The 1925 Commonwealth Election

The Country Party’s leader in the Commonwealth Parliament observed that between 1922 and 1925 "a deep fission in political thinking developed between the Government and the Labor Opposition. Labor’s position had moved steadily to the left since the [National Labor] breakaway in the First World War. Their policies conflicted with Nationalist Party and Country Party doctrine in vital matters, including the free enterprise system" (Page, 1963p.l71). Moreover, "the deep infection of Communist doctrine in the Labour movement was having severe repercussions on the industrial front The Government faced strikes which threatened to undermine the process of democratic government and to disrupt the country’s economic development" (Page, 1963p. 172); (Graham, 1966p.232). The Government thus "chose to fight this election almost entirely on the issue of "law and order" and the "Menace from Moscow"; it was the first of the full-scale "Red Scare" campaigns that were to be frequent during the next forty years" (Fitzhardinge, 1979p.545).

Table 5 4 reports (1) the number of non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions in which Country Party, Nationalist Party and Australian Labor Party candidates were present at this election, and (2) the percent-

T a b le 5 -3 : N a tio n a lis t P a rty F o rm a tio n an d D isso lu tio n , C o m m o n w e a lth E le c tio n , 1922 A u s t r a l i a N S W O t h e r S t a t e s E s t i m a t o r p r o b i t p r o b i t l o g i t M o d e l (2) (2) (1) N 4 9 2 2 5 4 2 3 8 I n d e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s : R e lig io n A n g l i c a n 1 . 9 6 ( 0 . 4 8 ) * * * - 1 . 6 8 (0. 13 ) 8 . 5 5 ( 1 . 0 8 ) * * * O c c u p a t io n F a r m e r 0 . 0 2 (0 .02) - 0 . 0 2 (0 .01) - 1 . 4 1 (0. 05 ) G r a z i e r - 0 . 1 5 ( 0 . 1 9 ) * 0 . 0 0 (0 .00) - 2 . 8 5 (0. 07 ) L a b o u r - 0 . 0 1 (0 .01) 1 . 9 0 ( 0 . 3 8 ) * * - 1 . 9 2 (0. 11 ) B u s i n e s s - 0 . 5 2 ( 0 . 3 4 ) * - 1 . 7 7 ( 0 . 3 9 ) * * - 0 . 3 6 ( 0 . 0 3 ) L a n d U t ilis a t io n G r a i n A c r e a g e 0 . 1 1 ( 0 . 0 5 ) * 0 . 1 8 ( 0 . 0 3 ) * 0 . 2 3 (0 .0 9 ) * F r u i t A c r e a g e 0 . 0 3 ( 0 . 0 0 ) 0 . 1 7 (0 .00) - 0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 0 3 ) S h e e p - 0 . 1 5 ( 0 . 1 6 ) * * * - 0 . 1 1 ( 0 . 0 4 ) - 0 . 4 6 ( 0 . 4 5 ) * * * C a t t l e 0 . 0 3 ( 0 . 0 3 ) 0 . 0 5 ( 0 . 0 1 ) 0 . 1 9 ( 0 . 1 9 ) M e c h a n i s a t i o n 0 . 0 2 (0 .01) - 0 . 4 2 (0 .09) - 0 . 2 5 ( 0 . 0 2 ) D a i r y 0 . 1 1 (0 .02) V o t e r T u r n o u t 2 . 0 3 ( 0 . 3 4 ) * * * 3 . 8 6 ( 0 . 2 4 ) * * * 1 . 7 2 ( 0 .29 ) S t a t e ( D u mm y ) 0 . 9 5 ( 0 . 1 4 ) * * * ( C o n s t a n t ) 1 . 7 2 ( 0 . 5 1 ) * * 3 . 4 6 ( 0 . 3 3 ) - 2 . 3 4 (0. 63 ) N . B . : T h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i s N P C A N D 2 2 . F i g u r e s w i t h i n p a r e n t h e s e s a r e p o i n t e l a s t i c i t i e s ( m e a s u r e d a t t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e ' s m e a n ) . * i n d i c a t e s t h a t t < 1 . 9 6 ** i n d i c a t e s t h a t 2 . 3 2 < t < 2 . 5 8 * * * i n d i c a t e s t h a t t > 2 . 5 8

