Initial Conditions

The ultimate goal of a positive science is to develop theories which yield valid and meaningful (i.e., not truistic or tautological) predictions about phenomena that have not yet been observed (Blaug, 1986); (Davis, 1969); (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977pp.l-15); (Nicholson, 1983). Positive economics, for ex­ ample, consists in "a body of tentatively accepted generalisations about economic phenomena that can be used to predict the consequences of changes in circumstances" (Friedman, 1953p.39); see also (Lipsey, 1966pp. 1-21). A meaningful scientific theory typically asserts that certain things cause (and that all other things do not cause) a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena. It is frequently convenient to analyse this phenomenon or set of phenomena as if it occurred in a highly abstract world which contains only theoretically-relevant variables (Friedman, 1953pp.39-40). When attempting to analyse a complex problem, in other words, it is often a good strategy to refrain from attacking the problem directly; rather, it is often a good idea to construct an artificial situation that is amenable to systematic analysis. One can often gain insight into the real problem by solving the artificial problem (Davis, 1969p.26). A small number of "initial conditions" simplify theoretical analyses and specify the circumstances under which they are expected to be valid. Four initial conditions, each of which is implicit in the conjectures set out in section 3.1, facilitate the analysis of non-major party formation, electoral support and dissolution. (Appendix C discusses and justifies this study’s "instrumentalist" methodology in detail).

IC .l (Institutional Arrangements): Liberal democratic institutional arrangements and procedures govern the conduct of elections: all adults are fully enfranchised; elections occur at regular intervals; ballots are cast without coercion and carry equal weight; party competition proceeds unhindered and electoral results are respected (Harrop and Miller, 1987); (Dahl, 1966); (Dahl, 1967); (Dahl and Tufte, 1973); (Sartori, 1987).

IC.2 (Voter Behaviour): (1) Voters are rational (goal-directed) actors (Robertson, 1976p.20); (Goldberg, 1969). Specifically, voter preferences are determined by the same influences which affect consumer tastes in the economic theory of demand: like consumers, voters maximise the expected satisfaction (utility) obtained from alternate "firms" (parties) and vote for the party which provides the greatest utility from government activity (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973pp.8-44); (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968). Voters act as if they are cognizant of their (subjectively-determined) self-interest; they evaluate parties and programmes competing for their support in terms of this self-interest and cast ballots on the basis of this self-interest (Downs, 1957); (Enelow and Hinich, 1984p.3); (Robertson, 1976pp.197-200).

(2) The greater is the salience (importance) of a particular issue(s), the greater is voter turnout at elections.

IC3 (Party Behaviour): Parties are goal-directed (rational) actors. They never seek office as a means of carrying out particular policies. Rather, their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office (Downs, 1957p.28) and they are as indifferent to the policies they espouse as to the welfare of the citizens whose voles they solicit. For this reason, they are prepared to advocate any policy that will help them win office (Hartley andTisdell, 1981pp.45-67); (Buchanan, 1978); (Schumpeter, 1950p.285).

IC.4 (The Interaction Between Voters and Parties):

• IC4.1: The mass electorate’s preferences with respect to particular issues, together with the salience (importance) of these issues, are the sole determinants of a political party’s policy positions: no other actor (pressure group, government bureau, etc) influences a party’s policies.

• IC4.2: Electoral laws (i.e., the laws that govern the process by which electoral preferences are articulated) greatly influence the process by which popular votes are translated into parliamentary representation (Rae, 197lp. 14); they do not, however, influence voter or party behaviour at elections.17

• IC4.3: (a) Parties always respond to changes in voter preferences and issue salience, (b) they do not, however, necessarily respond satisfactorily to changes in voter preferences and issue salience.

It follows from these initial conditions that voter dissatisfaction with the major parties, together with issue salience, are the sole determinants of non-major party formation and electoral support. If the salience of an issue(s) is low, and if voters are dissatisfied with the policies of one or both of the major parties, voters will abstain from electoral competition. If, however, the salience of an issue(s) is great and if voters are dissatisfied with the policies of one or both of the major parties, voters will consider voting for a non-major party - and "political entrepreneurs" will therefore stand as non-major party candidates (i.e., non-major party formations results).

