E
vidence
Evidence is the means, sanctioned by these rules,
of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding
the truth respecting a matter of fact.
F
oreword
The journey towards becoming a great litigation lawyer starts with how well the student
has grasped the laws on Evidence. More than clearly defining evidentiary relevance and
competence, these laws also establish several doctrines which guide lawyers in assessing the
admissibility of their available evidence. But most importantly, these rules provide the steps
which the lawyer has to take in order for the court to take cognizance of what he has to offer –
steps which are essential in the protection of rights in our adversarial system of justice.
We understand how complex the study of evidence can be. To obtain mastery of the
rules, numerous cases are to be read, and those who are capable of reading them all are
considered as legends. This compilation seeks to lessen the burden for students who will succeed
us in the study of evidence. We made sure that each case is concise yet informative, so that
readers are immediately directed towards the pertinent doctrines in the study of the subject.
Nonetheless, we recognize that nothing beats patience and hard work. Whether or not
students choose to read full cases or resort to this compilation is a completely personal choice.
What is important is that they be able to find the hunger to learn, as well as the passion to chase
after their dreams. Because above all, the journey towards becoming great lawyers start within
ourselves. [Jyrevie Mae A. Fernandez]
D
edication
To our beloved professor and mentor
Hon. Judge Mel-Gerald N. Nieva
who has unceasingly challenged our minds
in appreciating the core logic behind the all-important
subject of evidentiary matters:
A Compilation of Cases for Evidence
________________________________________________
A Project of Class 3A SY 2017-2018
Contributors:
John Carlo B. Barcela
Louie Z. Belgica
Noel Melvin B. Bitas
Jann Carlo A. Columna
Rafael B. Dayap III
Romulo T. Espalmado, Jr.
Vhiena May D. Estrellado
Jyrevi Mae A. Fernandez
Marissa G. Fortes
Roxanne B. Lanzuela
Ma. Theresa Jessica B. Luzuriaga
John Mark M. Masamoc
Marion Rico M. Opeda
Victor Jeric B. Soliman
T
he rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and
hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or these rules. (Sec. 2 Rule 128)
ROMERO REYES, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, defendant.
216 SCRA 25 (1993)
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, the father of defendant Olympio is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 devoted to the production of palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la Cruz, the husband of plaintiff Eufrocina de la Cruz. In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband she succeeded him as a bona fide tenant. However, Olympio in conspiracy with the other defendants prevented her daughter Violeta and her workers from entering and working on the farm lots. Defendants likewise refused to vacate and surrender the lots which prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The petitioners in this case and the defendants Reyes, Parayao Aguinaldo and Mananghaya are duly elected and appointed Barangay Officials of the locality who denied their interference in the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and Eufrocina. Olympio o his part raised abandonment sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and non-payment of rentals as his defenses.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Agrarian Court’s decision with modification which ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of palay until they have vacated the area.
On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson since the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits of plaintiff even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination.
RULING:
The trial court did not err when it favourably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the Rules of Court shall not be applicable in Agrarian cases even in a suppletory character. The same provision states that in the hearing investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee vs
RODEGELIO TURCO, JR., aka "TOTONG”, Accused-appellant
GR. No. 137757 August 14, 2000
FACTS:
Accused raped his 12 year old neighbor Escelea Tabada. When the victim was about to sleep, she heard the voice of the accused calling from outside the house. When she opened the door, the accused threw a towel on her head and raped her near their house.
The accused was then charged of rape but argues that he must be released because of the following: 1. They were sweethearts
2. Inconsistencies to the testimonies given by the victim.
3. Whether the medical certificate was erroneously admitted since the doctor was not presented at the trial.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the accused should be acquitted on the ground of inconsistency on the testimony of the complainant.
2. Whether the medical certificate should be admitted as evidence. RULING:
NO. - Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape. Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor.
Moreover, minor inconsistencies in the testimonies given by a child of tender age destroy the suspicion that the testimony was rehearsed. It is when the testimony is seemingly perfect that the Court must take it with caution.
