2.44 Non-Domicile taxation – The government is undertaking a major reform to non-domicile taxation. As announced at Summer Budget 2015, from April 2017 non-UK domiciled individuals (non-doms) will be deemed UK domiciled for all tax purposes after they have been UK resident for 15 of the past 20 tax years. Additionally, individuals who were born in the UK and who have a UK domicile of origin will revert to their UK domiciled status for tax purposes whilst resident in the UK. The government will also legislate to charge inheritance tax on all UK residential property indirectly held through an offshore structure from 6 April 2017. As set out at Summer Budget 2015, non-doms who have a non-UK resident trust set up before becoming deemed domiciled in the UK will not be taxed on income and gains retained in the trust. The government will legislate all non-dom reforms in Finance Bill 2017. Budget 2016 confirms that non-doms who become deemed-domiciled in April 2017 can treat the cost base of their non-UK based assets as being the market value of that asset on 6 April 2017. Individuals who expect to become deemed UK domicile under the 15 out of 20 year rule will be subject to transitional provision with regards to offshore funds to provide certainty on how amounts remitted to the UK will be taxed. (Finance Bill 2017) (31)
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through to 2015-16 announced in the last Parliament. Second, impacts of policy changes in the current parliament, up to and including Budget 2016 are estimated on top of this. In this second stage the newest available LCF input data, covering 2010-11 to 2012-13, are used, and the counterfactual is updated to be the policy setting at the end of the 2010 to 2015 Parliament. 2.25 The two sets of impacts are combined with the modelling of the 2010-11 baseline, and all figures are converted into the same year’s price terms. This two-stage approach ensures that analysis of policy decisions in the current Parliament is underpinned by the data that most accurately reflects the present composition of the underlying population, while avoiding the double counting of policy impacts that would occur in trying to re-run analysis from the last Parliament on the new data.
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Lower nominal GDP affects government tax revenues and, in turn, the budget deficit. The OBR forecasts that the new lower nominal GDP forecasts alone – and before Government policies in this Budget are included – result in tax revenues being less each year compared with its November forecast. For instance, they are expected to be £12.3 billion lower in 2019-20 than the OBR forecast in November.
The government will provide the ATO with $679m over four years to establish the Tax Avoidance Taskforce (first announced 3 Feb 2016) – expected to involve a team of 1,300 people including 390 new specialized officers headed by the FCT. The Taskforce is to work closely with partner agencies including the ACC, the AFP and AUSTRAC. New legislation will be introduced that will allow the ATO to improve information sharing with the ASIC. Part of the work of the Taskforce will be testing the law through litigation where there is deliberate tax avoidance and reporting to the government and the public.
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The last thing that I would say to the government is that if consideration is being given to increasing the inclusion rate, it would be appropriate to provide a transitional rule in one form or another, and I think it would be a good idea to signal that there would be a transitional rule any day now. There is a paranoia in the taxpayer and adviser communities that an inclusion rate increase will be effective immediately upon announcement, resulting in a lot of wasted effort with taxpayers undertaking crystallization or step-up transactions before every budget (and economic statement). Although there is no precedent for tightening changes to the inclusion rate having been made with immediate effect, this paranoia is traceable in large part to the 2010 budget’s tightening of the stock option deduction: that measure took effect for option exercises immediately after the announcement. I prefer what Finance Minister Bill Morneau did last Decem- ber in connection with the stock option deduction debate. Comments had been made by the Liberals in their 2015 election platform, and people were concerned that there could be tightening on that front. The government responded in December 2015 (well in advance of the 2016 federal budget) that if there were to be changes in that context, such changes would be prospective. I think that is the preferred approach—not only to avoid the deadweight transactional costs, but also to avoid what I suspect would be a regressive outcome, reflecting the practical reality that high net worth individuals primarily would undertake the protective planning.
