Further  discussion

176   Contributions    

7.5. Further  discussion  

Here  follows  a  few  interesting  ideas  that  spring  from  the  dialogue  between  the  research  and  the   literature,  but  where  the  evidence  is  more  suggestive  and  not  as  thorough  as  the  evidence  for  the   main  contributions  discussed  above.  These  relate  to  the  personal  nature  of  cognitive  metaphors   and  the  relationship  between  perception  and  action.    

1. The  personal  nature  of  cognitive  metaphors  –  linguistic  analysis  limits  the  research  to  what  is   sufficiently  general  to  appear  in  language.  This  study  looks  at  the  metaphors  particular  to   individuals.  Both  are  limited  views.  

2. Participants  did  not  distinguish  sharply  between  perception  and  action.  The  actions  were   given  in  the  perceptions  of  the  situation.  They  fell  out  naturally  from  the  perception.    

In  CMT,  cognitive  metaphors  are  ‘found’  through  analysis  of  the  so-­‐called  dead  metaphors  that   are  commonly  used.  It  is  suggested  that  everyone  using  expressions  that  embody  metaphors,   such  as,  argumentation  is  war  and  affection  is  warmth,  have  the  same  metaphorical  way  of   structuring  their  understanding  of  argumentation  and  affection.  However,  two  individuals  may   use  the  same  verbal  expressions  connecting  the  same  target  and  source  domains.  However,  the   target  and  source  domains  may  be  very  different  in  terms  of  the  concrete  experience  they  evoke   for  each  of  these  individuals.    

For  example,  two  different  people  may  both  operate  from  a  metaphor  that  argumentation  is  war,   but  for  a  scholar  who  has  never  experienced  war  first  hand,  and  a  war  veteran,  this  metaphor   may  operate  very  differently  as  the  word  war  has  been  forged  through  very  different  kinds  of   experiences.  Furthermore,  the  scholar  and  the  war  veteran  may  also  have  very  different   experience  with  argumentation  and  thus  the  experience  that  is  structured  may  also  be  of  a   different  nature.  Thus,  when  a  scholar  and  a  war  veteran  say  that  they  shoot  someone  else’s   arguments  down,  one  could  argue  that  they  actually  use  two  different  metaphors.  Similarly,  an   individual  may  have  developed  the  metaphor  affection  is  warmth  from  the  affectionate  moments   of  being  held  close  by  his  mother  (as  suggested  in  CMT).  However,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that   a  particular  individual  will  hold  the  cognitive  metaphor  that  affection  is  not  only  warmth,  but  that   affection  is  a  multitude  of  the  aesthetic  elements  present  in  the  moments  he  was  held  close  by  his   mother.  In  other  words  affection  is  the  particular  feeling  of  warmth  afforded  by  the  individual’s   actual  mother.    

Contributions   177   Such  personal  aspects  of  the  cognitive  metaphors  are  not  visible  when  the  metaphors  are  studied   as  common  patterns  in  language.  This  is  important,  because  it  suggests  that  our  cognition  may  be   metaphorical  in  nature  in  the  way  that  experience  from  one  domain  is  structured  in  terms  of   experience  from  another  (as  suggested  by  CMT),  but  that  the  words  used  when  formulating  the   cognitive  metaphor  may  not  capture  the  fullness  and  complexity  of  this  metaphorical  

structuring..  For  example,  when  studying  how  an  individual  speaks  one  may  conclude  that  he   uses  the  cognitive  metaphor  ‘affection  is  warmth’.  But  this  does  not  reveal  the  details  of  the   reactivation  in  the  sensory-­‐motor  centres  this  metaphorical  connection  creates,  i.e.  the   simulation.  

Gendlin  (1997)  touched  upon  this  point,  when  he  criticised  CMT  by  stating  that  cognitive   metaphors  do  not  exist  until  they  are  formulated  by  the  linguist  (i.e.  by  Mark  Johnson).  Because   of  this  Gendlin  prefers  to  talk  about  that  gap  beyond  the  words  –  the  actual  experience  for  which   no  word  can  substitute.  However,  the  evidence  in  the  present  research  is  not  sufficient  to  argue   for  either  Johnson’s  or  for  Gendlin’s  position.    

