Top PDF Art: Incentive Payment Schemes

Art: Incentive Payment Schemes

Art: Incentive Payment Schemes

• Incentives and motivation, where incentives are extrinsic, and motivation is intrinsic, to the workers. Incentives in the form of ‘piece rates’ have been used since the commercial revolution of the 11th-12th centuries. The phrase 'piece work' first appears in writing around the year 1549, but masons marks on stonework would suggest this type of payment is much older.

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FINANCIAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES FOR THE GIRL CHILD

FINANCIAL INCENTIVE SCHEMES FOR THE GIRL CHILD

centre upto age six and should have been immunized as per the health guidelines. She must be enrolled in a school recognized by the state education department and should not be engaged in any form of child labour. Either of the parents must have undergone terminal sterilization so that the number of children in family does not exceed three. It is compulsory that the beneficiary completes Standard eight and that she should not get married before she reaches the age of 18. Under the scheme each beneficiary was entitled to a sum of Rs.10,000that was invested in a fixed deposit in her name in the financial institution will be maximized and paid along with the accrued interest to the beneficiary on her attainment of 18 years of age. As per the revision done in the scheme in the year 2008 instead of the initial deposit amount of Rs 10,000 an amount of Rs 19,300 was to be deposited with the financial institution in the name of the first girl beneficiary and Rs 18,350 in the name of the second girl beneficiary of the same family. On her attaining the age of 18 years the first girl beneficiary who fulfills the conditions of the scheme will get a maturity amount of Rs 1,00,097 and the second girl beneficiary will receive Rs1,00,052. The beneficiaries willing to continue higher education after passing Standard 10 were eligible to pledge the bond and avail a loan, up to a maximum of Rs 50,000 from recognized banks. To keep track of the status of the beneficiaries with respect to health, education, migration and other benefits availed through different schemes the State Women and Child Development Department had developed a child tracking system with the assistance of NIC. It also reveals the status of the payment made to the beneficiary from time to time. The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) was made the financial partner for implementing the scheme through a tender process.
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Title: Payment Schemes for Securing Multihop Wireless Networks: A Survey

Title: Payment Schemes for Securing Multihop Wireless Networks: A Survey

Mohamed Elsalih Mahmoud et.al [12] suggested a method which is called practical incentive system to motivate the support of the nodes in the multi-hop wireless networks. While the communication sessions may arise without concerning an infrastructure, the communicating nodes provide digital receipts for the intermediate nodes, which submit the receipts to the accounting center (AC) to maintain their payment. The decisive point of the practical completion of incentive systems is the receipts’ submission and high overhead because of the high frequency of low-value transactions. If there is a huge number of receipts is submitted for the node clarification, there are high computation overhead and high complexity.
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The effectiveness of incentive payment systems: An empirical test of individualism as a boundary condition

The effectiveness of incentive payment systems: An empirical test of individualism as a boundary condition

Evidence as to the extent of incentive pay in Britain, and to the scale of its extension in the last decade is difficult to report, because, with the exception of schemes requiring Inland Revenue approval to quality for tax relief^, firms are not required to disclose publicly their means of paying employees. What figures are available, however, broadly support the anecdotal evidence of widespread and increasing use of incentive pay. The first Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS), carried out in 1980 among approximately 2000 establishments in the UK, found that 13 per cent of private sector workplaces operated some form of employee-share ownership scheme, (Daniel and Millward (1983)). By 1984 the second WIRS survey reported that this figure had almost doubled, to 23 per cent. Rises from 19 to 34 per cent incidence were recorded in the retail distribution sector, and from 16 to 3 2 per cent among electrical and instrument engineering establishments (Millward & Stevens (1986)). Smith
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Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis

Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis

his source of income is his patients. By ensuring that his quality is close to the best level, his patient load will be higher, which means that the revenue received will also be higher. It is also important to note that there is no way for the physician to over-providehe has no incentive to provide unnecessary services at the expense of his patient load and effectively his revenue. In the previous section, we have discussed how payment schemes will affect quality given that the physicians choose their optimal work hours. By inspecting the first-order conditions, we can see that the optimal work hours ℎ ∗ differ across payment schemes, which then results in different quality scores 𝑉 . The presence (or absence) of income incentives explains the differences in quality. We observed that fixed payment scheme yields the lowest level of quality compared to other payment schemes due to lack of income incentive and that the only way for the physician to perform closer to the best level is for him to value quality more. We also observed that FFS can reward quality due to income incentive, but posited that there is a possibility of over-providing especially when the sensitivity of patient demand is low and the valuation of income is very high relative to his valuation of quality. We also saw how mixed payment scheme can temper the possibility of overprovision by inducing the incentive to cut down on unnecessary procedures by giving them a fixed amount without the need to increase procedures. Table 3.1 summarizes these predicted effects on scores.
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State of the Art Review of Mobile Payment Technology

State of the Art Review of Mobile Payment Technology

Out of band payment [6] refers to the fact that the payment channel is separate to that used for a shopping phase, e.g. a credit card holder may use their mobile device to authenticate and pay for a service they consume on the fixed line Internet or interactive TV. This type of payment usually involves a system controlled by a financial institution, maybe in partnership with a mobile operator. In order to make the wireless device suitable for authenticating payments, financial institutions are especially interested in wireless PKI, shared secret (or symmetrical key) schemes, or merging with their chip card programs via dual slot or dual chip devices.
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Incentive schemes in the financial industry. An experimental approach

Incentive schemes in the financial industry. An experimental approach

A point of consensus between authors investigating bonus payment and option-like contracts is that these contracts increase risk taking (Kleinlercher et al.; 2014; Holmen et al.; 2014; Hedesström et al.; 2015). But this is only a part of the story. Paul et al. (2015) argue that when subjects can trade more than one type of risky asset at the same time, tournament incentives do not distort prices more than absolute-performance based incentives do. 5 Furthermore, due to the convexity of option-like incentives, trading at higher prices and taking more risk increases traders’ expected payouts, which makes this behavior rational from the point of view of the manager being incentivized with this type of contract (Holmen et al.; 2014). Although rational from a trader perspective, overvalued assets produce negative consequences for other market participants: not only investors who delegate their portfolio to these managers (with convex incentives) face a linear incentive structure and therefore bear the losses of overvalued assets, but the overvalued asset affect also the efficiency of the markets since the value of the asset is no more reflecting the discounted future cash-flows.
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A Review of Conservation Payment Initiatives in Latin America: Conservation Concessions, Conservation Incentive Agreements and Permit Retirement Schemes

A Review of Conservation Payment Initiatives in Latin America: Conservation Concessions, Conservation Incentive Agreements and Permit Retirement Schemes

2004] CONSERVATION PAYMENT INITIATIVES IN LATIN AMERICA 883 The first example of a permit retirement scheme to be implemented in Latin America was the 1996 Noel Kempff Project, where log[r]

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The influence of financial conditions on optimal ordering and payment policies under progressive interest schemes

The influence of financial conditions on optimal ordering and payment policies under progressive interest schemes

