Intelligence tasking

The first step in the intelligence process involves the identification of information requirements by the consumer. Intelligence requirements have their origins in the response by consumers, analysts and intelligence gatherers to stimuli which are related to the consumers objectives as they become known, and in the perceived threats and risks involved in the pursuit of those objectives.106 Whereas the intelligence cycle suggests that requirements for collection are generated by policy makers, this is rarely the case.107 Policy makers often know little about the depth of existing data and are unfamiliar with the intelligence community's capabilities and vulnerabilities in gathering their requirements. Collection requirements are also generated by the analytical components which understand where gaps in existing data need to be filled and by the collectors themselves, who recognise the logical progression of information as they collect it.108 This principle implies therefore, that producers and consumers must maintain regular contact with one another.

During the Lebanon initiative, the core capabilities of the intelligence community for political analysis were rooted in the operations and intelligence directorates of the CIA. Within the Directorate of Intelligence, the Office for Near East and South Asian Analysis (NESA) was responsible for Lebanon intelligence.109 The relevant body in the Reagan Administration responsible for initiating intelligence requirements during the period in question was the Secretary of State, the National Security Council staff, the National

106 See Stephen J Cimbala, (1987), op.cit:. p.135

1 D7 -

See Harry Howe Ransom, (1958), op.cit:. p.13 and Jeffrey T Richelson, (1989), op.cit:, p.3.

108 This observation is based upon the author's personal experience as an intelligence officer.

Intelligence Officer and Reagan's Middle East envoy, Philip Habib.110 In the early stages of the administration the architect of the U.S. government's Lebanon policy was Secretary of State Alexander Haig.111 It is not known how often or whether Haig or Habib consulted the intelligence community prior to or during the times when they made policy decisions.

The consequences of their policy, however, would suggest that whatever they did, the available intelligence was simply ignored. In addition, tension between the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor and the Director of Central Intelligence prevailed throughout the Reagan Administration.112 Furthermore Philip Habib was described as somewhat of a dogmatic character who had definite ideas on how the U.S. should approach the Lebanon situation and was seldom amenable to discussion, particularly when it led to dissenting opinions.113 He therefore inadvertently became part of the problem instead of contributing towards its solution.114 He was not amenable to suggestions when they contradicted his opinions and went his own way and seldom, if never, consulted the intelligence community.115 Underlying tensions therefore dominated the relationships between the key policy makers which created barriers between the intelligence community and the consumers.

110 Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:. pp 169-191; See also Chrostopher Andrew, For the President's Eves Only, Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush, (London, Harper Collins, 1995), p.468

See Alexander Haig, (1984), op.cit:. p.310 Ibid.

Habib's bias was described by Geoffrey Kemp, former NSC staff member, diuring an

interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C. The same view on Habib's behaviour and mind set were expressed by John Walcott, editor U.S. News & World Report, during an interview,

on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C. See also George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:. pp.45 & 110; Also Howard Teicher, (1993), op.cit:, pp.172 & 218 and "Habib, Miracle Man of the Mideast," U.S. News and World Report, August 30, 1982, p.8 and "Habib the Peacemaker," Newsweek. August 30, 1982, p.36.See also Eric Hammel, (1985), op.cit:. p.16

114 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.

115 Geoffrey Kemp, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C. According to Kemp, Habib would shout everyone down at meetings and was nicknamed "the Volcano".

in

112 113

When George Schultz took over from Alexander Haig as Secretary of State in 1982, he relied upon Habib for guidance with regard to the State Department's policy objectives in Lebanon115 116 and lent his support to the Habib plan, without due consideration of the intelligence community's opinions, whom he instinctively mistrusted.117 He did not question or test the basic assumptions upon which the Haig-Habib policy initiatives had been based.118 At an early stage in the crisis, Haig and Habib decided that the key to their Lebanon strategy lay in persuading Israel and Syria to withdraw from Beirut while simultaneously resurrecting the Lebanese Armed Forces which would provide the security base for the unification of the Lebanese government under the Christian leadership of Bashir Gemayel.119 Habib was confident that he could negotiate a quick withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. His strategy was based upon the primary objective of securing an agreement between Israel and Lebanon. In his mind, once Israel had withdrawn, Syria would automatically follow suit.120 Habib's assumptions and expectations of Syrian behaviour led him not to consult with Asad during his negotiation efforts between Israel and Lebanon, other than to keep Syria informed in general as to the progress that was being made with the talks.121 This alienated Asad, who perceived the U.S.

