Evaluation and interpretation

The type of intelligence that was available to the NSC staff at most times throughout the crisis and even before the first embassy bombing was predominantly photographic and imagery intelligence that was supplied by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Access to human intelligence sources remained difficult to acquire and scarce. The Sheikh Abdullah Barracks in the Bekaa Valley was consistently maintained as a high priority intelligence target which was set by the NSC staff.204 Prior to the U.S. embassy bombing, the NRO were in possession of photographic evidence of a mock-up of the embassy at a training base in the Bekaa Valley.205 The NRO analysts, however, were unaware of the significance of the evidence as provided by the imagery before them and were unable to relate this information to the layout of the U.S. embassy in Beirut. The failed to analyse the information because they were unable to interpret it in context of the threat posed to U.S. interests in Beirut.206

203 See Bruce Hoffman, Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International Terrorism, (Santa Monica, California, Rand Report No. R-3783-USDP, March 1990), pp.9-15

204 Howard Teicher, telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D C

206 Unattributable interview with a former member of the DIA, Washington D.C., July 13, 1995. This was also confirmed by John Walcott, during an interview, on July 17, 1995, in Washington D.C.

While it can be argued that the administration should have correctly predicted the attack based upon the evidence mentioned, the information only assisted the NSC staff and the Marine's commanders to identify the potential target of the attack. It was, however, insufficient as far as determining the specific date and time that the attack would take place. Photographic intelligence is a reliable asset in determining intelligence with regards to the capabilities of an adversary. As a reconnaissance tool it is capable of providing physical and real-time proof of any change in quantifiable variables. For example, photoint may reveal an increase over time in the number of missile silos that have been build by the enemy, or it may produce physical evidence of troop concentrations. However, it remains a passive medium that is incapable of providing insight into the intentions and the minds of the enemy.207 This remained the fundamental shortcoming in the intelligence community's capabilities

in monitoring terrorist activity in Lebanon.

The extent and calibre of the administration's humint pertaining to the first embassy bombing that was collected, remains unknown. However, there are indications that the administration was in possession of a limited amount of warning intelligence prior to the attacks on the embassy and the Marine barracks in 1983. In an exchange between Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Senators Smith and Levine during the Congressional Hearing on the U.S. embassy bombing held on June 28, 1984, Eagleburger was asked if the embassy had received any threats or warnings whatsoever before the bombing or any advance surreptitious information and if any threats had been received subsequent to the embassy bombing. Eagelburger responded that he would prefer to answer both questions during the executive session. Had the administration not been in possession of any intelligence to that

20 ? For an overview of the comparison between technical and human intelligence collection techniques, see Abraham N Shulsky, £1991), op.cit:, see Chapter 2, Spies, Machines and Libraries: Collecting the Data, Comparison of Humint and Techint, pp. 11-30

effect, he could have easily said so. His response suggests that the administration was, in fact, in possession of warning intelligence prior to the bombing of the U.S. embassy in 1983 and, because the information was classified, he could only respond to these questions during the executive session. The latter is limited to access by those senators who have received the necessary security clearances, and who are privy to classified information.208

The bombing episodes are pertinent examples of where disputes can arise over the difference between intelligence and policy failures. One the one hand, former NSC staff members claim that the administration was in possession of the necessary intelligence, but failed to respond because the policy makers at the most senior level failed to recognise the significance of the intelligence and the nature of the environment in Beirut. The unrealistic demands (rules of engagement) enforced upon the Marines by Caspar Weinberger arguably bear testimony to this fact.209 On the other hand, senior policy makers allege that the failure cannot be attributed to them, but to the inadequate performance of the military officers on the scene who had in turn been let down by the intelligence system and by their own inefficiencies in taking adequate security precautions.210

While some of the reasons for the administration's failure to respond to the warnings must be attributed to a combination of the behaviour of the principal cabinet officers, who failed to recognise the

200 U.S.Congress Hearing on the U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, June 28, 1983, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983), pp.17-18

209 Howard Teicher, former senior NSC Middle East staff member, telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C. The same opinion was expressed by Vincent Cannistraro, during an interview, on July 21, 1995, McLean Virginia. This is also the view of John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.

210 See Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:. pp.161-166. Also George Schultz, (1993), op.cit;. pp.220-234. See also the U.S.Congress Hearing on the U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress. June 28, 1983, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983) and The Investigations Subcommittee on the Terrorist Bombing at Beirut International Airport, U.S. Congress Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, January 31, 1984 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1984) also confirmed by Geoffrey Kemp, former NSC staff member, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C.

implications of the facts as revealed to them by the intelligence community, and the difficulty that the CIA experienced in ascertaining the exact date of the attacks,211 it should be recognised that intelligence gathering with regard to the intentions of terrorist groups remains one of the most difficult tasks that any intelligence community has to carry out. Another explanation for this failure was the fact that the NSC staff, who were the intermediary level between the intelligence community and the Cabinet, were actually adjudicating and implementing policy. They had resorted to this behaviour in the vacuum that had been created through President Reagan's indecisive management style and the stand-off between Caspar Weinberger and George Schultz.212 The NSC staff displayed a cognitive resistance towards the intelligence that they received which was in conflict with the policy initiatives that they had implemented.

