The politicisation of intelligence

Politicisation can manifest itself in many ways, but in each case it boils down to the same essential elements: Almost all will agree that it involves the deliberate distortion of analysis or judgements to favour a preferred line of thinking irrespective of the evidence.155

153 See David Brinckiey and Andrew Hull, Estimative Intelligence: A Textbook on the History, Products, Uses and Writing of Intelligence Estimates, (Colombus, Ohio, Battelle, 1979) and Arie Ofri, "Crisis and Opportunity Forecasting," in Orbis, No.26, (Winter 1983), p.822 and Robert Mandel, "Political Gaming and Foreign Policy Making During Crises," World Politics, No.29, (July 1977), p.622

154 The politicisation of intelligence will be demonstrated in the following case studies, for an overview of intelligence and politicisation, see Robert Gates, Guarding Against Politicisation, Extract from a speech on the subject delivered by Gates to CIA Analysts in the CIA Auditorium on March 16, 1992. See also Robert Gates, "The Use of Intelligence at the White House," Washington Quarterly, Vol.12, No.1, (Winter 1989), pp.35-43. See also Kenneth de Graffenreid, "Intelligence and the Oval Office," in Roy Godson, (eds.), (1986), op.cit:, pp.8-18

155 Statement made by former DCI Robert Gates in a speech to the CIA at Langley, Virginia on March 16, 1992

Politicisation - essentially policy-driven bias, arises when there is a lack of understanding of the basic normative principles governing the role and function of intelligence and where intelligence is regarded as either a product in support of preconceived policy objectives, or as a product that is in search of a policy to support.156 From the perspective of the policy maker and the consumer, this phenomenon is more likely to occur under the former misunderstanding. Policy makers are intimately involved in their policy objectives and actively seek out information that reinforces their beliefs and which can be used to substantiate their course of actions.157 According to Richard Haass:

The danger of politicisation, the potential for the intelligence community to distort information or judgement in order to please the political authorities of the day, is real, and obviously can never be eliminated if intelligence officials are involved, as they must be in the policy process. The challenge, though is to develop reasonable safeguards while permitting intelligence producers and consumers to interact. Guarding against political pressure, guarding against parochialism is a powerful argument for maintaining a strong centralised capability, and not leaving decisions affecting important intelligence-related questions solely to the policy making departments.158

During the Reagan Administration, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and some members of the NSC staff are alleged to have altered the text of intelligence analyses pertaining to National Security Staff Directive (NSSD5-84) which reported that the

156 See Major-General Sir Kenneth Strong, Men of Intelligence, (New York, St Martin's

Press, 1972), pp. 140-143

1-7 See Mark M Lowenthal, (1992), op.cit:. p.15 and Richard K Betts, "American Strategic Intelligence: Politics, Priorities, and Direction," in Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr, Uri Ra'anan and Warren H Milberg, Intelligence Policy & National Security, (London, Macmillan Press, 1981), pp.256-260. See also House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978, 96th Congress, 1st session, 1979, (Washington D.C., U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1979)

*'8 See the testimony of Richard Haass, former senior director of the NSC staff, Hearing of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence

US had little prospects of success in establishing ties with moderate elements within the Iranian government. They updated and paraphrased the intelligence estimates to support their policy bias which was based on the belief that the key to rapprochement with Iran and to the release of the western hostages in Lebanon, could be achieved through establishing contact with the Iranian moderates.159

Consumers - who are policy makers - are prone to cognitive bias, a tendency to display mental intransigence, and when presented with evidence that is in conflict with their ambitions - their comfort zones - they tend towards cognitive dissonance.160 The latter can be described as a state of mind where there is a conflict between reality and a preconceived idea. The difference creates tension in the mind of the beholder, who follows a subsequent course of action or decision making which concurs with his or her preferred line of thinking.161

Festinger argues that dissonance exists between two cognitions which are inconsistent with each other.162 A cognition may be a fact, a belief or an opinion about anything, including one's own behaviour. Any two cognitions can be consonant - that is, consistent with one another, or dissonant - inconsistent, or irrelevant, where the

159

This allegation is made by former Secretary of Defence, Casper Weinberger, (1991),

op.cit: p.362

160 For a useful discussion on the problem of cognitive dissonance see Norman F Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1976). In this seminal work Dixon provides numerous examples of military failures as a result of cognitive dissonance. See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton University Press, 1976) and for cognitive dissonance and intelligence, see Richard J Heuer, Jr, "Cognitive Biases in the Evaluation of Intelligence Estimates," Proceedings, Tenth Annual Convention of American Institute for Decision Sciences, (St. Louis, Montana, Oct.30-Nov. 1, 1978), p.1. Also Jack Davis, "Combating Mind-Set," Studies in Intelligence Vol.36, No.5, 1992

151 For further academic explanations of this phenomenon see Roun Harre' and Roger Lamb, (eds.), The Encyclopaedia Dictionary of Psychology, cognitive dissonance, (London, Blackwell, 1983), p.93, and N Chapanis and A Chapanis, "Cognitive Dissonance: Five Years Later," Psychological Bulletin. Vol.61, pp.1-22. See also C Osgood and P Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," Psychological Review, Vol.62, (1955), pp.42-55

16- See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957)

existence of one implies nothing about the other. According to Festinger, any person who behaves in the above manner, and who displays an inconsistency with his own attitude, suffers from cognitive dissonance.163

An example of this phenomenon was the unshakeable belief of the former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, DCI William Casey and President Reagan, who based their opinions on terrorism and counter-terrorist policies on their perceptions that the former Soviet Union was the orchestrating arm behind international terrorism.164 It is interesting to note that Haig requested the intelligence community to produce a National Intelligence Estimate of the Soviets' role in terrorism after he had stated it as a fact in a cabinet meeting.165 This is a classic example of how the consumer, by tasking the intelligence community, can either inadvertently or quite deliberately influence the analysis requested by making policy statements. This can induce the intelligence community to provide substantiating evidence in support of existing policy bias.166 It is an easy trap for intelligence analysts in their attempts to support the consumer, to succumb to presuppositions and to either search for specific corroborating evidence, or to skew their analysis by placing a slant or special emphasis on specific factors which may or could result in a predetermined interpretation of the evidence.

The challenge for analysts lies in their ability and integrity to be able to produce intelligence that objectively assesses relevant policy issues - irrespective of whether it supports or undermines current consumer beliefs.167 Under these circumstances, the least that can be

163 ibid.

lo4 The background to Alexander Haig's and the intelligence communities' opinions are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3

165 Martin & Walcott, (1988), op.cit:, p.51

166 See the testimony by Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in September 1991, titled: CIA Politicisation, dated September 30, 1991

‘‘ This point and subsequent argument is attributed to the author's personal experiences as an intelligence officer from 1975-1985

hoped for is to facilitate a wider understanding of the realities of a particular situation and the potential implications should the policy maker insist in implementing his policy initiatives. Where it is known that the consumer holds a divergent view to that of the intelligence community, the analysis should at least include the consumer's opinion but in such a manner that it reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of his belief. These should be contrasted against the evidence and reasoning of the argument which substantiates the conclusions of the analyst.168 By highlighting those specific areas where the producer and the consumer's policy preferences are based upon speculation, hearsay and untested assumptions, one can hope that reason will prevail and that the consumer will at least be prompted to review his opinions. The root of the problem of convergence between the producer and consumer is to be found in the dilemma over the linkage between the two and the traditionalist - activist debate. This very issue of communication between the intelligence analyst/manager and the policy maker during the decision making process is the centre of the producer-consumer dichotomy and is explained below.