Another  interesting  point  worth  mentioning  is  that  I  found  that  participants  often  did  not  speak   separately  about  their  perception  of  the  problem  and  the  possible  action  they  could  imagine.  In   my  interview  guide,  I  asked  first  about  perception  and  next  about  possible  actions.  However,   many  times  the  actions  were  such  an  integrated  part  of  the  perception,  that  the  second  question   felt  rather  repetitious.    

The  actions  seemed  to  be  given  in  the  perception,  so  to  speak.  For  example,  P13  initially   perceived  the  problem  as  a  matter  of  low  self-­‐esteem  among  the  customer  service  employees.  

Thus,  the  obvious  action  was  to  try  in  different  ways  to  heighten  the  employees’  self-­‐esteem.  P13   later  changed  her  perception  of  the  problem.  She  then  saw  it  as  a  problem  of  the  customer  

service  employees  being  frustrated  about  the  department  manager  not  allowing  them  to  make   decisions  they  were  fully  competent  to  make.  Given  this  new  perception,  the  obvious  action   changed.  P13  simply  asked  the  department  manager  to  stop  micro-­‐managing.  Similarly,  when   P14  saw  her  role  as  a  magician  who  needs  to  fix  problems  for  the  organisation,  she  tried  to  come   up  with  answers  and  acts  on  her  own,  but  when  she  changed  her  perception  and  saw  her  own   role  as  a  facilitator,  she  started  asking  questions  and  involving  other  people  in  the  process.  The   possible  actions  were  often  so  closely  related  to  the  perception  of  the  problem,  that  it  made  sense   to  speak  of  perception/actions  as  one  thing  rather  than  two.  This  offers  some  support  for  the  

178   Contributions    

claim  in  simulation  theory,  that  the  simulations  used  to  represent  phenomena  have  the  primary   function  of  supporting  and  enabling  interactions  with  these  phenomena.  However,  the  evidence   in  the  present  research  is  not  sufficient  to  support  this  claim.  

Contributions   179   8. Summary  of  main  contributions  

Beneath  I  have  summarized  the  contributions  and  the  literature  and  findings  they  relate  to.  

Cognitive  Metaphor  Theory   be  related  to  specific  types  of   changes  in  perception  of  and   interaction  with  this  situation  

Art-­‐based  methods  in  management  education  

Theory/literature   Findings   Contribution  

Traditional  focus  in  the  field:  

ABMs  are  analysed  in  terms  of   what  kind  of  information  it  

New  focus  in  the  field:  ABMs   should  be  analysed  in  terms   of  what  experience  the   inclusion  of  art  enables  and   how  this  experience  may  be   used  as  a  tool  to  structure   future  experiences.  This  focus  

It  gives  facilitators  tools  for  realizing  particular  learning  outcomes  of  ABMs.    

• If  they  wish  to  remove  judgments  they  can  focus  participants  on  primary  metaphors  

• If  they  wish  to  find  radically  new  behaviours  they  can  have  participants  create  new  complex   metaphors  based  on  different  primary  metaphors  

Furthermore,  it  brings  awareness  to  the  impact  on  learning  of  the  form  of  the  whole  of  the   concrete  learning  intervention.    

Limitations  and  reflection   181   9. Limitations  and  reflection  

Following  the  suggestion  of  Alvesson  and  Sköldberg  (2009),  throughout  the  project,  I  took  time   to  reflect  upon  the  research  on  four  levels  of  “contact  with  the  empirical  material,  awareness  of   the  interpretive  act,  clarification  of  political-­‐ideological  contexts,  and  the  handling  of  the  question   of  representation  and  authority”  (Alvesson  &  Sköldberg,  2009,  p.  263).  In  this  chapter,  I  present   the  most  important  of  these  reflections  and  use  them  to  outline  the  limitations  of  the  research.