In contrast to the siege mentality that prevailed among the members of the diplomatic and intelligence community on the ground in Beirut, the intelligence community in Washington, situated in the White House, Langley and the Pentagon, were totally complacent. Intelligence information gathered in Beirut had mostly been collected by intelligence officers whose movements were restricted as a result of their hostile environment. Intelligence was essentially gathered by officers who liaised with their counterparts on the diplomatic cocktail circuit rather than through regular recruitment and debriefing activities of local agents.213 Intelligence gathering through human

211 See the statement of the Hon. Bill Nicols, the Chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee on the Terrorist Bombing at Beirut Internationa! Airport, U.S. Congress Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, January 31, 1984 (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1984), p.3. This was also confirmed by Howard Teicher, telephone Interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C

212 See John Dumbrell, (1990), op.cit:. p.98

"13 John Walcott, during an interview, with the author on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C. This is a particularly difficult point to verify. The fact of the matter is that most of the CIA officers concerned were killed in the embassy bomb in 1983. Further efforts to obtain comments and opinions from analysts and consumers during that time were met with understandable reluctance out of respect for their fallen colleagues. However, during a

assets, was mostly achieved by intelligence sharing between the U.S., its allies and the Lebanese Armed Forces, who were not renown for their unbiased or objective reporting.214 Following the embassy attack in April 1983, the CIA’s humint operations were conducted from out of its embassies in Tel Aviv and Cairo. The CIA was therefore geographically remote from its target area. Supplementing their poor human intelligence was signals intelligence which monitored communications between the Pasdaran in Ba'albek and the Iranian Embassies in Beirut and Damascus.215

In examining the phenomenon of terrorism in Lebanon, however, the intelligence community concentrated upon the symptoms and failed to examine the underlying causes more thoroughly.216 To be specific, no tasking instructions were issued to the intelligence community to conduct an interrelated study of the effect of terrorism upon American foreign policy objectives in Lebanon. The intelligence community on its part did not offer any alternative view papers on the intentions and objectives of Syria or Iran. It did not examine the effects that the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and in particular, Beirut, had on the local Shi'ite population. Iran's influence exercised through the interaction between the Shi'ites and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) in the Bekaa Valley, was not fully appreciated.217 If the intelligence community had conducted a more

stated that the quality of intelligence emanating from Beirut at the time did not leave him very impressed and that given the hostile environment, it would not have been unusual for collection to have taken place in restaurants and bars.

214 For the interaction between the U.S. Marines in Beirut and the LAF, see Eric Hammel, (1985), op.cit. See Christopher Simpson, (1995), op.cit:, "National Security Decision Directive 128, Lebanon," p.362. Also Howard Teicher, former senior NSC Middle East staff member, during a telephone interview, October 23, 1995, Washington D.C

215 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:. p.293

216 See Marc Celmer, Terrorism, U.S. Strategy and Reagan Policies, (London, Mansell Publishing Co., 1987), pp.26-27

217 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, p.102. See also Christopher Dickey, "Assad and his Allies: Irreconcilable Allies," Foreign Affairs, Vol.66, No.1, (Fall 1987), pp. 58-76 and Christian Marshall, "Syria and Iran: A Strategic Alliance, 1979-1991," Orient, Vol.33, No.3, (September 1992), pp. 433-446

thorough interpretation and integrated their findings with the crisis management principle of the limitation of objectives, their analysis could have identified the faulty assumptions upon which the administration's Lebanon policy had been construed. Having made that observation, however, there is still no guarantee that, given the cognitive dissonance that prevailed within the NSC staff and the policy makers, that it would have made any difference. As the events in this case study demonstrate, the availability of intelligence does not necessarily guarantee good decision making.

An indication of this complacency was demonstrated by the fact that there had been no request from the decision making community for a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Lebanon. NIEs represent the most authoritative analysis on a subject by the U.S. intelligence community and is the most ambitious and comprehensive information that combines current intelligence with prediction on how a specific situation is expected to evolve.218 NIEs are usually generated by decision makers and officials who operate at the intelligence - policy making - interface level, such as the NSA or NIOs who are appointed by the Nations! Intelligence Council as case officers on specific topics of importance to national security, such as terrorism and weapons' proliferation.219 Notwithstanding the flaws in their collection and analysis, the distribution of intelligence from the analytical community via their managers and the NSC staff to the NSC presented a further obstacle as will be explained below.

See Abram N Shulsky, (1991), op.cit:, pp.57-58. See also Roy Godson, Intelligence Requirements for the 1980s, Analysis and Estimates. (Washington, D.C., National Strategy Information Centre, 1982), pp.1-11

“1' For a comprehensive explanation of the analysis production process and the interface between the intelligence and policy making communities, see Jeffrey T Richelson, {1989), op.cit:, pp.433-437. See also Richard K Betts, "American Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities, and Direction," in Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren Milberg, (1981),op.cit:, pp.245-263. For an overview more pertinent to the Reagan Administration, see John Prados, (1991), op.cit:, pp.447-481