"Instrumentalist” Methodology
Some knowledge of the nature and form of scientific explanation, of the meaning and use o f scientific methods, techniques, and constructions, and of the various other aspects of scientific inquiry, is already an essential part o f the intellectual equipment of any adequately-trained political scientist and the need for this training seems very likely to increase rapidly in the near future (Meehan, 1965p.v).
The term "methodology" does not refer, despite frequent usage to the contrary, to techniques of empiri cal research (i.e., to the techniques by which data ~ quantitative and non-quantitative are analysed). Rather, it refers to the "requirements for good science" (Papineau, 1978p.21), i.e., the rules and conven tions that are invoked in order to ascertain "whether a suggested hypothesis or theory should be ten tatively accepted as part of a body of systematised knowledge" (Friedman, 1953p.3);see also (Agassi,
1969); (Blaug, 1980pp.27-28); (Boland, 1982pp.l-9). The methodology which is appropriate for a par ticular research project depends upon its objectives (Boland, 1982pp.l88-196). This study’s raison d ’etre
is practical, not theoretical; it constructs a formal theory not for its own sake, but in order to resolve a relevant problem for comparative political science research (i.e., the formation, electoral support and dissolution, in the years immediately following the First World War, of agrarian parties in Australia, Canada and New Zealand). An "Instrumentalist" methodology is an appropriate methodology for the analysis of immediate and practical problems (Boland, 1979); (Boland, 1980); (Boland, 1981); (Boland,
1982pp. 141-152, 174-175,193-195). This study therefore adopts an Instrumentalist methodology.
Recognition of two modes of reasoning is essential for an understanding of this methodological doctrine [see in particular (Boland, 1979p.505)]. (a) To argue from the truth of a set of premises to the truth of a set of conclusions is to argue in modus ponens. If an argument conforms to the formal rules of logic, in other words, then whenever all of its premises are true then all of its conclusions will also be true, (b) However, if an argument is logical then any time that one of its conclusions is false then not all of its premises can be true. To argue against the truth of one or more of a theory’s premises by demonstrating that one or more of its conclusions is false is to argue in modus tollens. If an argument can be successfully criticised by modus tollens then one or more of its premises is false or it is not logical (or both).
Heuristically, modus ponens "passes" the assumed truth of a theory’s premises forward to its conclu sions; modus tollens "passes" the falsity of a theory’s conclusions backward to its premises. The truth of a theory, however, cannot be "passed" backward; nor can its falsity be "passed" forward. Any use of modus ponens in reverse ("the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent") or of modus tollens in reverse ("the Fallacy
of Denying the Antecedent") violates the canons of logic and is therefore invalid (Boland, 1979p.508).
Three characteristics distinguish Instrumentalism. (1) Given the "problem of induction" (i.e., the impos sibility of inferring true universal statements from singular statements or individual observations), the "truth" of theories can be neither established nor rejected with complete certainly (Papineau, 1978:26). Instrumentalism therefore considers theories to be no more than contingent instruments for making
successful predictions (i.e., predictions which are consistent with observations).56 Theories organise, summarise and impose order upon hitherto incommensurable observations, but do not represent "truth" or "reality" (Boland, 1982pp. 16-17); (Davis, 1969pp.25-33); (Friedman, 1953p.9).
(2) An hypothesis or theory can be accepted as part of a body of systematised knowledge only to the extent that it makes successful predictions. Instrumentalism rejects any attempt to immunise an hypothesis against falsification; rather, it advocates the formulation of falsifiable predictions and a will ingness to abandon hypothesis that have been refuted. Blaug, for example, argues that "theories must stand or fall on the basis of the predictions that they yield. Empirical testing of hypotheses constitutes the Mecca of modem economics" (Blaug, 1986p.270). Similarly, Friedman argues that "the only relevant test of the validity of an hypothesis is a comparison of its predictions with experience" (Friedman,
1953pp.8-9); see also (Davis, 1969pp.22-25); (Popper, 1963pp.33-41); (Lipsey, 1966pp.l-21).
(3) Given (1) and (2), as long as its conclusions are derived in a logical manner and are successful (i.e., are consistent with experience) the "truth" and "realism" of a theory’s premises are, for all practical purposes, irrelevant. By modus tollens, one or more of a theory’s premises must be false whenever one or more of its conclusions are false. It does not, however, follow that a theory’s premises are true because its conclusions are consistent with observations (this would constitute an invalid, reverse modus tollens
argument). Provided that its conclusions are consistent with observations, therefore, criticism of a theory’s premises is meaningless because it relies upon an invalid (reverse modus tollens) form of reasoning. (Similarly, nothing is gained by applying modus ponens: this line of reasoning requires ab solute certainty that a theory’s premises are true; the "problem of induction," however, precludes such certainty).
An hypothesis or theory, in short, cannot be judged on the basis of the "truth" or "realism" of its initial conditions (which are frequently but erroneously labelled "assumptions"). The demand that the theory’s initial conditions be "realistic" belies "a lack of understanding of theoretical knowledge. All theories abstract from reality. They are approximations and not reality. They are by definition unrealistic" (Davis, 1969p.26). Accordingly, "the relevant question to ask about the "assumptions" of a theory is not whether they are descriptively realistic (for they never are), but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand" (Friedman, 1953p.l5). This question can be answered only by ascertaining whether the theory yields accurate predictions.
A theory’s initial conditions help to present the theory succintly and to specify the conditions under which the theory is expected to be valid. A theory’s initial conditions are frequently "unrealistic" because they are abstract, because they idealise actors’ behaviour and because they simplify the theory’s ex planatory variables. Indeed, "any theory which is not an exact replica of reality abstracts, idealises and oversimplifies outrageously. If good theories are to explain much with little, they must be descriptively inaccurate or unrealistic" (Blaug, 1986). Friedman expresses this methodological point most forcefully:
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have "assumptions" that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality; the more significant the theory the more "unrealistic" the assump tions. An hypothesis is important if it "explains" much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomenon to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of these alone (Friedman, 1953p. 14).
To be important, therefore, an hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of, and accounts for, none o f the many other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained (Friedman, 1953pp. 14-15); see also (Davis, 1969p.26); (Robertson, 1976p.23).
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more than an engine for generating refutable empirical propositions. It does not attempt (or claim) to provide an exhaustive explanation of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution. It ac cepts that it may omit relevant factors from consideration. Nor does it claim that its empirical proposi tions uncover ultimate or transcendent truths. It says only "look at the phenomenon of agrarian party formation, electoral support and dissolution in this way; when you do you will see the order which has been eluding you" [paraphrased from (Boynton, 1982p.38)]. (2) At the same time, however, to the extent that its empirical propositions are consistent with factual observations, this study claims to produce systematised knowledge. (3) This study’s theory and empirical propositions cannot be judged on the basis of the "realism" of its initial conditions; rather, they can only be judged on the basis of its empirical proposition’s conformity with factual observations. As Boland observes, "any valid or fair criticism of an instrumentalist [theory] can only be about the sufficiency of its argument. The only direct refutation is one that shows that the theory is inapplicable. Failing that, the critic must alternatively provide his own sufficient argument, which does the same job" (Boland, 1979p.509).