80

Table 5-4: Non-Metropolitan Electoral Subdivisions With Country Party, Nationalist Party and

Australian Labor Party Candidates, Commonwealth Election, 1925 C o u n t r y N a t i o n a l i s t L a b o r P a r t y P a r t y P a r t y N u m b e r (%) N u m b e r (%) N u m b e r (%) N e w S o u t h W a l e s 1 0 3 (40.6) 2 0 7 ( 8 1 . 5 ) 2 5 4 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) Q u e e n s l a n d 38 (38.0) 40 ( 4 0 . 0 ) 78 (78.0) S o u t h A u s t r a l i a 0 (0.0) 57 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) 5 7 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) W e s t e r n A u s t r a l i a 14 (37.8) 2 3 ( 6 2 . 2 ) 37 ( 1 0 0. 0 ) T a s m a n i a 13 (29.6) 44 ( 1 0 0 . 0 ) 44 ( 1 0 0. 0 ) A u s t r a l i a 1 6 8 (34.2) 3 7 1 ( 7 4 . 4 ) 4 6 9 (95.3) N . B . : F i g u r e s r e f e r t o H o u s e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e l e c t i o n s .

age of total non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions in which these parties’ candidates were present. It indicates that Australian Labor party candidates were present in 15.2 percent more electoral subdivisions in 1925 than in 1922. ALP formation was particularly marked in New South Wales, where the number of subdivisions with ALP candidates increased by 18.1 percent at this election. The number of subdivisions in other states with ALP candidates increased by 12.5 percent. As a result, Australian Labor Party candidates were present in almost all (95.3 percent) of Australia’s non-metropolitan electoral subdivisions at this election.

Conversely, Nationalist Party and Country Party candidates were present in fewer electoral subdivisions at this election than at the 1922 election. For each party, sub-national distinctions appear. Across Australia, for example, the number of electoral subdivisions with Nationalist Party candidates declined very slightly (by 1.9 percent) between the 1922 election and the 1925 election. In New South Wales this number decreased by 9.6 percent; in states other than New South Wales, however, it increased by 10.1 percent. At this election, therefore, Nationalist Party dissolution occurred in New South Wales and Nationalist Party formation took place in states other than New South Wales.

The percentage change in the number of electoral subdivisions in which Country Party candidates were present was much greater than the percentage change in the number of electoral subdivisions in which Australian Labor Party or Nationalist Party candidates were present. At the 1925 election, the Country Party’s House of Representatives candidates were present in 168 electoral subdivisions. Across Australia, therefore, Country Party candidates were present in 45.5 percent fewer electoral subdivisions in 1925 than in 1922. Moreover, Country Party dissolution took place in all states. Country Party dissolution was less marked in New South Wales (where the party’s candidates were present in 34.6 percent fewer subdivi­ sions in 1925 than in 1922) than in states other than New South Wales (where its candidates were present in 57.2 percent fewer subdivisions at this election). In consequence, only in New South Wales were Country Party candidates present in more than 40 percent of a state’s electoral subdivisions. This result is consistent with the differential (New South Wales versus, states other than New South Wales) pattern of results observed at the 1922 election.

lhat party’s vigour, then the Country Party was much weaker in 1925 than in 1922. Particularly at this election, however, this inference may not be valid. Between the 1922 election and the 1925 election the Country Party entered into an electoral alliance with the Nationalist Party [for a detailed discussion of this alliance, see (Graham, 1966); (Page, 1963Appendix 6)]. In some House of Representatives elections, the two parties agreed that they would accord one another electoral preserves, within which they would not compete for votes. In other House of Representatives elections (and in Senate elections), each party urged its supporters to give their second preference vote to the other party.