YES. - The certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. The entry in official records is an exception since it involved an opinion of one who is an expert witness. However an admission of evidence does not follow that it must be given weight. It is up to the Court to give weight or not. When the medical certificate is not corroborated by the positive identification of the physician who made the same, still it can be admitted but it is up to the Court whether or not to give weight or not. Thus it must be admitted.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ ROLANDO SASAN, SR. ET AL., Petitioners,
vs
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4th DIVISION, EQUITABLE PCI BANK & HELPMATE, INC., Respondents,
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank. For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients.
On the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC, 4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered, engaged in "labor-only contracting."Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases. RULING:
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.
The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO "Botong" MALIBIRAN Accused, and BEVERLY TIBO-TAN, Accused/Appellant.
G.R. No. 178301 April 24, 2009
FACTS:
In 1995 Reynaldo Tan and Beverly Tan were Greenhills with their children for their usual Sunday gallivant. Later the family stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. An explosion was heard, in the direction where Reynaldo car was park. They saw the car was burning, and Reynaldo badly injured, which later died because of the injuries sustained in the explosion.
A case was filed against Beverly Tan, Rolandon Malibaran and 3 others of a crime of Parricide and murder respectively. One of the co-accused Oswaldo Banaag was later discharged and utilized as one of the prosecution witnesses having overheard a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle. Janet Pascual, a friend of Beverly Tan, also testified that as to when the killing would take place, she heard that they will do it during the baptism of the child of Gloria, Rolando Malibiran’s sister.
The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged and impose the maximum penalty,which is Death sentence. The CA affirmed the decision with Modification in that the supreme penalty of deathimposed on both accused-appellants is hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of OswaldoBanaag and Janet Pascual should be accepted as evidence.
RULING:
Yes. The testimony of Oswaldo Banaag should be accepted as evidence. . Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.The witness who testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is to prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof.
In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overheard a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. Likewise, Janet may testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be considered as independently relevant statements, but also personally conveyed to her by appellant and Rolando.
E
vidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the
law or these rules. (Sec. 3 Rule 128)
HERMOGENES BAUTISTA, Petitioner, vs.
APOLONIO APARECE, Respondent,
51 O.G. 805 (1995)
FACTS:
Nicolas Anasco was the owner of the lot subject of the controversy, sold the same to Valentin Justiniani. Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani in the same year thereof. Claudio Justiniani executed a public instrument on the 12nd of October 1935 whereby he sold the same property for P100 to
Apolonio Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935.
While Aparece was in possession, Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of the land and took possession thereof. In effect, Aparece filed a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating in the province of Bohol.
When the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a guerilla officer, Bautista executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land to Aparece in good will, and thereby recognized Aparece’s lawful ownership over the land.
Thus, possession of the land was returned again to Aparece. However, Bautista believeing that the property was his and alleging that with the aid of armed and by pretending to be the owner of the said land, Bautista filed a complaint against Aparece in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Bohol.
The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of said land. On appeal, Bautista raised as a defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public instrument which he executed as evidence. He contended that the document was executed under duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed, had no jurisdiction over the matter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed before an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.
RULING:
This argument is beside the point. The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document is not only relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership between the parties’ litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in ac action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence is one that s not excluded by law in a particular case.
With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere fact that the public document was executed before a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really belong to defendant Aparece. _____________________________________________________________________________________
• Admissibility is determined, first, by relevancy—an affair of logic and not of law; second, but only indirectly, by the law of evidence which, in strictness, only declares whether matter which is logically probative is excluded. • Relevant evidence – evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence; evidence which tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. Dean Riano
Jesse G. Lopez, Plaintiff-Appellant vs.
Robert Heesen and Sears, Roebuck and Company, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees
365 P. 2D 448 (1961)
FACTS:
In the early afternoon of October 14, 1958, appellee, Heesen, an Air Force officer, purchased a J.C. Higgins Model 51, 30.06 rifle from the store of appellee, Sears. Said rifle has a bolt action known more particularly as a "Mauser type action" with which Heesen was familiar. Heesen, although experienced in hunting, was not familiar with the Higgins Model 51 and had never used such a rifle.