Trade credit terms may vary significantly from industry to industry. The simplest way to offer a trade credit is to define a fixed time period in which the buyer is allowed to delay the payment to its supplier. If the buyer fails to settle the account (completely) during this time span, then interest is charged on the outstanding balance. This type of trade credit was first analyzed in the context of an economic order quantity (EOQ) model by Goyal (1985), who showed that the order quantity increases if predefined payment delays are permitted, as compared to the classical EOQ model. Subsequently, Dave (1985) introduced a model that considered different purchasing and selling prices, and Chung (1998) presented a simplified solution procedure for this model. Teng (2002) further extended the model of Goyal (1985) and demonstrated that in certain cases, it is beneficial for the buyer to reduce its order quantity if trade credits are offered, and to benefit from the permissible delay in payments by ordering more frequently. Huang (2007) considered the case of a supplier that specifies a threshold order quantity, where the full trade credit is only granted if the buyer’s order quantity exceeds this threshold. If the order quantity is below the predetermined quantity, then only a partial trade credit is offered. Similar works are the ones of Chung et al. (2005) and Yang et al. (2013), which assumed that if the order quantity is smaller than a predetermined quantity, the supplier does not offer a trade credit at all. Taleizadeh et al. (2013) considered a scenario where a fraction of the purchasing cost has to be paid immediately after the order has been received into inventory, and where only the remaining fraction of the purchasing cost is subject to trade credits. A related scenario is the one where the supplier offers the trade credit on a one-time-only basis. Papers that fall into this stream of research assumed that the trade credit is available only for a single order at a pre- specified point in time, which is in contrast to the works discussed above that assumed that the trade credit is available in each order cycle. In case a one-time-only trade credit is offered, the buyer has an incentive to place a special order quantity once to benefit from the trade credit, and to revert to its original order policy after the trade credit option has expired. Works that belong to this stream of research are the ones of Goyal and Chang (2008) and Chung and Lin (2011), among others.
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Economic ordering and payment policies under progressive payment schemes and time-value of money

Economic ordering and payment policies under progressive payment schemes and time-value of money

The numerical examples (cf. Table 2) indicate that for a low interest rate on deposits of 4%, an increase in the length of the first credit period (M) has only minor influences on the quantity ordered and the length of the replenishment cycles. The buyer, however, has an incentive to increase his/her order quantities slightly. The net present value of the total costs, in turn, is reduced as M adopts higher values due to the saving of interest cost that result from deferring the payment to the supplier. An increase in the length of the second credit period (M–N) neither influences the ordering policy nor the present value of the total costs (the fact that the length of the second credit period has no influence on the ordering policy and total cost is caused by the specific setting considered here, where the balance is completely settled before time N). For high interest rates on deposits (cf. Table 3), in contrast, the first credit period (M) again does not influence the buyer’s ordering policy significantly, whereas an increase of the second credit period length (N-M) induces smaller order quantities. This seems not very intuitive as trade credits are intended to enable buyers to increase their order quantities as the time-value of money effectively lowers the price as frequently assumed in the literature (cf. Seifert et al., 2013). However, in the present case a relaxed trade credit policy that offers more generous payment cycles may induce contrary effects given that the financial conditions allow the buyer to gain interests by depositing money in an interest bearing account or by investing it elsewhere that exceed the interest charged by the supplier on the outstanding balance. This is obviously a reaction of the buyer to maximize annual interest earnings. In the case where 𝐼𝑐 1 < 𝐼𝑒 < 𝐼𝑐 2 , the interest gains exceed the interest cost between time M and time N. If 𝑁 is increased, the buyer may have an incentive to take advantage of potentially higher interest gains and by reducing the length of the replenishment cycles, the annual interest earnings will be increased. Finally, it can be seen that an increase in both credit periods reduces the present value of the total costs.
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Specialist payment schemes and patient selection in private and public hospitals, CHERE Discussion Paper No 54

Specialist payment schemes and patient selection in private and public hospitals, CHERE Discussion Paper No 54

These results complement those found in Ellis and McGuire (1986), where profit maximizing hospitals that receive a prospective payment have an incentive to employ specialists that place little weight on patient wel- fare. These specialists order few hospital services and so are very profitable from the hospitals perspective. On the other hand, hospitals that receive cost-plus reimbursement have an incentive to employ specialists that place a lot of weight on patient welfare as these specialists order many hospital services and so are very profitable. Ellis and McGuire stress the importance of how the hospital is paid in determining which specialists it would like to hire. The current paper stresses the importance of how specialists are paid in determining which specialists different types of hospitals hire.
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Cooperatives and Payment Schemes

