B.: The dependent variables are CHRPC22, CPSPC22 and TOUT 2 2 The coefficients of Model (2) are both unstandardised

b's and constant elasticities. The coefficients of Model (1) are unstandardised b's.

* indicates that t < 1.96

** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58 *** indicates that > 2.58

Representatives and Senate elections a strong negative relationship exists between the Grazier variable and the Country party vote. Occupational status as a grazier, in other words, was associated with electoral support for parties other than the Country Party. The Cattle variable, however, continues to be a strong predictor of the party’s support. Indeed, the magnitude of its coefficient is much greater within New South Wales than across Australia. These results indicate that in New South Wales the economic at­ tributes of pastoral production were more important determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support than was occupational status as a grazier. They also indicate that pastoral economic variables were stronger determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support in New South Wales than in other states.

(2) The coefficient of the Dairy variable indicates that, at least within New South Wales, an increase in the size of dairy herds per farm decreased the Country Party’s electoral support. (3) Occupational status as a farmer in New South Wales was associated with electoral support for the Country Party. At the same time, agricultural economic variables (particularly Grain Acreage and Mechanisation) yield larger and more efficient coefficients than the Farmer variable. Like the Cattle measure, the magnitude of these variables is greater in New South Wales than across Australia. This result indicates that voting in response to agricultural economic conditions was more prevalent within this state than in other states.

(4) A strong relationship emerges between the Business variable and the Country Party’s electoral support. The size of its coefficient relative to other coefficients indicates that rural businessmen were a bulwark of the Country Party vote in this state. (5) The negative relationship between electoral participa­ tion and Country Party support represents the strongest relationship in the table. Farm owners, for example, were less likely to vote but more likely to vote for the Country Party. Conversely, farm mechanisation encouraged voter turnout but discouraged Country Party electoral support. This relation­ ship is stronger within New South Wales than across Australia (the magnitude of the coefficient of the Turnout variable, for example, increases from -1.84 to -2.07). Moreover, other sets of coefficients bear signs of this relationship: an increase in the value of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables, for example, decrease voter turnout but increase Country Party support; increases in the Grazier, Dairy, Sheep and Fruit Acreage variables show the opposite tendency.

Country Party support in New South Wales and states other than New South Wales differed sharply at this election. Table 6-5 reports estimated parameters of voter turnout and the Country Party’s electoral support in Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.44 Once again, five relation­ ships are noteworthy. (1) In these states the Country Party had no religious base of support. (Indeed, in Senate elections the coefficient of the Anglican variable is strongly negative). (2) In these states (unlike New South Wales) occupational status as a grazier is associated with electoral support for the Country Party. At the same time, the magnitude of economic coefficients of pastoral production (particularly the coefficient of the Cattle variable), is much smaller in these states than in New South Wales. The pastoral bulwark of the Country Party support which is present in New South Wales is thus largely absent in other states.

(3) To a slightly greater extent than in New South Wales (particularly in Senate elections) occupational status as a farmer was associated with electoral support for the Country Party. Conversely, agricultural economic indicators yield much smaller coefficients (and hence suggest weaker links to the Country Party vote) in these states than in New South Wales. The party’s agricultural economic bulwark was thus weaker in these states than in New South Wales. (4) Similarly, the relationship between the Business variable and Country Party support is much weaker in these states than in New South Wales. This result indicates that a third bulwark of the party’s strength in New South Wales was much weaker in these other states.

98

Table 6-5: Country Party Electoral Support, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and

Tasmania, Commonwealth Election, 1922 House of

Representatives Senate

Turnout Vote Turnout Vote

Variable R e lig io n Anglican -. 35*** .35 - .4 5*** -.81** O c c u p a tio n Farmer -.06*** . 15** ” .04*** .28*** Grazier .04** .06 .04** .1 1* Labour .01 -1.0 0*** .01 - . 2 1 Business .16 . 51** .11 L a n d U tilis a tio n Grain Acreage .02 . 05** .01 .1 0** Fruit Acreage .01 -.03 - . 0 1 .1 1* Sheep -.03*** .04 — # q4★ ★ ★ _.01 Cattle _ ]_!*** .19* .08*** .05 Mechanisation - .1 1*** -.18 -.07** -.09 Voter Turnout (Constant) - .51*** -1.14*** -2.60*** .02 -2.04*** Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS Model (2) (2) (2) (2) N 157 157 181 181

N.B.: The dependent variables are CHRPC22, CSPC22 AND TOUT22 The coefficients of Model (2) are both unstandardised b's and constant elasticities.