Between the 1922 election and the 1925 election Country Party and Nationalist Party leaders thus restricted their respective parties’ electoral manoeuvrability (the freedom to present candidates in any and all constituencies) in return for greater electoral security (in some constituencies, the status as the sole non-Labor party; in other constituencies, the recipient of the other party’s second preference votes). It follows from the initial conditions specified in Chapter 3 that in such circumstances each party would attempt (subject to the bargaining strength of the other party) to negotiate an agreement that would permit it to direct organisational resources away from constituencies in which electoral returns were least attrac­ tive and to concentrate them in constituencies in which electoral returns were most attractive. Accord­ ingly, the decline between 1922 and 1925 in the number of constituencies in which Country Party candidates were present may constitute a rationalisation or a re-allocation (not necessarily an erosion) of the party’s organisational resources.

Table 5-5, which sets out determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution, indicates that the Country Party’s organisational resources were both eroded and re-allocated at this election. In New South Wales, the Country Party consolidated the strengths observed at the 1922 election. Agricultural and pastoral economic variables (particularly the Cattle, Grain Acreage and Mechanisation variables) remained much more powerful determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution than agricultural and pastoral occupational variables (such as the Farmer and Grazier variables). Indeed, the magnitude of the coefficients of all occupational variables drops precipitously (and their standard errors increase) at this election: unlike the 1922 election, at which three of the four occupational variables were associated with the presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in an electoral subdivision, at the 1925 election only the Business variable showed such a relationship. (At both elections, the presence of businessmen and professionals in an electoral subdivision is strongly associated with Country Party formation in that subdivision).

Conversely, the relationship between the economic attributes of agricultural and pastoral production and the presence of Country Party candidates increased markedly at this election. The elasticity of the coef­ ficient of the Grain Acreage variable increases from 0.43(1922) to 1.21(1925); the elasticity of the coefficient of the Cattle variable increases from 1.23(1922) to 5.53(1925), and the elasticity of the coefficient of the Mechanisation variable increases from 0.69(1922) to 3.71(1925). These results, together with the large standard errors of the coefficients of the Fruit Acreage, Sheep and Dairy variables, indicate that in New South Wales electoral subdivisions a much stronger relationship existed between the produc­ tion of price- and income-inelastic commodities and Country Party formation (and the production of price- and income-elastic commodities and Country Party dissolution) at the 1925 election than at the 1922 election. In New South Wales, in other words, the allocation of the Country Party’s candidates seemed to respond more clearly to the hypothesised determinants of voter dissatisfaction with the major parties in 1925 than in 1922. This result suggests that (in organisational terms at least) in constituencies contested at both elections the Country Party seemed to be a stronger entity in 1925 than in 1922.

