EMILIO DE LA PAZ, JR. ET AL., Petitioners, vs
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL, Respondents,
G.R. No. 71537 September 17, 1987
FACTS:
This is a petition for review to nullify the decision of the IAC in a civil case declaring plaintiffs as the true owner owners of a parcel of land covered by CTC No. 901 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. The court ordered the defendants to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
901 and directed the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Pasig Branch to cancel Original Certificate of Title No.
901 and to issue a new one in the names of the plaintiffs (Loreto's heirs)
The records show that Loreto Dela Paz, the mother of the Dela Paz heirs, filed a complaint against the petitioners with the RTC for a judicial declaration of ownership of a 43,830 square meter parcel of land covered by CTC 901. Loreto alleged that the subject land was among the properties adjudicated to her and her mother as a result of a partition submitted by the heirs of Ponciano dela Paz and approved by the court. The petitioners contend that said land was not accounted for in the probate of Ponciano's estate but is actually community property of the parties.
The parties were instituted as compulsory heirs. Amicable settlement failed and trial proceeded.
Loreto was put on the stand and was examined. After the direct examination of Loreto, the counsel for petitioners did the cross-examination but wasn't able to finish and asked the court for suspension. The court granted and moved the continuation of the cross to a later date. However, the counsel for petitioners asked for successive postponement and later on, Loreto died. Children of Loreto were substituted as heirs.
The court denied the petition of petitioners to strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto and subsequently denied the MR as well. The court ruled on the case in favor of the heirs of Loreto.
ISSUE:
WON the court erred in ruling in favor of the heirs of Loreto RULING:
The higher courts sustained the ruling of the appellate court as to ownership but modified the award on damages. The court held that petitioners were given ample time and opportunity to cross-examine Loreto. The records show that after Loreto's direct examination, she has always been available for the cross-examination and that it was the counsel of the petitioners who consistently asked for postponement of such. The court also held that the lower court did not err in ruling against the motion of the petitioner to strike off the record the entire testimony of Loreto, as interlocutory orders are not subjects of appeal.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
RUPERTO FULGADO, substituted by his heirs, JULIANA, JOSE, MAXIMO, PACITA and SEVERO all surnamed FULGADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINO CUSTODIO, SIMPLICIA CUSTODIO, ARSENIO PIGUING, ISMAEL PORCIUNCULA and DOMINGA MACARULAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61570 February 12, 1990.
FACTS:
Ruperto Fulgado filed a case for annulment of certain contracts of sale and partition with accounting. Defendant and his counsel failed to appear in the set pretrial conference. The defendant was declared in default. They appeal such order to the CA who ruled in their favor and lift such order. During the postponement of the case because the presiding judge went on official leave, Ruperto Fulgado died, and his sole witness Jose Fulgado migrated to the United States. When the hearing resumed, the
defendants moved to strike the testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado off the record on the ground that they were deprived of their right to cross0examine. The counsel for Fulgado opposed the motion but the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants and ordered the testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado be stricken off the record. Since the plaintiff had no more witnesses to present, apart from Ruperto and Jose, the trial court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of the deceased, RupertoFulgado, and his witness, Jose Fulgado, should be stricken off the record?
RULING:
NO. The right to cross examine is a personal right which may be forfeited by failure of a party to avail of the ample opportunity given him. Where the failure to obtain cross examination was imputable to the cross examiner fault, the lack of cross examination is no longer a ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an opportunity, though waived, will suffice.
In the case at bar, the defendants had enough opportunity to cross examine Ruperto Fulgado before his death, and Jose Fulgado before the migration. Despite their knowledge of Ruperto Fulgados failing health and José’s imminent travel, the defendants did not move swiftly to cross examine the said plaintiff and his witness. As a matter of fact, it took them more than one year from the finality of the judgment of the Court of Appeals lifting the order of default before they asked the trial court to resume the hearing of the case. Further, the tasked of recalling a witness for cross examination is in law, imposed on the party who wishes to exercise the said right because of the fact that it is a personal right and can be waived. In addition, even though Jose Fulgado is out of the country, the defendants should have resorted to the various modes of discovery to cross examine Jose. Defendants even disclosed the fact that they had knowledge that Jose was in the country for a visit and yet they did not exert any effort to have him subpoenaed. The acts of the defendants constitute a waiver of their right to cross examine. The Court ordered the trial court to reinstate the case and allow the direct testimonies of Ruperto Fulgado and Jose Fulgado to remain in the record.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, vs
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, Defendant-Appellant,
52 OG 4627 (1956)
FACTS:
The Provincial Hospital of Occidental Negros, located in the city of Bacolod, capital of the province, was built in 1924 at a cost of about P200, 000. But subsequent improvements brought the total cost to more than half a million pesos.