115 For a comprehensive overview of Schultz's views on Lebanon see the published excerpts from George Schultz News Conference of August 20, 1982, U.S. Department of State Bulletin. No.82, (September 1982), pp.8-13

117

Stansfield Turner, former DCI, during an interview, with the author on July 22, 1995, Skipworth, McLean Virginia. See also Stansfield Turner, (1991), op.cit;. p.51. See also George Schultz, (1993), op.cit;. p.60

118 -

Geoffrey Kemp, interview, on July 19, 1995, Washington D.C. The same opinion was expressed by John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C.

11 q

See Geoffrey Bowder, "Lebanon's Struggle for Survival," World Today. No.39, (November 1983), pp.443-449 and Caspar Weinberger, (1990), op.cit:. pp.143-174

120 .

For an overview of Habib's assumptions on the behaviour of Syria and Israel in Lebanon, see Ze'ev Schiff, "Dealing With Syria," Foreign Policy, No.55, (Summer 1984), pp.92-112

121

See Robert Neumann, "Assad and the Future of the Middle East," Foreign Affairs, Vol.62, No.2, (Winter 1983), p.240. See also U.S. House of Representatives, Committee On Foreign Affairs, Developments in the Middle East, November, 1983, Ninety-Eighth Congress,

initiatives as an American-Israeli conspiracy to undermine his influence in Lebanon and Syria's national security interests.122 This ultimately caused the Reagan Administration to miss an opportunity to bring Syria into the peace plan and to secure U.S. objectives.123 Habib's perception of Syria's compliance was reinforced by promises made by Saudi Arabia to that effect and upon his expectations that moderate Arab states would influence Asad to withdraw once the Israelis had departed.124 He maintained a disproportionate level of self confidence in his powers of persuasion and believed that he could convince the Lebanese government and President Asad to adhere to the terms of the May 17 agreement.125

At the most senior and strategic levels, the intelligence community and the administration were divided over the issues of the administration's policy strategy in the Middle East.126 This extended to the Soviet Union's alleged support for international terrorism.127 An irreconcilable difference in opinion prevailed between the Directorate of Intelligence's analysis on international terrorism and the perception of the DCI, William Casey, who shared an unshakeable belief with Alexander Haig and President Reagan that the Soviet Union was universally culpable for international terrorism.128 Shortly after the

First Session, (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp.8-9

122 See Patrick Searle, (1988), op.cit:. pp.394-395 also Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit:. p.97

12 3

See Paul Wilkinson, "The Lebanese Powderkeg," Contemporary Review, No.243, (August 1983), pp.64-71

124 Howard Teicher, former senior NSC Middle East staff member, during a telephone interview, on October 23, 1995, Washington D.C. See Dan Tschirgi, (1989), op.cit. pp. 193 & 233 also George Schultz, (1993), op.cit:, pp.57-61 also Dilip Hiro, (1993), op.cit:. p.97

125 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995

126 Graham Fuller, telephone interview, on November 15, 1995.

127 John Walcott, interview, on July 17, 1995, Washington D.C. See also Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit.'. pp.93 & 134-135

128 Casey, Reagan and Haig had been heavily influenced by Claire Sterling's book: The Terror Network (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981), which is based upon her hypothesis that the Soviet Union was responsible for coordinating and exploiting international terrorism towards its foreign policy objectives. Ironically, much of the information that she obtained in her research was the product of a previous CIA disinformation campaign conducted in Italy a

