Contingency planning and capabilities

The fourth principle is the establishment of an adequate crisis management capability and includes the necessity for contingency planning.42 This principle encourages actors to create crisis contingency capabilities towards eliminating routine problems within

See William L Waugh Jr., "Integrating the Policy Models of Terrorism and Emergency Management," Policy Studies Review. Vol.6, No.1, (August 1986), pp.287-301 and Uriel Rosenthal and B Pijnenburg, (eds.), "Special Issue on Multiple Scenarios for Crisis Management and Decision Making," International Journal of Contemporary Crises, Vol. 14, No.4, (December 1990).

the bureaucracy thereby decreasing the time required for the transition from normal to crisis mode and as an essential step in conducting scenario forecasting and the identification of potential crisis situations. Standard FBI crisis management doctrine holds that the key to successful crisis management lies in the ability of the crisis manager to enable the response units to make the transition from normal operating conditions to crisis mode, where the authorities are equipped and in position to cope with all the requirements that the situation may demand. A speedy transition from normal to crisis state enables the crisis manager to focus on the unique aspects of the situation instead of wasting time dealing with routine organisation problems.43 As an integral part of creating a response mechanism to deal with envisaged situations, contingency planning is useful at the strategic policy making and implementation levels of government as well as at the tactical response levels of the executive. At the strategic level, contingency planning which involves war-game theory and scenario forecasting and planning, can help to provide institutional memory and preparedness for those decision makers who participate.44 At the tactical response level, the creation of crisis response capabilities can reveal and introduce institutional tensions and problems of cross-compatibility between organisations that may be tasked with providing support and logistics.45 Contingency

This was explained by Robert Grace, FBI Special Agent in Charge of the Crisis

Management Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico Bay, Maryland, during an interview, with the author on July 13, 1995

44 For an insight into the use of war games as an aid to contingency planning see James Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, (1981), op.cit:. pp.531-536. See also Anatol Rapoport, "The Role of Game Theory in Uncovering Non-Strategic Principles of Decision," in Andre Mensch, Theory of Games: Techniques and Applications, (London, St Paul's House, English Universities Press Ltd., 1966), pp.410-431 and Jeffrey S Banks, "Crisis Bargaining," in Banks, Signalling Games in Political Science, (London, Harwood Academic Publishers, 1991), pp.71-85 and Martin Shubik, "The Uses of Game Theory," in James C Charlesworth, (ed.), Contemporary Political Analysis, (New York, The Free Press, 1967), pp.247-249. See also Harvey Averch and M Lavin, Simulation of Decisionmaking in Crises: Three Manual Gaming Experiments. (Santa Monica, Rand Report, RM-4202-PR, August 1964). Also Melvin Dresler, Games of Strategy: Theory and Applications. (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1967) and Norman C Dalkey, "Simulation," in E S Quade and W I Boucher, Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in Defence. (New York, Elsevier, 1977), pp.241-254

45

Observations made by Robert Grace, FBI Special Agent in Charge of the Crisis Management Unit, FBI Academy, Quantico Bay, Maryland, during an interview, with the

planning provides an opportunity to identify potential practical problems that may arise between security organisations in communication, command and control arrangements and with equipment incompatibility.46 It helps towards identifying those routine issues that contribute towards most crisis complexities and with bureaucratic and turf problems which can be identified and resolved beforehand. One of the most important contributions of this principle, however, is towards intelligence tasking. Speculation pertaining to possible crisis scenarios helps to identify those circumstances and areas where there may be intelligence shortcomings.47 Intelligence requirements and inputs can be identified and fed into the intelligence cycle beforehand. This can ensure that basic intelligence is available on specific topics, organisations or individuals, which may compliment current intelligence during actual crisis situations.48

According to Taylor and Ralston, most governments look to their intelligence services to provide them with pre-crisis information on the activities of friends and enemies.49 Whereas the importance of intelligence participation in scenario planning may be recognised, in a world of diminishing resources and budgets very little is done to include intelligence analysts or officers in contingency planning. Where such participation does occur, however, contingency planning encourages closer communication between decision makers and the

author on July 13, 1995 46 Ibid.

47 These comments were made by Brigadier Andrew Massey, former SAS Commander in an interview, with the author on May 5, 1995, Buckingham Gate, London.

48 For an overview of preferences, knowledge and crisis response decision making in game theory, see Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International Relations, (Aldershot, England, Edward Elgar Publishing, Ltd., 1994), pp.97-121. See also J Harsanyi, "Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian Players," Management Science. (1967), Vol.14. Also Avenhaus, Rudnianski and Karkar (eds.), Decision Making Analytical Support and Crisis Management. (Heidelberg, Springer Verlag, 1991)

49 See Stan A Taylor and Theodore J Ralston, "The Role of Intelligence in Crisis Management," in Alexander L George, (1991), op.cit:. p.396 and Charles C Cogan, "Intelligence and Crisis Management: The Importance of the Pre-Crisis," Intelligence and National Security, Vol.9, No.4, (October 1994), pp.633-650

intelligence community. Communication is necessary for the efficient distribution of intelligence between the intelligence community and decision makers during crises.50 Not only is communication essential towards building a closer relationship between intelligence producer and consumers, it is also vitally important to ensure that intentions are clearly understood by the adversary, the public and one's allies during a crisis.