7.3 Separate
functions
during
peacetime?
There is an enormous difference in DA/UW during an overt war and in peacetime. “The covert operations con- ducted during the war did not have to be unattributable. On the contrary; saboteurs, for example, in order to avoid precipitating reprisals on the local population, would leave behind evidence which tended to indicate that [ex- ternal] agents were responsible. Security and secrecy were important, but only tactically important.” It was im- portant that the [enemy] should not know the identities and homes of the resistance workers, but it never mat- tered at all that the [enemy] should know that operations were directed from outside occupied territory (i.e., the operations were covert, not clandestine). Publicizing the external support, in fact, helped the underground in its recruiting.
7.3.1
UK postwar change
“In time of peace ... governments cannot acknowledge the fact that they are undertaking clandestine operations, there has been déveloped a whole new, delicate tech- nique, the technique of nonattributability. A successful nonattributable operation is a long, tedious, touchy, and complicated affair which, the British recognized, not only requires background intelligence but, more importantly, cannot be undertaken except by experienced case offi- cers.
“Thus the SOE-SIS disharmony and its consequences led the British to a firm postwar conviction—that a single ser- vice should be responsible for all clandestine and covert activity undertaken by the nation.”
“Although the British special operations organization was independent of MI6 from 1940 to the end of the war, MI6 had the responsibility for these operations before that pe- riod and has had it since, and second, that the record of the wartime SOE, although it scored some brilliant successes, was over all not such as to inspire emulation. Some of its most conspicuous failures are directly trace- able to its separation from theSecret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and the BritishSecurity Service(MI5).”[9]
SOE abolished; partial reabsorption by SIS
While SOE was abolished after World War II, SIS, in 1946, absorbed selected SOE personnel and organiza- tions, to form a new SIS section called the Directorate of War Planning (D/WP). D/WP had the SIS general char- ter for special operations, and liaison with UK and allied special operations forces. D/WP, however, was replaced, in 1953, by the Special Political Action Section (SPA), known[1] as the “jolly fun tricks department”, and op- erated until being shut down in the mid-seventies. SPA
could call on SAS, outside contractors, or other UK mil- itary personnel.
UK Military Special Forces
It was at this stage that the relationship with the SAS, sec- onded and retired, as well as a number of 'private' special- ist companies became ever more important and by 1987 a Special Forces Directorate was formed to coordinate the activities of the SAS and SBS and ensure closer collabo- ration with the SIS.[1]
United Kingdom Special Forces(UKSF) was formed in 1987 to draw together the Army’s Special Air Service (SAS) and the Special Boat Squadron Royal Marines (SBS), which was renamed the Special Boat Service at the same time, into a unified command, based around the former Director SAS who was given the additional title of Director Special Forces. The Directorate has been ex- panded by the creation of the Joint Special Forces Avia- tion Wing, the Special Reconnaissance Regiment and the Special Forces Support Group.
Current SIS paramilitary capabilities
Britain certainly uses military special operations forces directly, but, by 2003, they had a working relationship with SIS to assist the General Support Branch (GSB). GSB is a coordinating rather than an operational branch, which allows it to call upon 22Special Air ServiceReg- iment (especially its Counter-Revolutionary Wing), the RAF “S&D” flight, and M Troop (counter-terror) of the Special Boat Service(SBS).[1]
RAF S&D pilots are qualified to fly special operations versions of theC-130Hercules andPuma helicopter. SIS can also call on theSpecial Reconnaissance Regi- ment, which absorbed14 Intelligence Companyas well as Intelligence Corps and Royal Military Police person- nel, including female officers.
7.3.2 US postwar change
Immediately after World War II, a number of groups were broken up, and bureaucratically housed in an assortment of interim organizations. The OSS was broken up shortly after World War II, on September 20, 1945, with func- tions scattering into a series of interim organizations:
• OSS X-2 (counterintelligence) and Secret Intelligence (i.e., clandestine HUMINT) went into the Strategic Services Unit(SSU) of the (then) War Department. The covert action and black propaganda functions, however, split off in 1948.
32 CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION
• Paramilitary direct action (DA) and psychological operationswere in a series of interim organizations, becoming the Office of Policy Coordination(OPC) in 1948.
• Research and Analysis went to the De-
partment of State.
Even before the OPC split, the SSU was an organizational anomaly, since it reported to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, rather than G-2, the Intelligence Di- rectorate of the Army Staff.[10]
In January 1946, President Truman, who was concerned with “building up a Gestapo”[11]and distrustedWilliam Donovan, head of the OSS, created the Central Intelli- gence Group (CIG) which was the direct precursor to the CIA.[10] The assets of the SSU, which now constituted a streamlined “nucleus” of clandestine intelligence was transferred to the CIG in mid-1946 and reconstituted as the Office of Special Operations (OSO).