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several organisations (Andres et al., 2012). These include the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), the International Energy Agency (IEA), the United Nations (UN), the United States Department of Energy (DoE) En- ergy Information Administration (EIA), and more recently also the Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving (PBL) Nether- lands Environmental Assessment Agency. Where available, we use national emissions estimated by the countries them- selves and reported to the UNFCCC for the period 1990– 2014 (40 countries). We assume that national emissions re- ported to the UNFCCC are the most accurate because na- tional experts have access to additional and country-specific information, and because these emission estimates are peri- odically audited for each country through an established in- ternational methodology overseen by the UNFCCC. We also use global and national emissions estimated by CDIAC (Bo- den and Andres, 2016). The CDIAC emission estimates are the only data set that extends back in time to 1751 with con- sistent and well-documented emissions from fossil fuels, ce- ment production, and gas flaring for all countries and their uncertainty (Andres et al., 2014, 2012, 1999); this makes the data set a unique resource for research of the carbon cycle during the fossil fuel era.
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To help, the Scottish Government will soon have greater power than ever before to vary its budget, whether through tax policy, borrowing, or encouraging faster economic growth. But it faces risks too that its new devolved revenues might grow more slowly. A weakening offshore economy, or a buoyant housing market in the south east of England are the types of risks that pose a threat to the Scottish budget, but that the Scottish Government can do little about. The Scottish Government will have the opportunity to use the full spectrum of its spending resources (around 2/3rds of total public spending in Scotland) to respond to the challenge. Chapter 3 showed how choices already made about how to allocate the Scottish budget – including new commitments and long-term constraints – will already dictate key trends in spending allocations.
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The government is dedicated to cutting the funding sources of organised crime and catching the individuals responsible. Tobacco smuggling undermines legitimate businesses and is dominated by organised criminal groups often involved in other crimes, such as drug smuggling and people trafficking. At this Budget, the Home Office will receive £31 million of funding to form a dedicated group of border officers and intelligence officials to tighten the government’s grip on the most prolific smuggling routes and intercept smugglers as they try to adapt their tactics. Coordinated enforcement, alongside the additional intelligence and investigative resources provided at Summer Budget 2015, will work to further increase the seizure of illicit shipments and increase
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• ‘tax repatriation from Jersey, Guernsey, and Isle of Man’ – this Budget 2013 measure announced a disclosure facility with the crown dependencies and was originally costed to raise £1,050 million from 2013-14 to 2017-18. This was made up of two main elements: the voluntary disclosure of unpaid past tax liability (which would run from 2013-14 to 2016-17) and an information exchange agreement whereby from 2016 onwards HMRC would receive annual information on UK resident account holders that would generate future compliance yield. We lowered our forecast of the total yield to £800 million in November, but also changed the profile having considered evidence from HMRC on the extent to which any initial yield lost through lower disclosures would be recouped through additional compliance activity in later years. The disclosure facility closed on 31 December 2015 and HMRC has informed us that there were far fewer disclosures than expected. They believe this is due to a number of factors, including HMRC campaigns being less effective and with less coverage than expected and a perceived lack of awareness from those targeted. HMRC is also now less optimistic about how much of the lost yield can be recouped through additional compliance activity, on the basis that they are unlikely to be able to work the higher number of additional cases on top of existing workloads. Taking both factors into account, we have lowered the costing for this measure by a further £530 million;
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CAPSNB is held constant, as a share of GDP, at its 2009-10 level across to 2019-20. The figure for CAPSNB in 2009-10 (8.21% of GDP) is taken from the OBR’s Public finances databank (March 2016). Estimates of the output gap are taken from OBR economic estimates as recorded in OBR’s Public finances databank (March 2016).
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compared with a neutral budget, indexing tax credits and welfare payments in line with expected wage growth of 2.35 per cent, has little impact on the incomes of the two deciles with lowest incomes. Looked at another way, Budget 2016 delivers similar income to the lowest income quintile as a wage-indexed budget: a substantial part of this came through the Christmas bonus rather than an increase in weekly payment rates. For other income deciles, Budget 2016 raises the incomes by between half and one per cent above the level a neutral budget would provide. The small scale of this overall impact contrasts with perceptions of Budget 2016 as a major ‘giveaway’. This is because, with wage growth of close to 2½ per cent, the cost of a neutrality – keeping average tax rates constant, and welfare payments growing in line with wages – is itself substantial. While the reduction in USC has attracted most attention, the freezing of income tax credits and bands in the face of rising incomes will, through ‘fiscal drag’, lead to a higher average income tax rate, offsetting a part of the USC reduction.
