mand, short of war, to achieve its national ob- jectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures ..., and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign ele- ments, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.
“Understanding the concept of political war- fare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of political warfare--one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as politi- cal warfare. Covert operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are rela- tively unfamiliar to this Government.
“Having assumed greater international respon- sibilities than ever before in our history and having been engaged by the full might of the Kremlin’s political warfare, we cannot afford to leave unmobilized our resources for covert political warfare. We cannot afford in the fu- ture, in perhaps more serious political crises, to scramble into impromptu covert operations... The principle of Kennan’s proposal was regarded favor- ably by all of the agencies discussing it, but none wanted control due to the potential embarrassment of having an operation compromised. As the junior agency, CIA lost the bureaucratic fight, and received, In 1948 National Se- curity Council Directive 10/2 formed, from some interim organizations, theOffice of Policy Coordination, respon- sible for covert operations. .[6]The Office of Special Op- erations had been autonomously doing clandestine intelli- gence gathering, and, in 1952,Director of Central Intel- ligence Walter Bedell Smithjoined the two to form the euphemistically named Directorate of Plans.
In the US more than in other countries, there is a con- tinuing battle between military and intelligence organi- zations, with different oversight procedures, about who should control covert action. Far from being avoided as it was in 1948, organizations actively want authority over it.
Both among intelligence and special operations organiza- tions, there are a variety of views of whether covert and clandestine activities should be in the same organization. Those that argue for complete separation tend to be from the clandestine side, and distrustful of the ability of covert action organizations to maintain the appropriate level of secrecy. On the other hand, there have been cases where covert and clandestine organizations, unaware of one an- other, approach the same target in different ways, with
both failing due to interference. As an example, OSS attempted to steal or copy a codebook from the World War II Japanese embassy inLisbon, Portugal. [7] Their actions were discovered, and the Japanese changed the code. Unfortunately, the clandestine communications in- telligence organization had broken the code and were rou- tinely reading traffic in it. The OSS action required them to start all over again in cryptanalyzing the new system. There is no consensus on whether it is, or is not, advisable to intermingle espionage and covert action organizations, even at the headquarters level. There is much more ar- gument for doing so at headquarters, possibly not as one unit but with regular consultation. Certain services, such as name checks, communications, cover identities, and technical support may reasonably be combined, although the requirements of a particular field network should be held on a need-to-know basis.
If the OSS operatives in Lisbon had asked permission for their proposed operation against the Japanese, their op- eration would not have been approved. They might have guessed the reason, but would not have known. On the other hand, if headquarters approval is necessary for ev- ery action, some fleeting opportunities may be missed. Further, if the communications used to contact headquar- ters are compromised, the enemy could learn about all upcoming operations.
7.2 Surging additional capability
for the Second World War
During World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- publics, the United Kingdom, and the United States all formed ad hoc organizations forunconventional warfare (UW),psychological operationsanddirect action(DA) functions. Other countries, such as occupied France, formed related units under their governments in exile. There was close cooperation between the US and UK spe- cial operations, counterintelligence, and deception orga- nizations. Cooperation was less tight between the more sensitive clandestine intelligence gatherers.
Rough US-UK wartime equivalents
None of these new organizations continued to function, in the same form, after World War II ended. Many of their personnel, techniques, and operations continued, but in reorganized form during official peace, and very real Cold War.
30 CHAPTER 7. CLANDESTINE HUMINT AND COVERT ACTION
7.2.1
United Kingdom World War II Op-
erations
TheMinistry of Economic Warfarewas a wartime op- eration responsible for UW/DA, economic warfare, and psychological operations. It contained theSpecial Oper- ations Executive(SOE) andPolitical Warfare Executive. While Section D of SIS became the nucleus of SOE, in World War II, the British separated the unconventional warfare from SIS, putting it into SOE .[8]It has been the conventional wisdom that this is the basic British doc- trine, but, as with so many things in the clandestine and covert worlds, it is not that straightforward .[9]
World War II wartime & permanent UK
SOE conducted competent training in parachuting, sab- otage, irregular warfare, etc. It could check language and marksmanship skills, as well as examining clothing and personal effects for anything that could reveal British manufacture, SOE trained agents in the distinguishing uniforms, insignia, and decorations of the Germans, “But it could not teach them the organization, modus operandi, and psychology of the German intelligence and security services; and it did not call upon the MI-5 and MI-6 ex- perts who did know the subject...”[9]those services also were reluctant to provide SOE with access to their own sensitive sources. While isolating SOE from the clandes- tine services provided some mutual passive security, it also failed to provide proactive counterintelligence. “The consequences of this shortcoming are evident in the German counterintelligence coups in France, Belgium, and Holland...While the Security Service maintained an extensive name index, the Registry (partially destroyed by German bombing, but otherwise irreplaceable), SOE apparently did not maintain a counterintelligence index against which prospective field recruits could be checked. SOE received help from the British police, but not the security experts.
“At the end of the war the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff agreed to return the responsibility for covert op- erations to the jurisdiction of the Secret Intelligence Ser- vice. There were three reasons for the change: to ensure that secret intelligence and special operations were the re- sponsibility of a single organization under a single author-
ity; to prevent duplication, wasted effort, crossing of op- erational wires, friction, and consequent insecurity; and to tailor the size of the covert action staff to the greatly reduced scale of peacetime needs. The peacetime condi- tion also added a new factor which greatly increased the importance of consolidation.[9]
Before World War II, paramilitary and covert action ca- pabilities were the responsibility of the variously named Organs of State Security.
7.2.2 United States World War II opera-
tions
Prior to World War II, the US had no standing paramili- tary or espionage services. Missions were taken on a case- by-case basis, such as MajorEarl Hancock Ellis' survey of potential Japanese bases in Micronesia .[4]
During World War II, the USOffice of Strategic Services contained both a secret intelligence (SI) (i.e., clandes- tine intelligence) and several covert operations branches, including operational groups (OG), maritime units, morale [psychological] operations and special opera- tions (SO).
7.2.3 USSR World War II Operations
AfterOperation Barbarossa,Soviet Partisansarose spon- taneously, from cut-off regular troops, and from ordinary citizens. Such a spontaneous uprising against an invader is accepted in international law, under the Third Geneva Convention.
A Central Command of the Partisan Movement formed, and various behind-the-lines groups were formed by the “Organs of State Security” and the Red Army.SMERSH was primarily under NKVD control but acted as military counterintelligence.
7.2.4 German World War II Operations
Nazi Germany had multiple and poorly coordinated orga- nizations, not surprisingly givenAdolf Hitler's tendency to duplicate functions and cause bureaucratic conflict, so he was the only person with the full picture. It was com- mon to have a military, a Party, and a state organization with the same function, which was true, to a lesser extent, in the Soviet Union.
Military intelligence/counterintelligence, the Abwehr, ran some clandestine intelligence, but so did the Ausland (foreign)Sicherheitsdienst(SD), the intelligence service of the party organization, the Schutzstaffel (SS). The Venlo Incidentwas run by theGestapo, an internal State organization. The direct action Brandenburgersstarted out as an Abwehr organization, but eventually reported toOKH, the Army high command.