CIA (1947)
TheNational Security Act of 1947created theCentral In- telligence Agencyas the successor to the OSS and Amer- ica’s first peacetime intelligence agency.
The Act also merged the Department of War and the Department of the Navyinto a singleNational Military Establishment, which was later renamed theDepartment of Defensein 1949. (OPC, however, remained outside the Department of Defense).
The Act also formalized several national security insti- tutions, including theNational Security Council(NSC), the modernJoint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of Emer- gency Preparedness (OEP), the precursor to theFederal Emergency Management Agency(FEMA),
OPC, OSO and interim covert solutions 1948-1951 U.S. covert psychological operations and paramilitary ac- tions organizations, formerly in the OSS, went into a unit called the Office of Special Projects, and then renamed theOffice of Policy Coordination(OPC) from the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) until the two were merged in 1951. OPC was created in 1948 by the National Se- curity Council under a document called NSC 10/2. The OPC’s directors included representatives of the State and Defense departments and the CIA. It was largely admin- istered and supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency .[12]
While State and the intelligence community wanted to avoid covert operations, there was a quite different per- spective among the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 17 August 1948, JCS memorandum 1807/1 went to the Secretary of Defense.[13]Its recommendations included:
• “The United States should provide it-
self with the organization and the means of supporting foreign resistance move- ments in guerrilla warfare to the advan- tage of United States national security during peace and war.
• “Guerrilla warfare should be supported
under policy direction of NSC.
• “Agencies for conducting guerrilla war-
fare can be established by adding to the CIA’s special operations functions the re- sponsibility for supporting foreign resis- tance movements and by authorizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to engage in the con- duct of such operations. Primary inter- est in guerrilla warfare should be that of CIA in peacetime and [Department of Defense] in wartime.
• "A separate guerrilla warfare school and corps should not be established[emphasis
added]. Instead, [Department of De- fense], in coordination with State De- partment and CIA, should select person- nel, give them necessary training in estab- lished Army schools, supplemented by courses in other military and State De- partment schools.
Korean War Paramilitary Operations
When the Korean War broke out in 1950,United States Army Special Forceswere not yet operational. Paramil- itary functions in Korea suffered from bureaucratic in- fighting between the Army’s G-2 intelligence division, and CIA. A heavily redacted history of CIA operations in Korea[14]indicates that the agency used US Far East Air Force resources, eventually designated “Flight B” of the Fifth Air Force. This unit provided air support for both military and CIA special operations. When CIA gueril- las were attacked in 1951-1952, the air unit had to adapt frequently changing schedules. According to the CIA his- tory, “The US Air Force-CIA relationship during the war was particularly profitable, close, and cordial.”
Unconventional warfare, but not HUMINT, worked smoothly with the Army. Korea had been divided into CIA and Army regions, with the CIA in the extreme northeast, and the Army in the West.
In addition to its own resources, the Eighth US Army Korea (EUSAK) G-3 Operations Division had approxi- mately 8,000 South Korean guerillas, who formed as a
levée en masse. The Army guerillas, however, had no bases on the Korean mainland, and their island support bases were largely wiped out by 1952. CIA advisors worked with the Army guerillas between January and April 1952, and the history treats the relationship as co- operative.
7.3. SEPARATE FUNCTIONS DURING PEACETIME? 33
During the Korean War,United Nations Partisan Forces Koreaoperated on islands and behind enemy lines. These forces were also known as the 8086th Army Unit, and then as the Far East Command Liaison Detachment, Ko- rea, FECLD-K 8240th AU. These troops directed North Korea’s partisans in raids, harassment of supply lines and the rescue of downed pilots. Since the initial Special Forces unit, 10 Special Forces Group (Airborne) was ac- tivated on 19 June 1952, but the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, Army Special Forces did not operate as a unit in that war. Experience gained in that war, however, influenced the development of Special Forces doctrine.
General US flow from wartime OSS to 1952
While GeneralCharles A. Willoughby, intelligence of- ficer (G-2) atDouglas MacArthur's headquarters asked CIA, in the absence of an Army HUMINT function, to establishspecial reconnaissance(SR) teams. This worked until the ceasefire talks began, but the CIA history speaks of severe conflict with G-2 over support resources and security. There was a continuing tension over CIA pro- viding tactical support to EUSAK, and carrying out its national-level missions. The Army and CIA never worked out effective counterintelligence cooperation.
PWD and the Creation of US Army Special Forces After World War II, the regular Army had a largesse of officers that had successfully run large UW operations, without any doctrine to guide them. The Army also had strong psychological operations capabilities, and a new Army Staff element was created to manage them. During World War II, thePsychological Warfare Divi- sion(PWD) of theSupreme Headquarters Allied Expe- ditionary Force(SHAEF) was created to conduct overt psychological warfare against German troops in Europe. A joint UK-US organization, it was commanded by US Brigadier-GeneralRobert A. McClure.[15]McClure had commanded psychological operations in North Africa, again under the command ofDwight D. Eisenhower, and enjoyed his confidence. SHAEF PWD’s staff came from the US Office of War Information (OWI), the US OSS, and the British PWE.