T a b le 5-5: C o u n try P arty F o rm a tio n a n d D isso lu tio n , C o m m o n w e a lth E le c tio n , 1925 A u s t r a l i a N S W O t h e r S t a t e s E s t i m a t o r M o d e l N l o g i t (1) 4 9 2 l o g i t (2) 2 5 4 p r o b i t (2) 2 3 8 I n d e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s: R e lig io n A n g l i c a n 1 . 8 2 (0.61) - 4 . 8 7 ( 3 . 1 6 ) * * 1 . 9 9 ( 3 . 0 1 ) * * O c c u p a tio n F a r m e r G r a z i e r L a b o u r B u s i n e s s 2 . 7 7 (0.17) - 1 0 . 8 0 ( 0 . 3 2 ) * * - 8 . 9 7 ( 1 . 0 1 ) * 5 . 6 8 ( 0 . 7 4 ) * * 0 . 2 3 (0.75) 0 . 0 4 (0.17) - 0 . 2 7 (0.45) 3 . 1 4 ( 5 . 8 5 ) * * - 0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 4 0 ) - 0 . 0 2 (0.13) 0 . 1 1 ( 0 . 4 2 ) - 0 . 5 2 (2.15) L a n d U tilisa tio n G r a i n A c r e a g e F r u i t A c r e a g e S h e e p C a t t l e M e c h a n i s a t i o n D a i r y 0 . 3 7 ( 0 . 5 9 ) * * * - 0 . 3 6 ( 0 . 2 2 ) * * 0 . 0 4 ( 0 . 1 1 ) 0 . 6 3 ( 1 . 2 4 ) * * * - 1 . 2 3 ( 2 . 0 6 ) * * * 1 . 0 3 ( 1 . 2 1 ) * * * 0 . 0 4 ( 0 . 0 1 ) - 0 . 0 3 (0. 09 ) 2 . 4 1 ( 5 . 5 3 ) * * * - 2 . 1 3 ( 3 . 7 1 ) * * 0 . 2 6 ( 0 . 3 3 ) - 0 . 2 4 ( 1 . 2 2 ) * - 0 . 1 0 (0.26) 0 . 5 7 ( 3 . 9 4 )* * * - 1 . 3 4 ( 6 . 2 5 )* * * 0 . 6 2 ( 2 .67 ) * V o t e r T u r n o u t S t a t e ( D u m m y ) ( C o n s t a n t ) - 7 . 0 7 ( 4 . 2 1 )* * 0 . 3 8 (0. 15) 4 . 7 7 ( 3 . 4 9 )* - 3 . 2 2 (0. 56 ) - 0 . 3 5 ( 0 . 1 2 ) N . B . : T h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i s C P C A N D 2 5 . F i g u r e s w i t h i n p a r e n t h e s e s a r e p o i n t ( m e a s u r e d a t t h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e e l a s t i c i t i e s ' s m e a n ) . * i n d i c a t e s t h a t t < * * i n d i c a t e s t h a t 2 . 3 2 * * * i n d i c a t e s t h a t t > 1 . 9 6 < t < 2 . 5 8 2 . 5 8

A very different pattern of results appears in states other than New South Wales. As in 1922, none of the four occupational variables was associated with the presence or absence of a Country Party candidate in one of these state’s electoral subdivisions. The Anglican variable, however, became a powerful deter­ minant of Country Party formation. As in New South Wales electoral subdivisions at this election, the coefficients of several agricultural and pastoral economic variables (e.g., Grain Acreage, Cattle, Sheep and Mechanisation) increased markedly in magnitude at this election. However, the direction of these variables’ coefficients is the opposite of that observed in New South Wales, and directly contradicts theoretical expectations. In these states a relationship existed between the production of price-elastic commodities and Country Party formation and the production of price-inelastic commodities and Country Party dissolution. In these states, in other words, the allocation of the Country Party’s candidates did not correspond with the hypothesised determinants voter dissatisfaction with the major parties.

Table 5-6, which sets out determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution at this election, helps to resolve this anomaly. In New South Wales electoral subdivisions the coefficient of the Labour variable is no longer associated with Nationalist Party formation. Further, the coefficient of the Grain Acreage variable changes direction (from 0.18 in 1922 to -0.30 in 1925) as does the coefficient of the Cattle variable (from 0.05 in 1922 to -0.64 in 1925). At the 1925 election, therefore, these agricultural and pastoral variable were associated with the departure of Nationalist Party candidates from New South Wales electoral subdivisions.

The elasticity of the coefficients of the Grain Acreage and Cattle variables remained constant or increased markedly in magnitude in states other than New South Wales. (The elasticity of the coefficient of the Grain Acreage variable was 0.09 in 1922 and 0.08 in 1925, and the elasticity of the coefficient of the Cattle variable increased from 0.19 in 1922 to 0.38 in 1925). In these states, however, these variables were associated with the presence - not the absence - of Nationalist Party candidates in electoral subdivisions. Finally, the relationship between Nationalist Party formation and dissolution and the Mechanisation and variable increased in magnitude (the elasticity of the coefficient of the Mechanisation variable increased from 0.02 in 1922 to 0.29 in 1925), and was associated with the absence of Nationalist Party candidates from electoral subdivisions. In these states, then, the agricultural and pastoral economic determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution are stronger than the corresponding deter­ minants of Country Party formation and dissolution. In short, the determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution in these states closely resemble the determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution in New South Wales.