Immediately after the purchase of the rifle, Heesen left for a deer hunting trip in an area known as Ute Park near the town of Eagle Nest in Colfax County. He arrived at Ute Park that night and began hunting the next morning on October 15, 1958. Heesen hunted without success and had seen no game up until the time his gun discharged and appellant was wounded shortly after 3:00 P.M. Appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, then filed a suit against appellee, Robert Heesen, alleging that on October 15, 1958, Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and feloniously assaulted and shot appellant with a shotgun, thereby inflicting dangerous and painful wounds and injuries to him.
In the course of the trial, several companies were called to testify that the rifle was indeed safe and was not defective. However, the appellant contends that the trial court committed error in permitting testimony as to the general reputation of other firearms companies who use the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51. A witness for appellee, Sears, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., qualified as an expert in gun designing and testified *452 that the following companies had an excellent reputation in the small arms field: FabriqueNationale of Belgium, Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company, and Jefferson Corporation. Objection was made to this testimony on the ground that it was wholly immaterial and irrelevant to any issue in the case.
Appellee, Sears, introduced testimony of witnesses who were either experts in the small arms field or experts in gun designing. The witness, Paul A. La Violette, Jr., testified that he is a gun designer employed by High Standard Manufacturing Company who manufacture the Higgins Model 51 for Sears. He qualified as an expert gun designer with many years' experience with other rifle manufacturers and in factories designing and building weapons of the small arms design. La Violette has two gun patents pending. La Violette testified that the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 is supplied to High Standard Manufacturing Company by Fabrique Nationale of Belgium. He also testified extensively as to the advantages of the safety device of the Higgins Model 51 and stated that six different makes of guns have the same modified leaf safety device as does the Higgins Model 51. The manufacturers of these guns are F.N. Mauser, Colt, Marlin, Nato and Weatherby. The evidence also shows that since 1951, 75,572 Higgins Model 51 rifles with the modified leaf safety device have been sold by High Standard Manufacturing Company to appellee, Sears. High Standard Manufacturing Company has never been sued by reason of the design of the Higgins Model 51 rifle. There is also opinion evidence that the Higgins Model 51 rifle is safe by all commercial sporting goods standards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony as to the reputation of the Fabrique National is relevant in the determination whether the rifle was dangerous and defective
RULING:
Yes, it is relevant in the issue of the case.
In United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 8 Cir., 166 F. 407, "It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule is that witnesses are permitted to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact.
Thus, applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51, and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and *454 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
State of Missouri, Respondent, v. William Arthur BALL, Appellant. Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
339 S.W.2d 783 November 14, 1960.
FACTS:
In the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored men, one of them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South 39th Street. The taller man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the day, as John Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in the store earlier. He recognized the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my face." Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not to turn around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.
In his motion for new trial, Ball objected to the fact that a police officer who arrested him was allowed to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from him. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits were immaterial and irrelevant neither tended to prove nor disprove any issues involved in the case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified by Krekeler or by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A.L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on Oct. 15; and that said evidence was considered by the jury to the prejudice of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the effects confiscated from Ball should be admissible in evidence. RULING:
The effects confiscated from ball are not admissible. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball’s person as having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in evidence, the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of $140. Here 19 days have elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all these circumstances the mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable.
In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball’s possession at the time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it tend to prove the offense for which the appellant was on trial, the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery. The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the right to a fair trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOERAL GALLENO, accused-appellant.
GR No. 123546 July 2, 1998
FACTS:
Evelyn Garganera, 5 years old, and Eleazar, 3 years old, was left under the care and custody of their uncle, Emetario Obligar, and aunt, Penicola Obligar. On August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar. The only persons left in
the house were niece Evelyn and nephew Eleazar. According to the prosecution, appellant took advantage of the situation by sexually molesting Evelyn. As Evelyn was only five-years old while appellant was fully-grown man, the penetration caused the child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain.
On the other hand, Galleno denied the allegations and presented his own version of the story. According to him, he was merely playing with the two children. He cajoled Evelyn by throwing her up and down, his right hand holding the child and his left hand covering her vagina. Upon lifting up the child the first time, his left ring finger was accidentally inserted into the vagina of child since his fingernail was long and the child was not wearing any underwear. Consequently, Evelyn began to cry because her vagina started to bleed.