Cooperatives and Payment Schemes

It is not easy to design a suitable payment scheme. A payment scheme must take into account a number of considerations. 1 It must reflect the existing conditions in production, processing and sales, and it must be flexible enough to accommodate changes in the business environment. It must be simple to understand and it must help in providing a steady income for individual members, without depriving them of the incentive to develop new ideas and to adjust to changes in the market. The payment scheme must be a compromise between different producer groups with different interests and different expectations, while allowing individual producers to change production, acquire capital and even to withdraw from the cooperative.
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Competing Payment Schemes

Competing Payment Schemes

An obvious feature of the equilibrium in our model is that it is sensitive to the ability of consumers and merchants to coordinate on cards from a particular scheme. We focused on the only pure-strategy equilibrium, in which schemes competed to attract merchants exclusively. The result of competition was relatively low merchant fees and high card fees. If, instead, consumers and merchants coordinate on the other equilibria in the stage (ii) subgame, in which merchants accept both cards and singlehoming consumers just hold the card with lower fees, then each scheme will have an incentive to set a slightly higher interchange fee than its rival (until merchants are left with no surplus, at which point either scheme can attract all merchants exclusively by offering a lower interchange fee). While there is no (pure- strategy) equilibrium in this case, it does raise the possibility that differences in users’ beliefs could lead to divergent outcomes. This result could underlie the fact that sometimes quite different fee structures can emerge in apparently similar two-sided markets. For example, rental agencies (which help match tenants and landlords) typically charge landlords exclusively for the service, but in some cities such as Boston and New York the tenant typically pays the entire fee (see Evans, 2002).
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On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

On the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes

On a more general level, our theory is therefore in line with experimental evidence found by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) who compared the effect of different payment schemes on the performance of children when collecting for a charity. The amount collected by those groups who received a commission rose with the height of the commission. Hence, the incentive effect is present and works well in line with standard contract theory. But the highest amounts were collected by the groups who did not receive any commission at all. It therefore seems that the fact that a commission was paid shifted the reason why the children collected the money. Whereas they might have felt committed to collect as much money as possible without monetary incentives, the introduction of a commission per se may have led them to orientate their actions towards a more “incentive compatible” effort level.
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Does offering an incentive payment improve recruitment to clinical trials and increase the proportion of socially deprived and elderly participants?

Does offering an incentive payment improve recruitment to clinical trials and increase the proportion of socially deprived and elderly participants?

incentive) were 37% and 36%, respectively, compared to 19% for the PATHWAY trials combined. The greatest in- crease in patients actually randomised into a trial with the incentive offer was seen for the FAST trial, but this 13.7% increase was not statistically significant. Subse- quent screening and randomisation rates were also sig- nificantly poorer for all of the PATHWAY studies, which was due to stringent study entry criteria for blood pres- sure as well as the greater perceived burden of multiple study visits for the participants. Recruitment into PATH- WAY 1 and 2 appears to have been negatively affected by the incentive offer; however, the number of consented patients was too small to allow meaningful interpret- ation. Recruitment into PATHWAY 3 increased with the incentive offer, but this still represented only 5 patients randomised out of 199 patients contacted.
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Metrology requirements of state-of-the-art protection schemes for DC microgrids

Metrology requirements of state-of-the-art protection schemes for DC microgrids

One of the remaining challenges is the development of effective DC protection schemes that are designed for multi-terminal LVDC distribution networks [3]. The main difficulty results from the unconventional fault current response of a DC system, which creates two issues for protection. The first relates to the discharge of filter capacitors in response to a short circuit. This causes a rapidly increasing transient fault current peak which presents a damage risk to any electronic components in the fault path if not interrupted by fast acting DC protection. The other issue is that the DC fault current will not necessarily have zero crossing points for easier current interruption, requiring the use of large circuit breakers. Even though many researchers have made substantial efforts in developing theoretically effective DC MG protection strategies, few of them consider the metrology requirements for practical implementation.
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Testing the performance of state-of-the-art dust emission schemes using DO4Models field data

