Section. A related British operation in WWI was run by a controversial military officer, Richard Meinertzhagen, who prepared a knapsack containing false military plans, which theOttomanallies of theGermanswere allowed to capture. The plans related to false British strategy for theSinai and Palestine Campaign, setting up a successful surprise attack in theBattle of Beershebaand theThird Battle of Gaza.
Active measures, however, reflected a national effort to influence other countries to act in concert with Soviet goals. These measures could involve state organizations up to and including the Politburo, much as the WWII British organization for strategic deception, theLondon Controlling Section, and its US counterpart, Joint Secu- rity Control, could get direct support from the head of government. Much of the Soviet responsibilities for ac- tive measures was focused in theKGB. Its “First Chief Directorate uses active measures such as agents of influ- ence, propaganda, and disinformation to promote Soviet goals.”
In the present political context of Western democracies, the sensitivity, and separation, of clandestine and open contacts do not lend themselves to the process of building agents of influence.
“Active measures is not exclusively an intelligence activ- ity, and in this sense it differs from the similar American concept of covert action. There are many differences be- tween active measures and covert action. One is the So- viet ability to mesh overt and covert influence activities through centralized coordination of party, government, and ostensibly private organizations dealing with foreign- ers. Despite interagency coordination mechanisms, the United States is too pluralistic to achieve full coordina- tion between all the overt and covert means of exercising influence abroad. Other major differences are in scope, intensity, and importance attributed to active measures and covert action, and in immunity from legal and politi- cal constraints.”
While deception and influence operations could involve the highest levels of Allied governments in WWII, it is worth noting that while the West generally speaks ofmilitary deception, strategic deception operates at a higher level. A Soviet, and presumably Russian, term of art,maskirovkaor 'denial and deception', is much broader than the current Western doctrine of deception being run by lower-level staff groups.
In the military, responsibility for maskirovka easily can be at the level of a deputy chief of the General Staff, who can call upon all levels of government.
Returning to KGB doctrine, presumably still present in the SVR, “Influence operations integrate Soviet views into foreign leadership groups. Propaganda operations take the form of disinformation articles placed in the foreign press. Disinformation operations are false doc- uments designed to incite enmity toward the United States.”
Russian concepts involve the full scope of grand strategy
“The Second Chief Directorate”, whose responsibilities are now primarily in the RussianFSB, is responsible for the recruitment of agents among foreigners stationed in the Soviet Union. The KGB influences these people un- wittingly, as most regard themselves too sophisticated to be manipulated.
“The second deception program is counterintelligence, which aims to neutralize the efforts of foreign intelligence services. It achieves this through the use of non-Soviet double agents and Soviet double agents. Non-Soviet dou- ble agents are foreign nationals who have been “turned”. A Soviet double agent is a Soviet with access to classi- fied information. These officials may be used as false defectors....[20]
“Influence operations integrate Soviet views into leader- ship groups. The agent of influence may be a well- placed, “trusted contact” who
• consciously serves Soviet interests on
some matters while retaining his integrity on others
• an unwitting contact who is manipulated
to take actions that advance Soviet inter- ests on specific issues of common con- cern.
8.5 Direct action services
There is no consensus on whether it is, or is not, advisable to intermingle espionage and direct action organizations, even at the headquarters level. SeeClandestine HUMINT and Covert Actionfor more history and detail. A termi- nology point: current US terminology, ignoring an occa- sional euphemism, has now consolidated espionage into
48 CHAPTER 8. CLANDESTINE HUMINT OPERATIONAL TECHNIQUES
the National Clandestine Services. These are part of the CIA Directorate of Operations, which has some respon- sibility forDirect Action(DA) andUnconventional War- fare(UW), although the latter two, when of any appre- ciable size, are the responsibility of the military. There is much more argument for doing so at headquar- ters, possibly not as one unit but with regular consultation. Certain services, such as name checks, communications, cover identities, and technical support may reasonably be combined, although the requirements of a particular field network should be held on a need-to-know basis. Other countries might have the functions under the same organization, but run them in completely different net- works. The only commonality they might have is emer- gency use of diplomatic facilities.