In 1949, The capitol subdivision, Inc., a real estate company, claiming to be the owner of the lot in which the provincial Hospital is located, question the right of the hospital to occupy it, and when its claim of ownership was rejected, it brought the present action in the CFI of Occidental Negros to recover the possession of the lot and reasonable rents for its use. But before filing the action, it had, in May, 1950, the lot declared in its name for assessment purposes.
In resisting the action of subdivision, the province put up the defense that it had acquired the lot in question from its former owner, Jose Bernas, and that the subdivision was aware of that fact when it bought the hacienda.
In support of his defense, the province endeavoured to prove that in compliance with Act No.
3144, as amended, which required the Province to provide a site for the hospital before the funds for its construction could be released, the province instituted condemnation proceedings against Jose Bernas for the acquirement of the lot in question.
Upon trial, the president and general manager of the subdivision, Mr. Montelibano pretends that the subdivision had no knowledge of the expropriation or deed of sale with donation at the time it bought the land. The fiscal’s efforts to cross-examine him on those matters were frustrated by Plaintiff’s counsel’s objections and the trial court’s ruling sustaining those objections.
The court reasoned that Mr. Montelibano was then on the stand as Plaintiff’s own witness and could not be questioned in such way as to make him to defendant’s witness.
After the trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favour of plaintiff requiring the defendant to restore possession of the lot to the plaintiff subject to the latter’s right to exercise the option granted in Article 361 of the old Civil Code and further requiring the defendant to pay the rents from November 8, 1935, which all in all would amount to P151, 706.29.
From this judgment, defendant appealed directly with this court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court is correct in sustaining the objection of the counsel of the plaintiff’s in allowing the fiscal to cross examine Mr. Montelibano.
RULING:
No. The fact alone that Mr. Montelibano was then testifying as Plaintiff’s witness is no justification for not permitting the fiscal to cross-examine him on any matter that would elicit all important facts bearing its issue.
In this jurisdiction, the adverse party may cross-examine a witness for the purpose among others, of eliciting all important facts bearing upon the issue.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-8332, November 13, 1913
FACTS:
These defendants were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan. On March 13, 1912, one Claro Mercado presented a complaint against the defendants in the Court of the Justice of the Peace of Baliuag. The Justice of the Peace conducted a preliminary examination and found that there was probable cause for believing that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged and held them for trial in the Court of First Instance.
On the 21st of March, 1912, the prosecuting attorney of said province presented the complaint, which alleged that the said accused on December 22, 1911, in the municipality of Baliuag, Province of Bulacan, P. I., did willfully and criminally, without legitimate authority therefore, and by means of violence or force employed upon the person of Claro Mercado, prevent the latter from rendering aid to Maria R. Mateo in order that Santiago Mercado might at his pleasure maltreat the said Maria R. Mateo, in a violation of law.
After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the Honorable Alberto Barretto, judge, found the defendants guilty of the crime in the complaint, without any aggravating or extenuating circumstances, and sentenced each of them to be imprisoned for a period of two months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine of 325 pesetas and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, allowing to the defendants one-half of the time they had already suffered in prison, and each to pay one-third part of the costs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the character of the witness has an intimate relation or may have a strong relation with the facts being investigated in the present cause.
RULING:
Yes. It plays an important role in the proper determination of the present case.
Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.) The question to which the defendant objected neither attempted to show neither that the witness had made contradictory
statements nor that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity was bad. While you cannot impeach the credibility of a witness, except by showing that he has made contradictory statements or that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, yet, nevertheless, it may be shown by an examination of the witness himself or from the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of a high crime. (Sec. 342, Act No. 190.)