After the end of the war, the US Army created a PWD. While there had been pressure to put PWD under the newly revitalized Intelligence Division, McClure was strongly opposed.
“A great part of my difficulty in carrying out what I felt was my mission was with G-2. The G 2’s all felt that they had a monopoly on intel- ligence and were reluctant in the earlier stages to give any of that intelligence to Psychological Warfare knowing that it would be broadcast or used in print.[13]
There was also a sensitivity about providing intelligence to units working behind enemy lines and subject to cap- ture. McClure believed that PWD either should report to Operations, or, as was eventually done, as a special staff for the Chief of Staff.
While McClure himself was a psychological operations specialist, his work with OSS had made him appreciative of UW. Since no other Army agency seemed interested in the UW mission, McClure was granted staff authority over UW, with a mission to:
“formulate and develop psychological warfare and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policy and to rec- ommend policies for and supervise the execu- tion of Department of the Army programs in these fields.”
OPCW had three major divisions:
• Psychological Warfare • Requirements
• Special Operations. The latter was par-
ticularly significant, because it formu- lated plans for creation of the US Army’s first formal unconventional warfare capa- bility: Special Forces.
McClure brought officers with World War II or Korean War experience in UW or long-range penetration, in- cluding COLAaron Bank, LTC Russell Volckmann, and CPT Donald Blackburn. Bank had been assigned to the OSS and fought with the French Maquis. Volckmann and Blackburn had both been guerillas in the Philippines, and Volckman had also led UW in Korea. McClure saw one of his responsibilities as “selling” UW, in spite of resistance from the Army and CIA. He was able to re- cruit qualified personnel from the Ranger units that had been disbanded in Korea. With personnel spaces avail- able from disbanding the Ranger companies in Korea, the Army activated Special Forces in early 1952.
Special Forces, both in their original form and as a com- ponent of the currentUnited States Special Operations
34 CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION
Command, have provided the nucleus of US paramilitary capabilities, both under direct military, CIA, and joint control. Some Special Forces personnel left the Army and went to work as CIA employees.
The US Special Forces was established out of several spe- cial operations units that were active during World War II. Formally, its lineage comes from the1st Special Service Force (Devil’s Brigade), but that unit was more aSpecial Reconnaissance (SR)andDirect Action (DA)command, which operated in uniform without augmentation by local soldiers.
Some of theOffice of Strategic Servicesunits have much more similarity, in mission, with the original Army Spe- cial Forces mission, Unconventional Warfare (UW), or acting as cadre to train and lead guerillas in occupied countries. The Special Forces motto, de oppresso liber (Latin: “To free from oppression”) reflects this historical mission ofguerilla warfareagainst an occupier. Specifi- cally, the 3-manOperation Jedburghunits provided lead- ership to French Resistance units. The larger OSS Oper- ational Groups (OG) were more associated with SR/DA missions, although they did work with Resistance units. COLAaron Bank, commander of the first Special Forces group, served in OSS during World War II. Other OSS guerilla units included Detachment 101 in Burma, un- der theChina-Burma-India Theater, which, among other missions, screened the larger Ranger unit,Merrill’s Ma- rauders
Douglas MacArthur did not want the OSS to operate in his South West Pacific theater of operations ,[16] so paramilitary operations there were at first ad hoc, formed by Filipinos, with Americans who refused to surrender. While Fil-American guerilla operations in the Japanese- occupied Philippines are not part of the direct lineage of Army Special Forces, some of the early Special Forces leadership were involved in advising and creating the modern organization.
US Army Special Forces (SF) are, along with psycho- logical operations detachments and Rangers, the old- est of the post-World War II Army units in the cur- rent United States Special Operations Command (US- SOCOM). Their original mission was to train and lead Unconventional Warfare(UW) forces, or a guerilla force in an occupied nation. 10th Special Forces Group was the first deployed unit, intended to operate UW forces behind enemy lines in the event of aWarsaw Pactinvasion of Western Europe. As the US become involved in South- east Asia, it was realized that specialists trained to lead guerillas also could help defend against hostile guerillas, so SF acquired the additional mission ofForeign Internal Defense (FID), working with Host Nation (HN) forces in a spectrum of counterguerilla activities from indirect support to combat command.
The Cold War CIA takes shape
In 1952, the OPC and OSO, along with assorted sup- port offices, were merged to what was originally called the “Directorate of Plans”, then, more honestly, the “Di- rectorate of Operations.” It has recently been reorganized into theNational Clandestine Service.