BLT bombing, government sources in Washington went so far as to allege that the Soviet Union may have also been involved.129 The intelligence community, however, pointed out that there was no factual evidence to support the claim after Alexander Haig, in his capacity as Secretary of State, had converted his sentiments into the holy grail of U.S. counter-terrorist policy. Haig's belief was based upon Claire Sterling's book, The Terror Network, which alleged that the Soviet Union was the mastermind behind international terrorism.130 His views were no doubt reinforced by his personal experience in Belgium where, as Commander-in-Chief of Nato, he survived an attempt on his life by the Red Army Faction Terrorist Organisation in 1979.131 132 The Reagan Administration maintained an over simplified view of the complexities of political violence. An example of the administration's tendency to oversimplify the phenomenon of political violence by sweeping it under the carpet of 'terrorism', is provided by Jack Davis who was a member of the CIA briefing team that was responsible for briefing President-elect Reagan on the PLO. During a briefing session, Davis presented Ronald Reagan with an Agency memorandum that described the subtleties of the Palestinian movement. This memo discussed the complex array of background, personalities, ideologies, tactics and strategies that divided Palestinian people and characterised the myriad of groups inside and outside the Palestine Liberation Organisation. After giving the memo careful consideration, Reagan turned to Davis and said, "But they are all terrorists, aren't they?'"'32

few years before. See Jeffrey D Simon, £1994), op.cit:. p.168. See also the United States Senate Select Committee On Intelligence, 98 th Congress. 1st Session, January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p.26. Also P Jenkins, "The Assassins Revisited" Claire Sterling and the Politics of Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security, (1989)

129 See the front page article by Robert Fisk, the Times, October 24, 1983 See Claire Sterling, (1982), op.cit.

131 See Peter Taylor, £1993), op.cit:. pp.80-82

132 See John L Helgerson, Central Intelligence Agency CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates. Chapter 6: Reagan and Bush: A study in Contrasts, (Washington D.C., CIA

Haig and Casey tasked the CIA with providing evidence to sustain their convictions.133 Following the CIA’s analysis which had failed to provide evidence in support of this policy line,134 Casey tasked the DIA to conduct its own investigation. The resultant analysis, however, was so blatantly skewed that Casey had no option but to reject that report as well in the interests of protecting the integrity of analysis.135 This demonstration of cognitive bias at the administration's most senior level is an example of how consumers, by tasking the intelligence community, can inadvertently, or quite deliberately, influence the requested analysis. Policy statements that have already been made can induce condescending individuals within the intelligence community to provide substantiating evidence in support of existing policy bias.136

The differences between William Casey's background, his manner of operating, and the CIA's institutional ethos, strained the relationship between William Casey and the organisation that he headed.137 Casey, a former OSS operative took command of the CIA

Centre for the Study of Intelligence May 22, 1996)

133

See US Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate,

January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1982, February 28, 1983, (Washington D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1983), p.26. On February 11, 1981, Alexander Haig announced that international terrorism would be the number one foreign policy priority of the new administration. See Robert Olson, "Denigrating America's Challengers," Middle East International, No.227. (June 15, 1984), pp.17-18

134 See "CIA Said to Doubt Soviet Tie to Terrorism," Washington Post. March 29, 1981 135 Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, CIA analyst responsible for the analysis on the role of the Soviet Union in international terrorism, interview, on August 1995, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.

136 While Haig and Casey were guilty of biais, however, this point deserves further clarification. Notwithstanding the fact that these senior individuals based their beliefs upon an erroneous assumption, hindsight indicates, with some recent disclosures from Stasi files, that their original perceptions were nevertheless partly correct. Evidence has come to light which indicates that the former German Democratic Republic was instrumental in supplying and supporting European terrorist groups in Western Europe and some Middle East terrorist operations in Europe. See the report by Marc Fisher, "E,Germans Said to Aid Anti-US Terrorist Acts," Washington Post, March 27, 1991. See also a report titled "Stasi Role in Lockerbie Bombing Examined," Per Spiegel, April 18, 1994 as well as an article (untitled) in the Frankfurter Rundshau, July 2, 1991, wherein a former RAF operative confirmed that the Stasi provided assistance and training to the Red Army Faction.

137

For an in-depth overview of Casey's personality and how he disagreed with the Agency's analysis on Soviet support for international terrorism, see Joseph E Persico, £1990), op.cit:. pp.217-222

at a time when there was littie confidence in the analytical expertise of the Directorate of Intelligence, since the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board had conducted the A-Team B-Team experiment.138 Casey created further tension between himself and the CIA bureaucracy by appointing a rank outsider, Max Hugel, as his Deputy Director of Operations. Hugel's appointment alienated the CIA bureaucracy and chafed the feelings of the career operations personnel as he had not risen through the ranks nor did he have any previous intelligence experience. The whole issue was exacerbated when allegations pertaining to Hugel's former business dealings and insider trading were disclosed in public. This controversy further undermined morale within the CIA.139 Casey, a Brooklyn lawyer, felt at odds with the Ivy

league graduates of the Directorate of Intelligence.140

The relationship between the DCI and the Directorate of Intelligence was not harmonious. From the beginning Casey made a point of targeting the production of National Intelligence Estimates.141 He believed that analysts were too preoccupied with protecting their carreer and positions and that their analysis was too ambivalent and bereft of opinion. Casey reformed the format and style of NIEs by demanding that they be produced quicker, that the language be more