8.6 See also
• Tradecraft
• Undercover
8.7 References
[1] Paterson, Tony (25 November 2004),“Berlin plaque pays tribute to “Schindler of Stourbridge"", Independent, the
(London)
[2] Rogov, (GRUofficer) A.S., “Pitfalls of Civilian Cover”
(–SCHOLAR SEARCH), Studies in Intelligence (Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency)
[3] US Department of the Army (September 2006),FM 2- 22.3 (FM 34-52) Human Intelligence Collector Operations
(PDF), retrieved 2007-10-31
[4] Beller, Patrick R.,“The Life and Work of Stephan Haller”,
Studies in Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency)
[5] Suvorov, Victor (1984), “Chapter 6, The Practice of Agent Work”,Inside Soviet Military Intelligence, MacMil- lan Publishing Company
[6] US Department of Defense(12 July 2007),Joint Publi- cation 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms(PDF), retrieved 2007-10-01 [7] Carroll, Thomas Patrick (5 September 2006),Human In-
telligence: From Sleepers to Walk-ins(PDF)
[8] Prouty, L. Fisher (1973),The Secret Team: The CIA and Its Allies in Control of the United States and the World, Prentice-Hall,ISBN 0-13-798173-2
[9] “R.F. Bennett”.
[10] U.S. Department of Justice,Commission for Review of FBI Security Programs (March 2002),A Review of FBI Security Programs
[11] “Agent Radio Operation During World War II”, Studies in
Intelligence
[12] Begoum, F.M. (18 September 1995), “Observations on the Double Agent”, Studies in Intelligence, retrieved 3 November 2007
[13] Bekrenev, (GRU officer) L. K., Operational Contacts
(–SCHOLAR SEARCH), Center for the Study of In-
telligence, Central Intelligence Agency
[14] Hall, Roger (1957), You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dag-
ger, W. W. Norton & Co.
[15] Decision Support Systems, Inc.“An Analysis of Al-Qaida Tradecraft”. Retrieved 2007-11-19.
[16] John Barron (1974), KGB: the secret work of Soviet secret
agents, Readers Digest Press
[17] David Kahn (1974), The Codebreakers: The Story of Se-
cret Writing, Macmillan,ISBN 0025604600
[18] National Security Agency. “VENONA”. Archived from
the originalon 2007-10-28. Retrieved 2007-11-18. [19] The SSTR-6 and SSTC-502 - “Joan-Eleanor”, 2007, re-
trieved 2007-11-17
[20] Edward J. Campbell. “Soviet Strategic Intelligence De- ception Organizations”.
Chapter 9
Concealment device
Concealment devices or diversion safes are used to hide things for the purpose ofsecrecyorsecurity. They are made from an ordinary household object such as a book, a soda can, a candle, a can, or something as small as a coin. The idea is that such an inconspicuous object would not be expected to contain anything of worth.Examples inespionageincludedead drop spikesfor trans- ferring items to other people, and hollowed-out coins or hollowed out teeth for concealing something - such as mi- crofilm or asuicidepill. Examples insmugglinginclude suitcaseswithfalse bottomsfor hidingcontraband. During World War II MI9 was responsible for creat- ing many concealment devices for “escape aids” to assist prisoners of warto escape.
9.1 Examples
9.1.1
Ammunition
Starting in the First World War and still continuing today, military personnel use ammunition casings to hide small amounts of critical information e.g. encryp- tion/recognition codes or navigational grid references etc. The hiding place is very easy to prepare: the bullet is removed from thecartridge and the propellant powder poured away. A small piece of paper with writing on it can be stored inside. Given that ammunition can be found everywhere in a combat zone, it is very easy to hide or dis- card such items because they blend in easily. Similarly, if a soldier is captured, the enemy expects that soldiers will have ammunition in their pockets, so little attention is paid, beyond confiscating and discarding it.
