l-aks),andtestingandexhaustion(al-sabrwa’l-taqsīm).
Consistencyandconversionvalidateacausebyshowingthateverytimesometrait occursthesamejudgmentisappliedandconverselywhenitdoesnotappearthe
324Zysow,Economy,pp. 196-204. Fordiscussionsofappropriatenessthatpattern discursivelyalongtheselines,seeGhazālī,Mustaṣfā,vol.1,pp.416-417;vol.2,pp.306-307.For furtherdiscussionsofthesefiveuniversals,seeMuḥammadb.Bahādural-Zarakhsī,Al-Baḥral- muḥīṭ fī uṣūlal-fiqh,ed.MuḥammadMuḥammadTāmir,4vols(Beirut,Dāral-Kutubal-‘Ilmīya, 2000),vol.4,pp.188-189;Yūsufb.MuḥammadMikalātī,KitābLubābal-‘uqūlfī radd‘alaal- falāsifafī ‘ilmal-uṣūl,ed.Fawqīya ḤusaynMaḥmūd(Cairo:Tawzī‘Dāral-Anṣār,1977),p.310.
325Zysow,Economy,pp.204-215. Fordiscussionsthatpatterndiscursivelyalongthese linesseeGhazālī,Mustṣfā,vol.2,p.307;Muḥammadb.MuḥammadBazdawī,Kitābfīhima‘rifat al-ḥujajal-shar‘īya,ed.MarieBernandandEricChaumont(Cairo:InstitutFrançais
judgmentisnotapplied.Ontheotherhand,withtestingandexhaustion,onemarshalsall thepossiblecausesforalawandtheneliminatesthemonebyoneuntilonlyonecause remains.326
Thisbriefoverviewdemonstratessomeofthewaysthatjuristsconfigureand validatearesemblanceandanalogybetweencases.Thenotionofsimilarityalthough groundedonthatofidentityisnotaunivocalconcept.Thewaysthatdiscoursesconfigure theirnotionsofsimilaritypermitdifferentkindsanalogiesandenlargeordiminishthe scopeofparticulartypesofanalogyaswewillsee.