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health is clearly highlighted as a priority area which contributes significantly to the growth of the economy. In addition, poor health indicators which directly create the need for more investments in the health sector seem not to be attracting more investments into the health sector. For example, it is estimated that each year, more than 7,000 women die due to pregnancy related causes, as well as 58,000 children under 5 years of age. [12, 13] However, some experts argue that the target of allocating 15% of the total budget to health out rightly undermines the autonomy of the Ministry of Finance to make sectoral budget allocation decisions.  They claim that by calling for an increased share of government expenditure to the health sector, less will be spent on other social services that also contribute to the health of the population.  In spite of the decreasing allocations vis-à-vis an ever-increasing list of health needs, the average budget execution rate from 2015 to 2017 is estimated at 86.6%.  This clearly highlights the public financial management challenges the health sector faces which contribute to the sector’s inability to fully absorb and consume its budget. This recurrent phenomenon nullifies advocacy efforts aimed at securing more resources for the health sector. Achieving better performing health systems with a wider more equitable coverage of health services require a twofold approach of first ensuring that existing resources are utilized more effectively and efficiently and secondly, generating additional public and private resources needed to bolster economic growth. 
The drop in oil prices which coincided with Western economic sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions (goods shortages and increasing prices) have also had a strong adverse effect on the economy of Kaliningrad Oblast (although the region’s socio-economic indicators match average levels for Russia as a whole). Gross regional product (GRP) in 2015 fell by 7.6% (and is expected to fall a fur- ther 1.3% in 2016; for more information on this, see Appendix 1). All potential growth factors remain negative at present. Investments in the region have decreased for the fourth year in a row (by 10% annually on average), and the residents’ real incomes have been falling since 2015 as well (by around 6%). The economic situation is still very tough, especially in the primary sector, the car industry (Kaliningrad’s Avtotor reduced its production by 50% in 2015), and trade and transport. However, some symptoms of an improvement of the situ- ation have been observed in the processing industry (mainly the food sector), agriculture (which was to a great extent a result of the embargo on imports of food and agricultural products and the import substitution policy implement- ed) and the constructions sector (partly in effect of the preparations for the 2018 FIFA World Cup).
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The small number of applications in 2016 and the fact that the Italian earthquake application was only completed during 2017 was a fortunate coincidence in budgetary terms. The mobilisations made during 2016 were paid from the unused part of the 2015 annual allocation that was carried forward to 2016. Accordingly the full amount of the 2016 allocation remained untouched and was carried forward to 2017, thus allowing to mobilise in 2017 the by far biggest Solidarity Fund contribution ever for Italy. This scenario demonstrates that the possibility to carry forward by one year the unspent amounts of the preceding year is extremely helpful in maintaining the Solidarity Fund operational in budgetary terms even though its annual allocation has been reduced for the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework from EUR 1 billion in current prices to EUR 500 million in 2011 prices. It will be important to maintain this flexibility after 2020. On the other hand, the events of 2016 also show that the financial basis of the Solidarity Fund is rather small and could easily run into difficulties should a number of severe disasters occur in a relatively short period of time, particularly when it was not possible to carry forward any significant amount from the preceding year. In such an event it could be difficult to maintain the established aid rates which would undermine the principle of equitable treatment.