The trial court did not accord credence to the version of the defense, and thus convicted him of rape. The case has been elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, and one of the contentions of the accused-appellant Galleno was that his testimony should have been admitted by the trial court. ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of the accused is admissible in evidence. RULING:
The testimony of Joeral Galleno is inadmissible.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nor-existence." This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic and human experience. There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law. However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely at the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings of logic and everyday experience.
There is no explanation how the left ring finger (allegedly with long fingernail) of accused-appellant penetrated the victim's vagina by a depth of one fourth of an inch. Accused-accused-appellant likewise failed to explain why after injuring Evelyn, he left her in the company of an even younger child, the victim's 3-year old brother. He did not even make an effort to immediately inform Emeterio and Penicola of what happened. Instead, he went home and kept mum about the incident.
All of these loopholes are palpable and manifest, and clearly work against the credibility of accused-appellant's story on which his defense is based.
E
vidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or nonexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed,
except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue. (Sec. 4 Rule 128)
FELIPE NAVARRO, Petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 121087,August 26, 1999
FACTS:
Radio reporters, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique “Ike” Lingan, together with Mario Ilagan, went to Entertainment City to verify on the veracity of reports that the said establishment is showing nude dancers. While inside, Jalbuena took pictures which prompted the floor manager, Dante Liquin, together with a security guard, Alex Sioco, to ask why he is taking pictures. An altercation ensued between Jalbuena and Liquin. When Jalbuena saw that Sioco is about to pull out his gun, he and his companions ran to the police station. Liquin and Sioco then followed Jalbuena and his companions.
In the police station, Jalbuena went directly to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to have the incident be put into police blotter. When Liquin and Sioco arrived, policeman, Felipe Navarro, petitioner in this case, talked with them. Upon knowing of the matter, Navarro turned to Jalbuena and pushed the latter to the wall. Lingan tried to stop them. But Navarro asked Sgt. Añonuevo to put on record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan which angered the latter. Thus, he challenged Navarro to a fistfight.Navarro hit the latter’s eyebrow with the handle of his pistol and thus, Lingan fell on the floor
with blood oozing from his face. Navarro gave him another fist blow and he again fell on the floor. He was brought to the hospital but he died immediately thereafter. Meanwhile, unknown to Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record the conversation that transpired between him and the deceased Lingan.
Petitioner Navarro was charged with the crime of homicide for the death of Lingan. Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals adjudged him guilty. In this petition, he questions the credibility of the witness, Jalbuena, who, according to him, is a biased witness for having a grudge against him. Also, he is asserting that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice and that the latter was so drunk that he fell on the floor twice thus, hitting his head on the concrete.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Stanley Jalbuena is a credible witness; and
2. Whether or not the tape recording made by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence in view of the prohibition under R.A. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
RULING:
Yes, Jalbuena is a credible witness. It is a well-settled principle that the testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of an accused is by itself, cannot be regarded as unreliable. The trial court did not find any ill motive on the part of Jalbuena to make false accusation against Navarro. Jalbuena’s testimony was further buttressed by the post-mortem report done by Dra. Eva Yamamoto who performed the autopsy of the body of the deceased. Said post-mortem report, along with Jalbuena’s testimony, belie petitioner’s claim that the head injuries suffered by the deceased were due to his falling down on the concrete pavement. The findings show that those injuries were not caused by an accidental fall. Dra. Yamamoto testified that it may be caused by a blow of a hard object.
Yes, the tape recording made by Jalbuena is admissible as evidence and does not come within the prohibition under R.A. 4200. R.A. 4200 declares it unlawful the secret overhearing, intercepting, or recording of “private communications.” In the case at bar, the heated argument between Navarro and Lingan is not within the purview of a private communication. Therefore, the tape recording made is not prohibited and thus, can be validly admitted as evidence.
As to the authentication of the tape recording by the testimony of a witness, the following must be satisfied: (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to be. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording, that the tape played in court was the one he recorded, and that the voices contained in the tape recording are those of Navarro and Lingan. Therefore, Jalbuena successfully complied the foregoing requirements for authentication.