Non-major party formation and dissolution thus refer to the extent to which non-major party candidates contest elections. An increase in the number of constituencies that the non-major party’s candidates contest (regardless of its percentage share of the total vote within these constituencies) constitutes non­ major party formation. The greater the number of constituencies which a non-major party contests from one election to another, the greater is non-major party formation at the latter election. Conversely, a decrease in the number of constituencies which a non-major party’s candidates contests constitutes non-major party dissolution. The greater the decrease in the number of constituencies which a non-major party contests from one election to another, the greater is non-major party dissolution at the latter election.

IC.1-IC.4 can be expressed mathematically. Following Riker and Ordeshook (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973pp.310-322), let

1. x = (Xj, x2, . . . , xn) represent a citizen’s most preferred outcome for each of n issues, where xi represents his preference with respect to issue i.

2. 9 = (9j, 02, . . . , 0n) represent a citizen’s estimate of party l ’s position for each of n issues, where 0j represents the citizen’s estimate of party l ’s position with respect to issue i (where party 1 is a major party).

3. y = (\jfj_, \g2, . . . , Yn) represent a citizen’s estimate of party 2’s position for each of n issues, where represents the citizen’s estimate of party 2’s position with respect to issue i (where party 2 is a major party).

4. (xi - G^2 represents the disparity between the citizen’s preference with respect to issue i and his perception of party l ’s position with respect to this issue — in short, the citizen’s dissatisfaction (with respect to issue i) with the position of party 1.

5. (xj - xjq)2 represents the disparity between the citizen’s preference with respect to issue i and his perception of party 2 ’s position with respect to this issue - in short, the citizen’s dissatisfaction (with respect to issue i) with the position of party 2.

6. represents the importance (salience) of issue i to the citizen.

7. Citizens satisfied with one of the two major parties will behave in the following manner: If <t>i(Xi - Gi)2 < ^ (X j - x ^ )2

they will vote for party 1; if 4>i(Xi - Yx)2 < - 0i)2 they will vote for party 2.

8. Clearly, however, not all citizens are satisfied with one or the other of the major parties. Nor do all citizens vote. Thus, let A(y) represent the change between election k and election k-1 in the number constituencies contested by non-major party candidates (or, equivalently, the change in non-major party support as a percentage of total votes cast in the constituency between k and k-1).

of the major parlies - and hence the percentage of the total electorate that is most prepared, when dissatisfied with one or both of the major parties, to consider a non-major party as an alternative to a major party (0 < a < 1).

10. X represents, among a , the durability of the conversion from a major party to a non-major party ( 0 < \ < 1).

11. Y represents, among a , the strength of the conversion from a major party to a non-major party (0 < y ^ 1).

12. r(k) represent voter turnout at election k. Specifically,

a. Voter turnout at elections increases (decreases) as the utility associated with one party becomes more (less) distinguishable from the utility associated with the other party. Voter participation (abstention), in short, is a function of the perceived presence (lack) of choice between parties (Downs, 1957pp.270-276); (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954pp.314-315); (Enelow and Hinich, 1984p.90); (Brody and Page, 1973pp.2-3); (Ordeshook, 1970p.52). Hence,

r(k) = + f](xi - e^ 2 - (xj -Vi)2!.

b. Voter abstention is not merely a function of apathy, indifference or satisfaction with the status quo; it is also a function of dissatisfaction with the status quo - i.e., of "disgust with the alternatives proffered by the major parties" (Converse, 1966p.24); see also (Brody and Page, 1973pp.2-3); (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973). Hence,

r(k) = - f[(Xi - öj)2, (Xj - Vi)2].

c. The greater the salience of issue i, the greater the voter turnout at elections. Hence, r(k) = + f ^ ] .