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The granger causality results presented in the Table 6 indicate that some null hypoth- esis had to be rejected, while other could not be rejected. No statistically significant cau- sation running from inflation to the budget deficit or from the budget deficit to money supply is found in the short run. As per the results, inflation does not granger cause the budget deficit, while the former granger causes latter at least at 10% level of significance. This is because, although the hypothesis could be rejected at 5% level of significant, it could not be rejected at 10%. The results therefore support the unidirectional assertion by theories such as the traditional approach to budget policy and empirical studies by Ahking and Miller (1985), Hamburger and Zwick (1981) and Rwegasira (1974) but con- tradicts with the Olivera–Tanzi effect theory and the Richadian Equivalence. It also con- tradicts empirical evidence by Aghevli and Khan (1978) and Barnhart and Mudell (1988) who found bidirectional causation. The results further indicated that while money sup- ply granger causes inflation at least at 10% level of significance, there is no feedback cau- sation running from inflation to money suppl. That is, changes in money supply granger cause variations in inflation and inflation does not provide a feedback effect to money supply.
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Enderlein (2016) stresses that Brexit offers an opportunity to substantially revise EU budget arrangements, including modification of the 7-year framework, development of true own resources and a clearer and more efficient division of powers between the European Commission and the member states. The mid-term review of the MMF expected by the end of 2016 is not likely to bring substantial changes to either account for Brexit or longer-term budgetary revisions. However, the review could propose a methodology to reassess the role of the EU budget in collaboration with the member states, potentially also bringing in participation by national parliaments. These proposals are also reflected in the independent report (Núñez Ferrer et al., 2016) to the High Level Group on Own Resources, chaired by
What features of each country’s tax and benefit systems lead to these patterns? In Ireland, the shape of the budget constraints shown here is strongly influenced by the fact that jobseekers can combine a part-time job, working up to three days per week, with a partial Jobseeker’s Allowance payment (JA), which is subject to a means-test. Any remaining JA payment is completely withdrawn from those working more than three days per week, resulting in the drop in net income at 24 hours per week in Figure 1. A second key feature is the structure of Rent Supplement payment, which is means-tested, and is not available when working more than 30 hours per week. The new Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) currently being rolled out has a different structure, which does not exclude full-time workers from potentially receiving support: analysis of this scheme is currently being undertaken by ESRI researchers.
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Based on the description, it can be explained that the budget cycle consists of budget planning / planning, budget execution, budget oversight, and reporting and budget accountability. Regarding this matter, which can affect the disproportionate and concentrated Budget Expenditure Absorption at the end of the year experienced by the Regional Apparatus Organization of the Bondowoso District Health Office in general, according to the budget cycle, is influenced by budget planning and budget execution. The Bondowoso District Health Office became the research locus with the consideration that, among other things, the Bondowoso District Health Office had a large workload with more number of Puskesmas, each of which had the main tasks and functions of APBD funds distribution. Based on this background, this study takes the title "The Influence of Budget Planning Perceptions and Budget Implementation on Budget Performance through Absorption of Budget Expenditures at the Bondowoso District Health Office".
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This paper examines the financial incentives to work implicit in the Irish tax and benefit system, focusing in particular on incentives facing those who are unemployed and in receipt of Jobseeker’s Benefit or Jobseeker’s Assistance. The results, based on an analysis of current incomes, benefits and taxes, suggest that more than eight out of ten of these unemployed jobseekers would see their income increase by at least 40 per cent upon taking up employment. Fewer than 3 per cent of these individuals would, in the short-term, be financially better off not in work. The risk of facing weak financial incentives to work is higher for unemployed persons with a spouse and children, as the income support goal of the welfare system means that they tend to have higher welfare payments. However, even among that group, fewer than 1 in 15 would be financially better off not working. Our analysis shows that a recent policy initiative, the Back to Work Family Dividend, announced in Budget 2015, clearly improves the immediate financial incentives to work for this group.
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Despite the manageable impact of Brexit, the EU should not sit on a false sense of security, ignoring the level of risks facing the EU budget and the impact of further mismanagement of possible crisis developments: enduring migration problems, climatic disasters, new financial crisis, etc. The financial, economic, debt and migration crises have already stretched the EU budget close to its limit and practically exhausted the existing ‘flexibility’ instruments. There is little doubt that the entire architecture of the EU budget is in need of deep revision.