* indicates that t < 1.96

** indicates that 2.32 < t < 2.58 *** t < 2.58

(5) The relationship between the Turnout variable and Country Party support is weaker in states other than New South Wales than in New South Wales (-1.14 versus -2.07). This result reflects the generally weaker pattern of results observed in these states. Moreover, this negative relationship is replicated in only one other pair of coefficients: as in New South Wales, farm owners were less likely to cast ballots but were more likely to vote for the Country Party.

Three results emerge from an analysis of Tables 6-3,6-4 and 6-5. First, the Farmer, Business, Cattle and Grain Acreage variables were, across Australia, the most important determinants of the Country Party’s electoral support at this election. Moreover, these agricultural economic variables were stronger predic­ tors of the Country Party vote than was occupational status as a farmer. This result, together with the finding that the party has no religious base, is consistent with the hypothesis that agricultural and pastoral economic stimuli are the most important catalysts of the agrarian party’s electoral support.

Second, at this election the Country Party’s electoral support in New South Wales and states other than New South Wales rested upon similar but unequally-firm foundations. In states other than New South Wales the Country Party lacked at least two of the pillars of support that it possessed in New South Wales. In particular, the coefficients of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables are smaller (and their standard errors are larger) than their counterparts in New South Wales. This observation also applies to the coefficient of the Business variable. The Country Party’s electoral support was thus more tenuous (and hence the party itself was weaker) in these states than in New South Wales.

Finally, at this election the parameters of the Country Party’s electoral support closely resemble the parameters of its formation and dissolution (which were reported in Chapter 5). A comparison of Tables 6-3, 6-4, 6-5 and 5-2 reveals that the same variables - Grain Acreage, Cattle, Business and Mechanisa­ tion — are most closely associated with the Country Party’s formation and electoral support. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that agrarian party candidates appear in the constituencies in which voter dissatisfaction with the major parties is greatest and that voters in these constituencies who are most dissatisfied with the major parties vote for an agrarian party candidate.

The parameters of the electoral support of the Australian Labor Party and the Nationalist Party differ significantly from the parameters of the Country Party’s electoral support. Table 6-6 reports the parameters of the Australian Labor Party vote in electoral subdivisions contested by the Country Party and the Australian Labor Party.45 Five sets of relationships distinguish the ALP’s electoral support from the Country Party’s electoral support (1) In all states and in both House of Representatives and Senate elections, the ALP (unlike the Country Party) had a very strong religious base of support (The coef­ ficients of the Catholic variable are among the largest coefficients in the table). (2) Occupational status as a grazier in New South Wales was associated with electoral support for the Labor Party, in other words, engendered support for the ALP. The economic attributes of pastoral production, however, did not engender support for this party: the coefficient of the Cattle variable is consistently (and strongly) negative, the direction of the coefficients of the Sheep and Dairy variables is negative (and their standard error is generally large). Measures of pastoral economic production, in other words, were determinants of of the Country Party’s - not of the Labor Party’s - electoral support.

(3) At this election farm owners rejected the ALP. The negative relationship between the Farmer variable and the Labor Party vote is, almost without exception, the strongest and most efficient in each equation. Further, measures of agricultural economic production (Grain Acreage, Fruit Acreage and Mechanisation) yield much more modest (and, with the exception of Mechanisation, negative) relation­ ships. Clearly, therefore, the ALP (unlike the Country Party) lacked an agricultural (or agricultural

100

Table 6-6: Australian Labor Party Electoral Support, All States, Commonwealth Election, 1922

H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s S e n a t e A u s t N S W O t h e r V a r i a b l e A u s t N S W O t h e r Religion Catholic 4 t"J * ★ ★ _{69*** .35* .56*** .56*** . 66***} Occupation Farmer #91*** -1.47*** -.96*** _ _ 77***_ 1.73*** -. 66*** Grazier . 32* 1.90** .19 .31* 1.61*** .12 Labour .54** -.15 .69** 72*** _ 41*** .54** Business .33** .47 -.31* — 4 4 * * * -.56** -. 32** Land Utilisation Grain . 02*** -.01 -.02* -.01** -.01 -.01* Fruit . 02*** -.02 -. 03** -.02** .02 -.03** Sheep .01 -.01 .01 .01** -.01 -.00 Cattle Dairy .06*** -.05** .01 -.03** -. 05*** -.05*** — q4 * * * - . 0 1 Mech'is'n .07*** .03 . 05** . 05*** 0 9*** .02 Turnout State .12 .05** _7 4*** _{.07 .01} -.1 0*** .13 -.2 2** (Constant) . 32*** . 14 #4 4 * * * _{.35*** .26*** . 43***} Estimator GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS Model (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) N 255 125 130 435 254 181

N.B.: The dependent variables are ALPHRPC22 and ALPSPC22.