The  embodied  view  of  cognition  as  basis  for  exploring  ABMs

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Due  to  this  criticism,  I  choose  to  conceive  metaphors  as  experience  gained  in  one  domain,  used  to   structure  experience  gained  in  another  domain,  and  to  emphasise  the  distinction  between  the   experience  and  the  words  used  to  refer  to  the  experience.  I  agree  that  the  experience  used  for   this  structuring  will  take  on  a  new  meaning  when  used  in  this  way.  I  furthermore  agree  with   Gendlin,  that  it  is  key  to  explore  how  it  is  possible  for  individuals  to  know  this  new  meaning.  

Gendlin  suggests  that  this  knowledge  can  be  accessed  through  the  process  of  focusing  on  the   bodily  felt  sense,  which  is  prior  to  any  categories  –  including  categories  of  bodily  dimensions   referred  to  by  Johnson,  such  as,  up-­‐down,  periphery-­‐center.  Gendlin  suggests  that  we  can  access   this  felt  sense  by  walking  past  categories  of  experience  and  placing  sustained  awareness  on  the   bodily  felt  sense  –  even  if  it  is  often  not  immediately  accessible  or  describable  through  words,  i.e.  

we  are  sensing  something  but  cannot  describe  it  –  only  feel  it.  From  this  point  of  view,  knowing  a   name  of  a  sensation  or  recognising  it,  is  not  part  of  staying  with  the  senses  (Springborg  &  

Sutherland,  2014;  Springborg,  2010),  dwelling  (Grisoni,  2012;  Heidegger,  1971;  Sutherland  &  

Ladkin,  2013),  or  giving  attention  to  the  sensuous  encounter  while  suspending  the  intellect   (Seeley  &  Reason,  2008).    

Awareness  of  this  critique  of  CMT  is  important  when  using  CMT  as  a  theoretical  lens  to  explore   ABMs  in  management  education  because  it  may  help  sensitise  the  researcher  to  the  effects  of  the   lens  used.    

2.8. The  embodied  view  of  cognition  as  basis  for  exploring  ABMs  

The  central  claim,  for  which  I  have  argued  in  this  literature  review,  has  been  that  the  ideas  from   CMT  and  simulation  theories  discussed  above,  offer  a  theoretical  lens  suitable  for  exploring  ABMs   in  management  education.  A  lens  that  may  well  reveal  aspects  of  ABMs  that  cannot  be  revealed   when  using  theories  grounded  in  the  representationalist  view  of  cognition.    

To  support  this  claim  further,  I  now  consider  how  they  can  offer  interesting  perspectives  on  the   questions  I  raised  regarding  the  importance  of  staying  with  the  senses,  aesthetic  agency,  and   making  –  even  before  embarking  on  an  empirical  research  journey.  

In  the  above,  I  have  shown  that  authors  in  the  field  of  ABMs  in  management  education  mainly   operate  from  a  representationalist  view  of  cognition.  A  view  that  is  inherited  through  the   theories  that  have  been  imported  from  other  fields,  to  describe  what  learning  processes  ABMs   facilitate.  This  has  focused  the  field  on  discussions  about  what  kind  of  data  is  relevant  to   managers’  reflective  processes  and  how  ABMs  are  able  to  make  such  data  available  for  these  

Literature  review   35   reflection  processes.  The  question  of  what  faculty  is  used  for  reflection  itself  is  never  seriously   addressed.  It  is  simply  assumed  that  our  mind  has  the  capacity  to  reflect  on  anything  we  become   aware  of.  Thus,  the  reflection  process  itself  remains  a  disembodied  and  abstract  process,  working   on  the  various  forms  of  data  that  are  made  conscious.  

When  this  logic  met  the  field  of  organisational  aesthetics,  scholars  in  the  field  of  ABMs  in  

management  education,  argued  that  it  is  important  to  include  the  aesthetic  aspects  of  experience   in  reflection  and  that  aesthetic  forms  serve  the  purpose  of  making  these  aspects  conscious.  

However,  stating  that  aesthetics  aspects  of  experience  are  important  to  include  in  the  reflective   process,  implies  that  they  could  also  be  excluded.  It  implies  that  there  can  exist,  a  reflective   process  that  operates  purely  with  disembodied  inner  symbols.  Thus,  arguing  that  it  is  important   to  include  aesthetic  experience  in  one’s  reflection,  only  makes  sense  from  the  representationalist   view  of  the  cognition.  