Table 5-4 indicated that at the 1925 election (1) Nationalist Party dissolution occurred in the state in which the determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution in 1922 were strongest (i.e., in New South Wales), and that (2) Nationalist Party formation occurred in the states in which the determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution in 1922 were weakest (i.e., in states other than New South Wales). Table 5-4 thus indicated that at the 1925 election the Nationalist Party directed organisational resources away from constituencies in which the Country Party responded most clearly to voter dissatis­ faction with the major parties and directed organisational resources towards constituencies in which the Country Party responded least clearly to to voter dissatisfaction with the major parties.

Tables 5-5 and 5-6 corroborate this result. In states other than New South Wales the Nationalist Party responded to voter dissatisfaction with major parties by directing organisational resources towards con­ stituencies in which voter dissatisfaction with the major parties was greatest. It was for this reason that the determinants of Country Party formation and dissolution in New South Wales and the determinants of Nationalist Party formation and dissolution in states other than New South Wales are similar.

T a b le 5-6: N a tio n a list P a rty F o rm a tio n a n d D isso lu tio n , C o m m o n w e a lth E le c tio n , 1925 A u s t r a l i a N S W O t h e r S t a t e s E s t i m a t o r p r o b i t l o g i t p r o b i t M o d e l (1) (2) (2) N 4 9 2 2 5 4 2 3 8 I n d e p e n d e n t V a r i a b l e s : R e lig io n A n g l i c a n - 2 . 3 1 (0.32) * - 1 . 3 9 ( 0 . 1 3 ) - 2 . 4 0 ( 0 . 0 9 ) * * O c c u p a t io n F a r m e r 0 . 0 0 (0.00) - 4 . 0 9 ( 0 . 0 2 ) 0 . 2 0 (0.02) G r a z i e r 4 . 1 1 ( 0 . 0 5 ) * 9 . 7 1 ( 0 . 0 3 ) - 0 . 0 1 ( 0 . 0 1 ) L a b o u r 9 . 3 7 ( 0 . 4 4 ) * * * 8 . 6 3 ( 0 . 2 4 ) 0 . 6 3 (0.0 6) B u s i n e s s - 4 . 7 8 ( 0 . 2 6 ) * * * - 4 . 5 6 ( 0 . 1 0 ) 0 . 0 5 (0.0 1) L a n d U t ilis a t io n G r a i n A c r e a g e - 0 . 0 5 ( 0 . 0 3 ) - 0 . 3 0 ( 0 . 0 9 ) * * 0 . 6 0 ( 0 . 0 8 ) * * * F r u i t A c r e a g e 0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 0 4 ) - 0 . 0 9 ( 0 . 0 1 ) 0 . 0 5 ( 0 . 0 1 ) S h e e p - 0 . 0 3 (0.03) 0 . 0 1 ( 0 . 0 1 ) - 0 . 6 1 ( 0 . 1 1 ) * * C a t t l e 0 . 1 6 ( 0 . 1 3 ) - 0 . 6 4 ( 0 . 3 7 ) * * 3 . 2 4 ( 0 . 3 8 ) * * * M e c h a n i s a t i o n 0 . 0 3 ( 0 . 0 2 ) 0 . 4 4 (0.19) - 2 . 6 8 ( 0 . 2 9 ) * * * D a i r y 0 . 0 5 (0.02) V o t e r T u r n o u t 1 . 8 1 (0. 45) - 0 . 6 8 (0. 11 ) 0 . 5 2 (0. 01 ) S t a t e (D u m m y ) 0 . 0 7 (0. 01) ( C o n s t a n t ) - 0 . 6 7 (0.20) 3 . 0 7 (0.64) 0 . 7 0 (0 .0 3 ) N . B . : T h e d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e i s N P C A N D 2 5 . F i g u r e s w i t h i n p a r e n t h e s e s a r e p o i n t e l a s t i c i t i e s