Chapter two of this study is an attempt to integrate the theory of intelligence with that of crisis management. In this regard the study is different from conventional approaches which tend to discuss each concept separately and then endeavour a comparative analysis. It approaches the theories of crisis management, intelligence and the producer - consumer dichotomy on the basis of three concentric circles, in the same order, interrelated and linked to one another through the function of communication. Beginning with the theory and principles of crisis management, the third principle which is the intelligence imperative, provides a platform from which the function of intelligence, as a subsystem of the decision making system, is examined. Using the intelligence cycle as a framework, the loci of intelligence analysis during crisis situations is examined towards determining the changes in the cycle and the intelligence production process. The presence of intelligence as an essential support instrument throughout the crisis management process is explained. In analysing the function of intelligence, the third theoretical domain, the producer - consumer relationship which embodies the traditionalist and activist approaches is discussed. The definition and function of intelligence, the intelligence cycle paradigm, the analysis process, the politicisation of intelligence - which includes a discussion of the traditionalist and activist approaches - embodying opportunity analysis, are examined. This forms the background to the relationship between intelligence analysts, National Intelligence Officers, and decision makers. Understanding this relationship is fundamental towards comprehending the institutional dynamics which are omni-present throughout the case studies which are discussed in the following three chapters.
The third chapter examines two incidents, notably the terrorist attacks against the U.S. Embassy and the Marine Battalion Landing Team Barracks in Beirut by Hizb'allah. Whereas the study will attempt to identify the reasons why the administration and intelligence community failed to detect or deter these attacks, the primary objective is to examine the manner in which the Reagan Administration responded to these crises when evaluated against the integrated theory of intelligence and the principles of crisis management. The study analyses the interaction of the intelligence community in the process, as well as the factors and constraints which influenced U.S. policy initiatives in Lebanon. Furthermore, the operational capabilities of the intelligence community in the Lebanese environment and the ethos that prevailed among the intelligence community and between it and key cabinet members of the administration are analysed. An attempt is made to identify the crisis management style and the intelligence management discipline which influenced the relationship during the crises.
In chapter four the analysis focuses upon the impact and consequences of another bombing attack by Hizb'allah against U.S. interests and the kidnapping of the CIA Chief of Station, William Buckley. The case study will attempt to provide an insight into the manner in which the administration conducted its threat perception in relation to its adversaries, notably Hizb'allah, Syria and Iran. This chapter examines the impact of Hizb'allah's strategy of bombing and kidnapping upon the administration and the latter's capacity to respond effectively to terrorism. While it maintains the focus on the relationships between the intelligence community and the policy makers, the chapter examines the role and influence of the behaviour of the Director of Central Intelligence and the National Security Advisor on the producer - consumer relationship. It looks at how intelligence is used as a support mechanism in the application of the principles of crisis management in relation to Hizb'allah's sustained
assault against the administration's objectives in Lebanon. The study concentrates upon how intelligence tasking and analysis was influenced by its consumers.
Chapter five analyses the crisis management performance of the Reagan Administration in relation to the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the linkage between this crisis and the overarching hostage crisis in Lebanon. The philosophy of terrorism and government response is examined. The chapter will explore the inherent tensions that exist between supporting the authorities counter terrorist initiatives and protecting intelligence assets and methods. The influence of the media which exposes tensions between government response and civil liberties is examined and the relationship between the media and the intelligence community will also be analysed. The media's behaviour during the hijacking of flight TWA 847 will be examined to determine which extraneous factors influence intelligence and crisis management.
Chapter six draws conclusions from the preceding evaluation of the Lebanon crises. The chapter will endeavour to contribute toward a more appropriate and practical theoretical framework for the analysis of the intelligence producer - consumer relationship. Finally, this study will make recommendations for further academic endeavour in relation to crisis management and the function of intelligence. Before analysing the case studies, however, it is important to arrive at an understanding of how the concept of intelligence and the producer - consumer relationship relates to crisis management. This is the essence of the following chapter.
Chapter 2
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE AND