From  the  embodied  view  of  cognition,  there  is  no  choice.  If  we  take  seriously  the  claim  that  all   our  abstract  thinking  is  grounded  in  simulations  (in  reactivations  in  the  sensory  and  motor   cortices),  then  aesthetic  experience  has  to  be  both  the  data  we  reflect  upon  and  the  tool  we  use  to   reflect  on  this  data.  Any  reflection  can  be  seen  as  a  process  of  pitching  two  types  of  activation  in   our  sensory  and  motor  cortices  against  each  other.  Reflection  can  be  seen  as  a  process  where   some  sensory  experience  is  used  to  structure  other  sensory  experience.  Thus,  ‘simplifying’,  

‘conceptualising’,  ‘analysing’,  ‘judging’,  or  ‘drawing  conclusions  from’  present  experience  are  all   names  for  the  act  of  using  old  experience  to  structure  this  present  experience,  i.e.  treating  it  as   data.  However,  if  an  individual  hangs  out  long  enough  with  the  present  sensory  experience  and,   as  much  as  possible,  refrains  from  ‘simplifying’,  ‘conceptualising’,  ‘analysing’,  ‘judging’,  or  

‘drawing  conclusions’,  the  present  sensory  experience  can  shift  from  being  data  to  be  structured   to  becoming  a  tool  used  for  structuring.  This  idea  is  part  of  what  I  intend  to  explore  in  my  

research.    

This  view  offers  a  way  to  explain  why  a  number  of  scholars  emphasise  the  need  to  stay  with  the   sensory  experience:  It  is  not  because  we  need  to  wait  for  the  aesthetic  data  to  be  received  (as  the   representationalist  view  of  cognition  might  suggest),  it  is  because  by  staying  with  the  sensory   experience,  we  choose  to  refrain  from  treating  the  new  sensory  experience  as  data  and  give  it   time  to  become  a  tool.    

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Furthermore,  this  offers  an  explanation  of  Dewey  and  Eisner’s  claim,  that  engagement  with  art   develops  the  mind,  and  Schusterman’s  similar  claim  that  aesthetic  experiences  spill  over  and   enhance  and  deepen  other  activities.  It  generates  new  tools  for  structuring  experience  (develops   the  mind),  and  using  these  tools  in  other  activities  can  potentially  enhance  and  deepen  them.  

Thus,  this  view  also  offers  an  explanation  of  what  aesthetic  agency  might  be,  namely,  the  agency   that  comes  from  having  new  tools  (sensory  experiences)  for  structuring  experience.    

Finally,  this  view  offers  an  explanation  of  the  process  Taylor  and  Ladkin  call  making,  i.e.  how  the   process  of  art  creation  creates  the  creator.  When  sensory  experiences  become  tools  for  

structuring  further  experiences,  they  will  leave  their  mark  on  these  experiences.  The  tools  we  use   for  structuring  our  current  experience  become  ever  present  in  this  experience.  And  what  is   constant  in  our  experience,  we  are  likely  to  perceive  as  ourselves.  Gregory  Bateson  (Bateson,   1972,  p.  218)  expresses  this  link  between  self-­‐identity  and  how  we  structure  experience  by   stating  that  words  for  personality  traits,  such  as  dominant,  submissive,  succouring,  and  

dependant,  are  really  words  for  how  we  punctuate  the  flow  of  events.  For  example,  imagine  that   an  individual’s  experience  consists  of  a  series  of  problems  and  solutions  (problem  –  solution  –   problem    –  solution  –  problem    –  solution  –  problem…  etc.).  One  individual  may  structure  this  by   saying  every  time  I  face  a  problem  I  overcome  it  –  seeing  the  above  flow  as  a  sequence  of  

problem-­‐solution  patterns.  Another  individual  may  punctuate  the  very  same  flow  of  events  in  the   manner:  Every  time  I  solve  one  problem  another  arrives  –  seeing  the  above  flow  as  a  sequence  of   solution-­‐  problem  patterns.  It  is  fair  to  say  that  these  two  individuals  may  be  described  as  having   very  different  personalities.  If  aesthetic  experience  truly  changes  the  way  an  individual  structure   presents  experience,  it  can  in  a  very  real  way  impact  his  personality.  I  will  not  go  deeper  in  to  this   argument  here,  but  simply  leave  it  as  a  suggestion  that  the  embodied  view  of  cognition  does  offer   an  interesting  perspective  on  how  experiencing  the  process  of  art  creation  may  be  said  to  create   the  creator.    

To  sum  up,  I  have  argued  that  current  literature  on  ABMs  in  management  education  has   uncritically  adopted  a  representationalist  view  of  cognition.  This  prevents  theorists  from  fully   embracing  ideas  about  art  and  cognition  developed  by  Langer,  Dewey,  Arnheim  and  others,  even   though  scholars  in  the  field  of  ABMs  do  include  these  thinkers  in  their  arguments  and  theory   building.  Furthermore,  the  representationalist  view  of  cognition  makes  it  difficult  to  explain   themes  that  are  widely  acknowledged  in  the  field,  such  as,  the  importance  of  staying  with  the   senses,  aesthetic  agency,  and  the  process  of  making.  Finally,  I  have  argued  that  CMT  and  

Literature  review   37   simulation  theory,  offer  interesting  perspectives  on  these  themes  and,  thus,  an  interesting   alternative  starting  point  for  exploring  ABMs  in  management  education.