In 1976, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the PFIAB conducted an experiment aimed at evaluating the quality of collection and production of US intelligence on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions. The experiment comprised of a comparasion in the analysis of an NIE between the Directorate of Intelligence, known as the A-Team and three independent groups of outside academics, known as the B-Team. The exercise highlighted shortcomings in the CIA's analytical capabilities, particularly with regard to their ability to predict Soviet intentions. Unfortunately the whole exercise was compromised and politicised as a result of leaks to the press about the results. See the A-B Team Experiments in Competitive Estimating, 1976, Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1978)

139 Bob Woodward, (1987), op.cit:. pp.145-146

140 See Joseph E Persico, £1990), op.cit:. pp.217-222. This was also confirmed by Abraham Shulsky, senior researcher at the Rand Corporation, interview, on July 18, 1995, Washington D.C.

141 See David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.3. Also Robert A Manning, Steven Emerson and Charles Fenyvesi, "Casey's CIA: New Clout, New Danger," U.S. News & World Report, June 16, 1986, pp.24-31

declarative and the key evidence be highlighted.142 As an activist, Casey believed that intelligence analysis should be used as an instrument by the intelligence community towards influencing policy and used the Presidential Daily Briefings toward that objective.143

In its foreign policy initiative in the Middle East, the Reagan Administration viewed the Lebanon problem through the same lens as the East - West superpower relationship instead of in the context of the regional dynamics between Israel, Syria, Iran and the emergence of Shi'ite fundamentalism.144 The administration's focus upon the Soviet Union's role in the Middle East and international terrorism blinded administration officials to the local dynamics and the ambitions of these principal Middle Eastern actors and their role in Lebanon.145 The administration also failed to recognise Syria's determination to safeguard its political and security interests in Lebanon.146 In response to a question put to him concerning Syria's support for renegade elements of the PLO the Under Secretary of State for political affairs, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, replied that the State Department was confident that Syria had an appreciation of the U.S. political concerns in Lebanon.147 His statement is a reflection of the attitude that prevailed within the State Department and a view that was held personally by George Schultz. The Secretary of State firmly believed that Syria had seriously considered the commitment

See David Kennedy, (1988), op.cit:. p.3. 143 See Joseph E Persico, (1990), op.cit:, p.221

144 See Magnus Ranstorp, (1994), op.cit:, pp.300-301 also Robert Neumann, (Winter 1983), op.cit:. p.255

145 See Geoffrey Jansen, "Khomeinists on the March in Lebanon," Middle East International, No.230, (July 27, 1984), pp.15-16

146 See Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, "Operations Other Than War," in Paul Davis, (ed.), New Challenges For Defence Planning. (Santa Monica, California, Rand, 1994)

147 See U.S,Congress Hearing on the U.S. Embassy Bombing in Beirut, House of Representatives, Ninety-Eighth Congress, June 28, 1983, (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1983), p.13

and determination of the U.S. to achieve its policy objectives and that President Asad as well as Syria's allies would be intimidated by America's superpower status and corresponding military capability.148 What Schultz failed to grasp, however, was the fact that the U.S. military instruments of statecraft were ill-suited for applying coercion in the Lebanon environment.149 The effects of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its siege of Beirut upon the local Shi'ite population, were overlooked in the broader scheme of developments of the U.S. foreign policy in the region.150 Consequently the NSC failed to recognise the use of terrorism as an effective instrument of leverage in the hands of Syria, Iran and their Shi’ite fundamentalist allies in Lebanon.151 Despite the fact that, following the first embassy bombing the NSC staff tasked the intelligence community to concentrate its attention on Hizb'allah, none of the cabinet members paused to ask what the underlying motives for the attacks might be. The focus of the