On the other hand, petitioner Navarro’s penalty will be reduced in view of the two mitigating circumstances namely, sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party, because it was Lingan who provoked him, and the other one is that the offender, Navarro, had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. He had no intent to kill Lingan. But an aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their official duties shall be taken against petitioner Navarro.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
S
tatutory Rules of Exclusion
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of the complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later, Atty. Pinto called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico agreed. An amount of P5,000 as settlement money was agreed upon. He was instructed to give the money to give the money to Atty. Pintor’s wife at the office of the Department of Public Highways. However, Laconico insisted that Atty. Pintor himself should receive the money. However, when Atty. Pintor received the money, he was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
On the following day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit that he heard complainant Atty. Pintor demand P8,000 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against Atty. Pintor. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without Atty. Pintor’s consent, Atty. Pintor charged Atty. Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200). Atty. Gaanan and Laconico were found guilty by the trial court. The decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) stating that the “extension telephone” which was used to overhear the telephone conversation was covered in the term “device” as provided in R.A. No. 4200.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited device in Section 1 of the AntiWiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
RULING:
The main issue revolves around the meaning of the phrase “any other device or arrangement.” The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other device enumerated un Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
The phrase “device or arrangement”, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. An extension telephone is not among such device or arrangements covered by Section 1 of R.A No. 4200.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 110662 August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wiretap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be any more than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE:
Whether or not the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence. HELD:
No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila, and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
FACTS:
The three (3) separate Informations were filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin respectively for Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act); Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms); and, Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban). During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives.
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim. Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992). Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification to his Demurrer of Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.
ISSUE:
Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
RULING:
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search.
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
• Evidence is also secured by resorting to modes of discoveries, such as: a) Taking of depositions of any person, oral or written (Rule 23); b) Serving of interrogatories to parties (Rule 25);
c) Serving of requests for admission by the adverse party (Rule 25); d) Production and inspection of documents (Rule 27); and
A
court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history
of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (Sec. 1 Rule 129)
J
udicial Notice
CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
GERARDO GARCIA, et al, defendants-appellants.
19 SCRA 413 1967
FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of certain parcels of land. Without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff, defendants occupied the property and built their houses. Having discovered, plaintiff through its mayor gave each defendant written permits, each labeled as “lease contract” to occupy specific areas. For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.
After sometime, plaintiff, through its treasurer, demanded payment of their rentals and vacate the premises for the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School’s expansion. Despite the demand, defendants refused to vacate the said property.
Hence, this case was filed for recovery of possession. The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff taking judicial notice of Ordinance 4566, appropriating P100k for the construction of additional building of Epifanio De Los Santos Elementary School. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. RULING:
The CFI of Manila properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes. It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. Such was done here. The defendants’ remedy was to bring the attention of the court to its contradictory stance. Not having done so, the Supreme Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose.
On the other hand, the elimination of the certification as evidence would not benefit the defendants. For in reversing his stand, the trial judge could have well taken because he was duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of Manila requires that all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. _____________________________________________________________________________________ GABRIEL BAGUIO, appellant
vs.
TEOFILA Vda de JALAGAT, defendant
42 SCRA 337 (1971)
FACTS:
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by the plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio. A motion to dismiss filed by defendants now appellees on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced. The instant complaint or case besides being clearly unfounded and malicious is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias maning jalagat, now deceasedand whose legal heirs and successor-in-interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of Real Estate involving practically the same property and the same parties as defendants are the widow and the children respectively thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said case, which is identical t or is the same case as the instant one has already been duly
and finally terminated as could be clear from an order of this court. There was an opposition on the part of the plaintiff made on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous cases decided by him resulting in the judgment relied upon.
