STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, vs
LAWRENCE LUNGSFORD, Defendant-Appellant,
400 A. 2d 843 (1947)
FACTS:
Defendant was arrested and found in his possession of a 1968 Plymouth Road Runner two-door hardtop. The state alleged that the road runner was stolen on January 8, 1987 from James Wilton.
However, the state failed to produce Wilton at trial to identify the vehicle or testify that it was stolen from him. Defendant testified at trial that he purchased the car from a certain James Law in January 1973.
Although he had a title and registration, he could not corroborate the purchase. Both sides attempted to locate Law but were unsuccessful.
The claims of trial error focus on the manner in which the police attempted to prove that the Road Runner in defendant’s possession when he was arrested was the allegedly stolen vehicle of Mr. Wilton. At the trial, the state alleged that defendant obtained possession of the car stolen from Mr. Wilton and then took the VIN tag from a similar model car and screwed it on to the dashboard of the stolen car. The state also conteded the packing slip number found in the back seat coils, when traced, proved that the seats came from a stolen 1969 Plymouth.
In addition to the various number traces the State produced a criminal investigation report which showd that James Wilton reported his car stolen on January 8, 1975. The incident report contained obviously an incorrect VIN. Sergeant Barett of the Edison Police testified that he contacted Wilton by phone within a wekk of the incident and obtained the correct VIN which the factory-trace undertaken though the NATB ultimately revealed to be the VIN compatible with the confidential serial number on the radiator brace of the subject Road Runner.
In Order to attempt to prove its case the State was required to reply on the National Automobile Theft Bureau (NATB) factory-trace information to establish that the car in defendant’s possession when he was arrested with the car reported stolen by Wilton. The NATB information led the police to the Wilton car-theft incident report through the not quite perfect matchup with the Division of Motor Vehicle VIN information. Although the judge did not permit the State to prove exactly what NATB told Detective
Walsh, the entire process in effect was crucial in the State’s attempt to link the car in defenant’s possession to the allegedly stolen Wilton vehicle. The record, however, contains no information about the probable reliability of the NATB.
Defendant’s appellate claims emphasize the hearsay nature of certain evidence admitted at trial over this objection.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NATB’s information is inadmissibile in court for being hearsay evidence.
RULING:
Yes. We are constrained to hold that this conviction must be reversed. The critical aspect of the case – this crucial link, was effectively evidential against defendant. Without the use of the NATB process no potential nexus between Wilton’s car and defendant’s car could have possibly been established. But the record is devoid of any proof of the reliability of the NATB procedures and therefore of any proper evidential basis for admission of data derived therefrom.
In our opinion the NATB procedures for tracing the identification of motor vehicles could be properly be held by a trial court to be evidential in a criminal case if compliance with this provision of law is established. This rule states: Evidence of a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation is admissible to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if the compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them.
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PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, petitioner vs.
Court of Appeals and Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, respondents
G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998
FACTS:
M/V Maria Efigenia XV collided with the vessel “Petroparcel”, owned at that time by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).The Board of Marine Inquiry found the Petroparcel at fault for the collision and based on this and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private respondent sued LSC and Petroparcel captain Edgardo Doruelo for actual and compensatory damages.
During the pendency of the proceedings, PNOC Shipping Transport Corporation acquired ownership of Petroparcel and replaced LSC in the trial.CFI Caloocan ruled in favor of private respondent, awarding it: the sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with interest of 6% per annum;
P50,000 attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.
Petitioner (PNOC) questioned the admissibility and competency of private respondent’s documents as basis for damages. The documents were not sufficient evidence to support the extent and actual damages incurred by respondent. The price quotations were not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) for the respondent did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the documents falls under Sec 45 Rule 130 of the ROC and thus sufficient to establish the amount of actual and compensatory damages.
RULING:
NO. For actual and compensatory damages, the injured party is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
The documents presented by private respondent are regarded as hearsay evidence. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the documents as he was not the author of them. He can only testify as to facts of his personal knowledge. As such, the price quotations were considered ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should be proffered along with the testimony of the writers thereof.
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GREGORIO ESTRADA, Plaintiff, vs
PROCULO NOBLE, Defendant,
G.R. No. L-2726 September 29, 1950
FACTS:
Proculo Noble received from his father, Maximo Noble, a land through a public deed of sale after payment of certain amount. The sale was subject to a condition wherein the vendor, his heirs and assigns shall have the right to repurchase the said land in a specific time. After the lapse of the period agreed upon, the right to repurchase is extinguished and the vendee shall be the absolute and unconditional owner of the said land without executing an instrument. Proculo alleged that the sale entered into was an absolute sale of land and it was only named as a sale with right to repurchase to prohibit him from disposing the property. After some time, Maximo Noble sell the said land to Gregorio Estrada.
A case arises between Noble and Estrada. Trial court ruled in favor of Estrada and ordered defendant to execute a deed of resale in favor of Estrada for the amount of P700 which plaintiff offered for repurchase and in case defendant refuses to execute a deed of resale, Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur is ordered to execute a deed of resale of the same property in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P700 in Philippine currency and the defendant is ordered to pay the cost of the suit. The appellant questions the decision rendered by the Court as it the amount to be paid for the resale of the land does not commensurate to the amount paid by the defendant at the time he bought the property.
ISSUE:
Whether the transaction entered into by Maximo and Proculo Noble was an absolute sale?
RULING:
This is an action to redeem a parcel of land worth about P3,000. The Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In the notice of appeal filed on November 22, 1948, the defendant announced his intention to appeal to the Supreme Court "inasmuch as the issues involved therein are mostly questions of law." The record was accordingly elevated to this Court. Several errors assigned in the brief for defendant-appellant unquestionably refer to questions of fact.
Among the cases over which the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction, are those in which only errors or questions of law are involved. Conformably to this constitutional and statutory precept, the Rules of Court (see. 3, Rule 42) provide that "where the appeal is based purely on questions of law, the appellant shall so state in his notice of appeal, and then no other questions shall be allowed, and the evidence need not be elevated."
The case at bar is clearly not one falling under the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. In the first place, the appellant expressly stated in his notice of appeal that the issues involved in the appeal are "mostly questions of law," an expression plainly not synonymous to "only errors or questions of law." In the second place, in accordance with his notice of appeal, the appellant has assigned in his brief several errors involving questions of fact. This, the appellant has undoubtedly the right to do, because in his notice of appeal he did not state that the appeal is "based purely on questions of law," as provided in section 3 of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
The present appeal, involving questions of fact and of law, falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (sec. 29, Rep. Act No. 296) and must therefore be certified to said court, pursuant to section 31 of Republic Act No. 296 which provides that "all cases which may be erroneously brought to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court, which shall hear the same, as if it had originally been brought before it.” Wherefore, let this case be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.