Testing the performance of state-of-the-art dust emission schemes using DO4Models field data

Atmospheric mineral dust is the dominant aerosol species in terms of mass (Andreae, 1996; Textor et al., 2006), yet it is one of the major sources of uncertainty in the climate sys- tem (Forster et al., 2007; Boucher et al., 2013) despite recent efforts to reduce these uncertainties from a remote sensing (Ginoux et al., 2010, 2012; Ashpole and Washington, 2012; Brindley et al., 2012), physico-chemical (Redmond et al., 2010; Formenti et al., 2011), or modelling point of view (Huneeus et al., 2011; Knippertz and Todd, 2012; Klose and Shao, 2012). Numerical models are a key tool for predict- ing weather and climate. Given the interaction between min- eral dust and the climate system, e.g. radiation (Pérez et al., 2006), clouds (Bangert et al., 2012), and weather systems such as tropical cyclones (Evan et al., 2006), it is important for models to simulate the dust cycle well. Key elements of model dust emission schemes are largely based on empiri- cal data from wind tunnel experiments. Their emitted dust loadings have often been tuned to match global (Pérez et al., 2011; Huneeus et al., 2011) or regional (Laurent et al., 2006; Heinold et al., 2009; Haustein et al., 2012) satellite or in situ dust data (Holben et al., 1998; Remer et al., 2002; Kahn et al., 2005) rather than attending to the efficacy of the emissions in key regions. None of the currently existing schemes has been thoroughly assessed with field data at the scale of a numerical model grid box.
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Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?

Coordinating Development: Can Income-based Incentive Schemes Eliminate Pareto Inferior Equilibria?

A principal, who we refer to as the government, seeks to design a mechanism to affect agents’ investment decisions. We restrict the government to transfer schemes T(y) that determine the post-transfer income of an agent with pre-tax income y. We consider, in turn, the cases where T only depends on an agent’s income, y, and where it can also depend on the full income distribution F . In both cases we assume T is a continuous function of y and F , in the following sense. Let F denote the set of distribution functions on the real line that place mass on at most two points. For any pair of sequences {y n } ⊂ ℜ
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The Choice, Design and Strategic Implications of Executive Incentive Pay Schemes at the Time of an Initial Public Offering

The Choice, Design and Strategic Implications of Executive Incentive Pay Schemes at the Time of an Initial Public Offering

This paper presents a descriptive survey of the choice and design of executive pay incentive scheme arrangements implemented at the time of a company’s initial public offering. Using a unique sample of 311 entrepreneurial companies over a five year period (1998-2002) it illustrates the strategic choices made with regards to incentive pay schemes by the board of directors at this crucial time in a company’s development. Furthermore, it discusses the importance of the configuration of incentive schemes in respect of three critical elements: the performance target, comparator, and target level requirement for the shares to vest. It finds that company’s choices are split between schemes that do have performance targets linked and others that are contrary to the guidelines of the Combined Code and best practice. In light of this it proposes strategic reasons why this might be the case for initial public offerings and develops this discussion in line with the uniqueness of this event.
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INFORMATION NOTE. A comparison of incentive schemes offered to frequent users of railway services in selected cities

INFORMATION NOTE. A comparison of incentive schemes offered to frequent users of railway services in selected cities

1.1 At the meeting held on 16 November 2012, the Panel on Transport requested the Research Office to conduct a study on the comparison of the monthly travel pass scheme of the MTR Corporation Limited ("MTRCL") with similar incentive scheme provided in Berlin, London, New York, Tokyo and Guangzhou. This information note studies the five selected cities and Hong Kong in terms of the background of their mass transit railway operator(s) and the travel passes or other incentive schemes they offer to frequent travellers. It concludes with a highlight of the salient features of various schemes studied to facilitate Members' deliberations on how to improve the monthly travel pass scheme currently offered by MTRCL.
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