RULING:
Yes. The law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. It was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant, thus: Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case is pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration. In addition appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice better not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did not reflect a little more on the matter.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ GABRIEL P. PRIETO, plaintiff-appellant
vs
MEDEN ARROYO, JACK ARROYO, NONITO ARROYO and ZEFERINO ARROYO, JR, defendants-appellees
G.R. No. L-17885 June 30, 1965
FACTS:
Arroyo, Sr. (Deceased) registered a parcel of land in his name. After the proper proceedings OCT No. 39 was issued in his name. The same year, and in the same Court, Gabriel P. Prieto filed a petition for registration of an adjoining parcel of land. As a result OCT No. 11 was issued in his name. When Arroyo Sr. died, OCT No.39 was cancelled and TCT No. 227 was issued of the heirs, herein respondents. The heirs then claimed an error as to the technical description set forth in their TCT and that it did not conform to the decision of the LRC and was less in area by some 157 square meters. The heirs then obtained a favorable judgment from the Court.
Prieto then filed a motion to annul the order. At the hearing, both Prieto and counsel did not appear. The Court dismissed the case. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. On appeal appellant pointed out that the Court should not have dismissed the case. He argues that no parole evidence is needed to support it since the matters alleged therein are already supported by evidence presented and relied upon by the Court at the time of the litigation concerning the registration of the land of Arroyo Sr. and/or Prieto. The Court should have taken judicial notice of the same.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court should take judicial notice of the evidence presented and used during the litigation concerning the registration of the land.
RULING:
NO. - Courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge.
Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper request or manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court correctly denied.
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, & SY CHUN YEN, Petitioners, vs
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, & HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents,
G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and personal properties in the Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al., filed a petition for the grant of letters of administration claiming among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the administrator of the deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao Kee’s petition but was modified and set aside by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese Law and Custom conclusive.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law and custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as that of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural children, hence given equal rights) the decision of the Court of Appeals.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
FACTS:
In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership of a parcel of residential land in Makato, Aklan, was filed in the RTC of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena. The trial court found that the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Tabernilla while they were in the United States. Peralta’s mother conveyed the land to Tabernilla upon the latter’s return. At the same time, she asked to be allowed to stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she did. Upon her death, Tabuena, the half-brother of Peralta, took possession of the property. He refused demands made Tabernilla to surrender the property, claiming it as his own. The trial court took judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the case before it in Civil case no. 1327. The trial court ruled for the estate and ordered Tabuena to vacate the property. Tabuena protested that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of documents which had never been formally submitted in evidence and in considering the proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land in resolving the ownership of the subject lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of Tabuena’s testimony in Civil Case No. 1327?
RULING:
Yes. The trial court erred when it relied on the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same judge.
Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
“in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending. It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending."
These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DANNY GODOY, Defendant,
250 SCRA 676 (1995)
FACTS:
Danny Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention against Mia Taha who is the private offended party to this case. Godoy was sentenced to a maximum penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny Godoy (Appellant) by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a knife and by means of deceit, having carnal knowledge with her and kidnapped and detained her.
In his defense, Godoy presented a different version of what actually transpired. His defense was that he and private complainant were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote by the private complainant to the accused and the same corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
Other witnesses were presented by the defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was affectionate and cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused RULING:
The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy. Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime of rape, namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how she was threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to his innumerable sexual demands.
In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it is not unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having been threatened appears to be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge. But it had not been duly corroborated by other evidence nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.
The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire families.
It could precisely be that complainant’s mother wanted to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter’s indiscretion and escape wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama. _____________________________________________________________________________________ BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 122480 April 12, 2000
FACTS:
This case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112,491.00 representing petitioners tax withheld for the year 1989. It appears from the foregoing 1989 Income Tax Return that petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00 being claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in the same 1989 Income Tax Return that the said total refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year. The petitioner filed a written claim for refund in the amount of P112,491.00 with the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00 (including P112,491.00) to its 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it incurred for the same year. Without waiting for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking the refund of the amount of P112,491.00. The respondent Court of Tax Appeals dismissed petitioners petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the amount of P297,492.00 (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present controversy) to its 1990 income tax liability. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied by respondent court in its Resolution dated May 6, 1994.
Petitioner now calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990. Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court can take judicial notice of the records of the present case. RULING:
Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 129 of Rules of Court provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof; in the same way that it refused to controvert the same fact established by petitioners other documentary exhibits.
In any event, the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 is not the sole basis of petitioners case. It is merely one more bit of information showing the stark truth: petitioner did not use its 1989 refund to pay its taxes for 1990.