In the present case, the other offense to which the question above related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and equal in guilt to felonies. The objection to the above question was properly interposed and should have been sustained. The evidence clearly shows that the witness committed the assault to which reference is made in the complaint in the present cause. Whether he had committed other assaults or not was a matter of no importance in the present action. The admission or rejection, therefore, of the proof to which such question related could in no way prejudice the rights of the defendants.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
United States of America, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Richard Charles Marshall, Defendant-appellant,
762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)
FACTS:
Marshall was charged with theft of a lawn mower of a value in excess of $100, which was the property of the United States. The lawn mower was allegedly stolen from the Four Seasons Retail Store of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the defendant Marshall was supervisor (assistant manager) of that store, where he had worked for about ten years.
The other principal actor in the evidentiary facts was Lee, the manager of the entire Post Exchange. After trial by jury, the defendant Marshall was convicted of the offense charged. 18 U.S.C. § 641. Marshall appeals, contending that over his objection hearsay evidence was improperly admitted to prove an essential element of the crime, namely, that in fact a lawn mower had been stolen or was missing from the military post exchange where he worked. Finding merit to this contention, we reverse and remand.
Lee saw the driver, whom he testified he recognized as the defendant Marshall, alight and lift one by one two large boxes from the rear of the van and place them in the carport. The van then drove off. Lee drove up to the driveway and recognized the writing on one of the boxes as showing that it was a "Lawn Boy" packing box; the other box, although apparently (when lifted by the driver) lighter in weight, seemed similar to the first, although Lee was unable to decipher any wording on it.
Lee made discreet inquiries in order to ascertain the explanation for the activities seen that day.
Finding no explanation, he finally, nine days later, called the defendant Marshall in to ask why he had been to Frederick Street. Marshall replied that he had never been there or in that locality, although he had been away from the store premises at another location in Shreveport from shortly after 10:00 a.m. until about 11:00 a.m. that morning.
At the trial, the government did not introduce any evidence as to who had received the boxes at the Frederick Street residence, nor did it attempt to prove that the boxes, one of which was marked "Lawn Boy," actually did contain lawn mowers. Instead, it relied upon the following circumstantial evidence and upon the testimony of Ms. Terri Stanlin, an investigator, who testified that, on the basis of her review of the records of the post exchange store, three lawn mowers were unaccounted for and missing during the period of Four Seasons' promotional sale.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cross-examination relied upon in determining how many lawn mowers had been sold was correct.
RULING:
Admitted over defense objection, the convincing and positive testimony of this witness, an investigator for an agency of the United States (with what weight that status might confer), was that the store records showed at least three lawn mowers were unaccounted for. Nevertheless, as our recitation above indicates, her positive conclusory opinion as to the number of lawn mowers missing was based upon a flawed methodology. For a starting figure of lawn mowers on hand, she had relied upon a hearsay
"correction" of the actual store record; in determining the number of lawn mowers sold during the period, she had relied upon cash register tapes that were incomplete for the period in question (with the missing tapes quite possibly indicating other lawn mower sales that would make up the shortage she found).
Our basic holding is that reversible error occurred because, over defense objection, the trial court permitted a non-expert witness to give prejudicial hearsay testimony as to the contents of documents that were not themselves introduced into evidence, which documents, moreover, could not have been introduced without prior authentication, including a query into their trustworthiness for the purpose for which introduced. We detailed in Part VI, supra, the unreliability of the testimony thus erroneously admitted only in order to illustrate that, by failing to apply the rules of evidence at issue, not only was their letter ignored but also their functional purpose as designed to assure trustworthiness of the evidence of this nature to be received, as well as to afford a fair opportunity to the opponent of the introduction of the evidence to prevent the trier of fact from being contaminated by unreliable prejudicial testimony.
We note also that Bitner, the custodian of the records, was not called by the government to authenticate the business records of Four Seasons as to the lawn mowers, and that from the cross-examination of him by Marshall, it is doubtful that his testimony would have shown that the records used by Ms. Stanlin to deduce that any lawn mowers were missing met the authentication threshold that, for the purposes noted (if they had been offered by the government), "the method or circumstances of preparation indicate ... trustworthiness."
_____________________________________________________________________________________