9.1.2
Books
Main article:Concealing objects in a book
Booksare possibly the most common concealment de- vices in usage. They are easily made and can contain quite large objects. They are also very difficult for outsiders to spot but easy to recognize for those that are looking for a specific book on a shelf.
9.1.3 Candles
A new type, the hollow candle looks like a large scented candlebut is mostly hollow. The bottom comes off and rolled papers or small objects can be placed and hidden inside. Some of the most clever of these contraptions looked like large, ordinary black candles with a felt base concealing the opening. To open them, two metal needles are poked through the felt at certain points and an electric current passed through, causing them to open.
9.1.4 Cans and jars
Also a new form of concealment device, mock cans of various household chemicals or food and drinks can be purchased. A wide variety of commonly used personal care, household products and food containers with re- movable tops and bottoms are available. Valuables can be discreetly stored inside these lookalike containers and kept in their seemingly rightful places. Each of these di- version safes are indistinguishable from the genuine prod- uct, and can thus avoid detection, and they may even be weighted to feel full.[1]
9.1.5 Coins
American dollar coin used for concealment
50 CHAPTER 9. CONCEALMENT DEVICE
A hollow container, fashioned to look like an Eisenhower dollar, is still used today to hide and send messages or film without being detected. Because it resembles ordinary pocket change, it is virtually undetectable as a conceal- ment device. If a hollow coin is suspected, it sometimes can be easily confirmed by weighing against a normal coin on a simple balance. However, more sophisticated hollow coins have had their weight adjusted to match an unal- tered coin by including a ring of a dense metal such as lead inside the coin. Typically coins that have no gold or silver content are used so as to further avoid suspicion. Such hollow coins were created from two ordinary coins, bymillingout one face and the interior of both coins (to create a cavity), and the edges of one (so it could slide into the other). The half coin with intact edges would also have a pin-prick size hole drilled through its face, so the device could be opened by inserting a pin. A scratch may be added to help line up the faces while clos- ing it—although it is very difficult to detect a slight mis- alignment by casual inspection. A device of this nature was famously discovered by a paper boy in the "Hollow Nickel Case".U-2pilotFrancis Gary Powerswas issued with a hollow silver dollar containing a tiny, saxitoxin- impregnated needle,[2] to be used tocommit suicidein case of capture by enemy forces.
9.1.6
Diversion safe
A device whereby a safe-looking safe is left open but has a hidden compartment (e.g., in the door) where small valu- able articles can be hidden. As an alternative variant, a safe may be “stocked” with some lesser valuables, with the expectation that it will be burgled, but that the real safe or hiding place for the important valuables will be missed.
9.1.7
Electrical outlet
A fake electrical outlet, which can be pulled out from the wall and which contains a hidden compartment for stor- age.
9.1.8
Painting
Thin objects such as papers/money can be concealed in or behind theframeof apainting.
9.1.9 Computers and consumer electronics
Computer equipment and consumer electronics can eas- ily be used for concealing goods and information. Usu- ally the only tool required is a screwdriver, the device can be opened up, have the majority of the electronic and mechanical components removed and replaced with the
goods to be concealed. Some of the more common de- vices used for this purpose are video players such as VHS, DVD and Blu-ray players, computer accessories such as DVD-ROM drives and hard disk drives, battery packs or even a laptop computer itself. More often than not, the majority of the components will be removed to allow more space to conceal an item, but that will render the device inoperable and may arouse suspicion, and it may be of more benefit to preserve the operation of the device at the sacrifice of space. Additionally, the electronic de- vice itself may be subject to theft, thereby defeating the purpose of such a concealment device.
9.2 See also
• Rudolph Abel
• Dead drop
9.3 References
[1] Diversion Safesat theWayback Machine(archived Febru- ary 21, 2009)
[2] Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents. Church Commit- teeReports 1. The Assassination Archives and Research Center (AARC). 1975-176. p. 7. Check date values in: |date= (help)
Chapter 10
Cryptography
“Secret code” redirects here. For the Aya Kamiki album, seeSecret Code.
