French operations

The Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE)[28] _{is responsible for intelligence analysis} and clandestine collection, but also has an operations division and an action service within it, the Division Action. TheSinking of the Rainbow Warrior, a covert action againstGreenpeace, was an example of no service being perfect.

Note that the French worked closely withOperation Jed- burghduring World War II. Some 3-man Jedburgh teams had a French, US, and UK member.

7.6 References

[1] “SIS Paramilitary/Covert Action Sections”. 2004-06-01. Retrieved 2007-12-08.

[2] “Secret Intelligence Service MI6 - UK Intelligence Agen- cies”. 2004-01-17. Retrieved 2007-12-08.

[3] Manget, Frederic F. (1996),“Intelligence and the Rise of Judicial Intervention: Another System of Oversight”,

Studies in Intelligence

[4] Ellis, Earl H.(23 July 1921),Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia, retrieved 2007-11-01

[5] Kennan, George F.(May 4, 1948).“Policy Planning Staff Memorandum: The inauguration of organized political warfare”. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945–

1950 Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment.

[6] John,Jessica Ryane (2006-01-30).“A Difference with (or without) Distinction: Evading Congressional Oversight of Covert Action through the Use of Special Operations Forces”(PDF). George Washington University.

[7] Kahn, David(1996). The Codebreakers - The Story of

Secret Writing. Scribners.ISBN 0-684-83130-9. Kahn. [8] “Secret Intelligence Service MI6”. Retrieved 2007-12-08. [9] Riffice, Albert E. (18 September 1995),“Intelligence and Covert Action”(–SCHOLAR SEARCH_{), Studies in}

Intelligence, retrieved 2007-11-18

[10] Finnegan, John Patrick (1998). “Chapter 7: The Cold War and Korea”. Army Lineage Series, Military Intelli- gence. United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 60-13.

[11] Taylor, Karen M. (2003).“Identifying the Traitor among Us: The Rhetoric of Espionage and Secrecy”(PDF). Uni- versity of Pittsburgh. Retrieved 2007-12-08.

[12] Berger, D. H,The Use of Covert Paramilitary Activity as a Policy Tool: An Analysis of Operations Conducted by the United States Central Intelligence Agency, 1949-1951, Marine Corps Command and Staff College

[13] Paddock, Alfred H. Jr (1982).US Army Special Warfare: Its Origins. Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952(PDF). National Defense University Press. [14] Central Intelligence Agency (17 July 1968),Clandestine

Services History: The Secret War in Korea 1950-1952

(PDF), retrieved 2007-12-06

[15] Paddock, Alfred H. Jr.,Major General Robert Alexis Mc- Clure: Forgotten Father of US Army Special Warfare, re- trieved 2007-12-09

[16] Finnegan, John Patrick (1998). “Chapter 6: World War II Intelligence in the Field”. Military Intelligence. Army Lineage Series. United States Army Center of Military History.

[17] Kennedy, John F.(1961-06-28),National Security Action Memorandum No. 57: Responsibility for Paramilitary Op- erations, retrieved 2007-11-21

7.6. REFERENCES 37

[18] Kelley, Danny M. II (2005), The Misuse of the Stud- ies and Observation Group as a National Asset in Viet- nam, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, retrieved 2007-11-21

[19] Shultz, Richard H., Jr. (1999). The Secret War Against

Hanoi. HarperCollins.

[20] Nixon, Richard M.(February 17, 1980),National Security Decision Memorandum 40: Responsibility for the Conduct, Supervision and Coordination of Covert Action Operations

[21] Central Intelligence Agency,“Support to Military Opera- tions”, 2002 Annual Report, retrieved 2007-12-19 [22] Gordon, Michael R.; Trainor, Bernard E. (1995). The

Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf.

Little, Brown and Company.

[23] Rosenau, William (2000),Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War. U.S. Air Ground Operations Against the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 1966-1972(PDF), RAND Corpo- ration, retrieved 2007-11-11

[24] Ripley, Tim, Scud Hunting: Counter-force Operations against Theatre Ballistic Missiles(PDF), Centre for De- fence and International Security Studies, Lancaster Uni- versity, retrieved 2007-11-11

[25] Waller, Douglas C. (1994). The Commandos: The Inside

Story of America’s Secret Soldiers. Dell Publishing.

[26] Suvorov, Viktor(1990). SPETSNAZ: The Inside Story Of

The Special Soviet Special Forces. Pocket. ISBN 0-671- 68917-7.

[27] Tucker, Jonathan B. (March 2003),“Strategies for Coun- tering Terrorism: Lessons from the Israeli Experience1”,

Journal of Homeland Security (Homeland Security Insti-

tute)

[28] DGSE - General Directorate for External Security; Di- rection Generale de la Securite Exterieure, Federation of American Scientists

• • • •

Chapter 8

Clandestine HUMINT operational

techniques

The Clandestine HUMINT page deals with the func- tions of that discipline, including espionage and active counterintelligence. This page deals with Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques, also called “trade- craft”. It applies to clandestine operations for espionage, and for a clandestine phase prior todirect action (DA) orunconventional warfare(UW). Clandestine HUMINT sources may also act as local guides forspecial reconnais- sance(SR).

Many of the techniques here are important in counterintelligence. Defensive counterintelligence personnel need to know them to recognize espionage, sabotage, etc. in process. Offensive counterintelligence specialists may actually use them against foreign in- telligence services (FIS). While DA and UW can be conducted by national military or paramilitary organi- zations, al-Qaeda and similar non-state militant groups appear to use considerably different clandestine cell systemstructure, for command, control, and operations, than do national forces. Cell systems are evolving to more decentralized models, sometimes because they are enabled by new forms of electronic communications. This page deals primarily with one’s own assets. See double agentfor additional information adversary sources that a country has turned to its own side.

8.1 Staff and Skills in a Clandes-

tine HUMINT Operations Sta-

tion

This description is based around the foreign intelligence service, of country B, operating in and against country A. It may also include operations against non-state organi- zations operating in country B, with or without country B support. It may also involve offensive counterintelli- gence against country D assets operating in country B. The basic structure here can be pertinent to a domestic service operating against a non-national group within its borders. Depending on the legal structure of the coun-

try, there may be significant, or very few, restrictions on domestic HUMINT. The most basic question will be whether criminal prosecution, or stopping operations, is the goal. Typically, criminal prosecution will be the pri- mary goal against drug and slavery groups, with break- ing up their operations the secondary goal. These priori- ties, however, are apt to reverse in dealing with terrorist groups.

If there are separate organizations with diplomatic and nonofficial cover, there may be two chiefs. Sufficiently large stations may have several independent, compart- mented groups.