“Cryptology” redirects here. For the David S. Ware al- bum, seeCryptology (album).
Cryptography (or cryptology; fromGreek κρυπτός
German Lorenz ciphermachine, used inWorld War IIto encrypt very-high-levelgeneral staffmessages
kryptós, “hidden, secret"; andγράφεινgraphein, “writ-
ing”, or-λογία -logia, “study”, respectively)[1]is the prac- tice and study of techniques for secure communication in the presence of third parties (called adversaries).[2] More generally, it is about constructing and analyzing protocols that block adversaries;[3] various aspects in information securitysuch as dataconfidentiality,data in- tegrity, authentication, and non-repudiation[4] are cen- tral to modern cryptography. Modern cryptography ex- ists at the intersection of the disciplines ofmathematics, computer science, and electrical engineering. Appli- cations of cryptography includeATM cards, computer passwords, andelectronic commerce.
Cryptography prior to the modern age was effectively synonymous withencryption, the conversion of informa- tion from a readable state to apparent nonsense. The originator of an encrypted message shared the decoding technique needed to recover the original information only with intended recipients, thereby precluding unwanted persons from doing the same. SinceWorld War Iand the advent of thecomputer, the methods used to carry out cryptology have become increasingly complex and its
application more widespread.
Modern cryptography is heavily based on mathematical theory and computer science practice; cryptographic al- gorithms are designed aroundcomputational hardness as- sumptions, making such algorithms hard to break in prac- tice by any adversary. It is theoretically possible to break such a system, but it is infeasible to do so by any known practical means. These schemes are therefore termed computationally secure; theoretical advances, e.g., im- provements ininteger factorizationalgorithms, and faster computing technology require these solutions to be con- tinually adapted. There exist information-theoretically secureschemes that provably cannot be broken even with unlimited computing power—an example is theone-time pad—but these schemes are more difficult to implement than the best theoretically breakable but computationally secure mechanisms.
The growth of cryptographic technology has raised a number of legal issues in the information age. Cryptogra- phy’s potential for use as a tool forespionageandsedition has led many governments to classify it as a weapon and to limit or even prohibit its use and export.[5]In some juris- dictions where the use of cryptography is legal, laws per- mit investigators tocompel the disclosureof encryption keys for documents relevant to an investigation.[6]Cryp- tography also plays a major role indigital rights manage- mentandpiracyof digital media.[7]
10.1 Terminology
Until modern times cryptography referred almost exclu- sively to encryption, which is the process of converting ordinary information (called plaintext) into unintelligi- ble text (calledciphertext).[8] Decryption is the reverse, in other words, moving from the unintelligible cipher- text back to plaintext. A cipher (or cypher) is a pair ofalgorithmsthat create the encryption and the revers- ing decryption. The detailed operation of a cipher is controlled both by the algorithm and in each instance by a "key". This is a secret (ideally known only to the communicants), usually a short string of characters, which is needed to decrypt the ciphertext. Formally, a
52 CHAPTER 10. CRYPTOGRAPHY
"cryptosystem" is the ordered list of elements of finite possible plaintexts, finite possible cyphertexts, finite pos- sible keys, and the encryption and decryption algorithms which correspond to each key. Keys are important both formally and in actual practice, as ciphers without vari- able keys can be trivially broken with only the knowl- edge of the cipher used and are therefore useless (or even counter-productive) for most purposes. Historically, ci- phers were often used directly for encryption or decryp- tion without additional procedures such asauthentication or integrity checks.
Incolloquialuse, the term "code" is often used to mean any method of encryption or concealment of meaning. However, in cryptography, code has a more specific meaning. It means the replacement of a unit of plaintext (i.e., a meaningful word or phrase) with acode word(for example, “wallaby” replaces “attack at dawn”). Codes are no longer used in serious cryptography—except inci- dentally for such things as unit designations (e.g., Bronco Flight or Operation Overlord)—since properly chosen ci- phers are both more practical and more secure than even the best codes and also are better adapted tocomputers.