UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant.
GR No. L-12858
FACTS:
Feliciano Santos bought medicine for his sick horses from the drug store owned by Santiago Pineda. However, the horses died shortly after the administration of the medicine. This prompted Santos to take the remaining packages to the Bureau of Science for investigation.
Drs. Pena and Darjuan conducted the examination and discovered that the packages contained barium chlorate instead of potassium chlorate. They also went to Pineda’s drug store but was similarly given potassium chlorate. During the trial, both Pena and Darjuan testified as to the negligence of Santiago Pineda.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of Drs. Pena and Darjuan are admissible?
RULING:
The testimonies are admissible.
As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.
On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
BENJAMIN IRANG, ET AL., Defendants.
BENJAMIN IRANG, Appellant.
G.R. No. L-45179, March 30, 1937
FACTS:
Benjamin Irang appeals the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
On November 2, 1935, between 7 and 8 pm, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos went to the house of spouses Perfecto Melocotones and MaximinianaVicente.
Perfecto was attacked with bolos and died thereafter. The wife, who was struck in the face with the butt of a gun, regained consciousness and saw her husband already dead. Maximiniana, gave the money and jewelry ordered by one of the assailants, who she remembers to have pockmarks and a scar on the eyelid.
That same night, malefactors assaulted the house of Juana dela Cruz. All of the assailants had white stripes upon their faces and De la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong colored suit.
With the description made by Maximiniana, the police arrested and presented a group of suspects.
Benjamin Irang was identified by Maximiniana to be the one who struck her. Irang was also identified by De la Cruz.
It was alleged that the accused made an affidavit in Tagalog wherein he admitted participation in the robbery after being coerced by a certain Fidel Estrella. The accused denied executing the affidavit, and said that the contents thereof are not true and that the soldiers maltreated him. Accused raises alibi as his defense, saying that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was in his rice field.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BenjaminIrang was correctly identified as one of the perpetrators.
RULING:
Yes, Irang was correctly identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
The victim, Maximiniana, gave a description of one of the assailants, and on the basis thereof, police presented three groups of persons. In the third group, the victim pointed at the accused as her assailant. The testimony of Dela Cruz corroborates Maximiniana’s testimony albeit indirectly that the man of the same description was the one who went to her house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry.
While evidence of another crime, as a general rule, is not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged or tends to show his presence at the scene of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with a crime. The court also found that the aforementioned testimonies were corroborated by the admission of the accused in his affidavit, which the Court found to have been made under oath. The affidavit can thus, be considered to have been made voluntarily; therefore, it is admissible against the person making it. Consequently, the defense of alibi cannot stand as it was contradicted by the testimony of Dela Cruz and the accused-appellant’s own admission under oath.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
GERONIMO SOLIMAN Y BUENAVENTURA alias EMONG and SOFRONIO PALIN Y PAZ alias POLONIO, Defendants-Appellants.
G.R. No. L-9723, June 28, 1957
FACTS:
At around 2:00 o’clock in the morning of April 29, 1955, the victim, Ernesto Basa, was sleeping in a pushcart along with Ernesto Balaktaw who was also sleeping in a box near the pushcart. After a short while, Balaktaw saw accused-appellants, Geronimo Soliman and Sofronio Palin, approached Basa, stabbed the latter with a balisong many times then, immediately ran away. Balaktaw brought Basa to the police station then subsequently to the hospital but the latter was pronounced dead.
Soliman and Palin were charged with murder and were sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death. The two interposed self-defense as their main argument. Soliman insisted that he and the deceased, Basa, had a fight and in the course of which he stabbed the latter.
The conviction was based mainly on the testimony of the eyewitness, Balaktaw, along with some circumstantial evidence. The court found his testimony credible because it was supported by the findings of Dr. Mariano Lara who conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased especially with regard to the nature of the wounds suffered by the victim. The wounds were inflicted while the deceased was in a lying position, contrary to accused-appellants contention that the same were due to the struggle between Soliman and the deceased.
However, the defense impugns the credibility of the eyewitness, Balaktaw, due to his prior criminal conviction. It also alleges that the deceased had a violent and quarrelsome character.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ernesto Balaktaw’s prior criminal conviction is a ground to disqualify him as a witness in this case; and
2. Whether or not Ernesto Basa’s violent character may be taken as evidence to prove the probability or improbability of the crime charged.
RULING:
No, the fact that a person has been previously convicted of a crime does not necessarily disqualify him as a witness for he may still prove to be a truthful one.
Anent the second issue, although good or bad character may tend to prove the probability or improbability of the offense charged, the same rule does not apply in cases of murder where the killing is committed through treachery and premeditation, as in this case. The proof of such character may be allowed only in homicide cases to show that it has produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action is necessary. This rule does not apply to cases of murder.
Nevertheless, while the evidence is sufficient to convict both appellants of the crime charged, some members of the Court have expressed doubt in the propriety of imposing the extreme penalty of death. Thus, the Court resolved to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CLEMENTE BABIERA, JUSTO BABIERA and DOMINGA BORES, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 28871 September 19, 1928
FACTS:
Severino Haro had leased from Basilio Copreros two parcels of land the ownership of which had passed to him due to Justo Babiera's failure to repurchase them within the stipulated period. Nor is there any question that the latter tried to recover them, first, by an accion publiciana (action for unlawful detainer), and then by an action for the recovery of possession. There is likewise no question that Severino Haro paid the expenses of the defendant Basilio Copreros for the reason that he was already in possession of said lands as lessee. There is also no question that Clemente Babiera's cow damaged the plantings of Fermin Bruce, for which reason the letter caught said cow, tied it, and notified his master of the matter when the latter went to visit the lands leased by him. Neither is there any question that there was an agreement between Clemente Babiera and Severino Haro whereby the latter ordered his co-partner on shares Fermin Bruces, to take the cow near Clemente Babiera's house and tie it up there.
In like manner there is no question that at about 7 o'clock in the evening of August 21, 1927, when Severino Haro and his companions were returning to the town of Oton, and upon their coming near Rosendo Paycol's house, in which were Clemente Babiera, his father Justo Babiera, and his mistress Dominga Bores, said Severino Haro had an encounter with Clemente Babiera in which Severino Haro received several wounds in consequence of which he died a week later in Saint Paul's Hospital of Iloilo.
Severino Haro made a sworn statement before the deputy fiscal, relating the occurrence and mentioning the persons who were present. This sworn statement was ratified by him before the same deputy fiscal when he had given up all hope of recovery.
It has been contended by the defense that the defendant-appellant, Clemente Babiera, only acted in defense of his life and property, having been obliged to resort to arms on seeing his life endangered, contending that the provocation consisted in that after Severino Haro had agreed to an indemnity of P2 for the damage caused, the latter wanted to take Clemente Babiera's cow to the town, and that the attack consisted in that Margarito Mediavilla gave him a bolo blow on the little finger of the right hand, and that Severino Haro threatened him with his revolver and fired several shots at him.
The defense attempted also to prove that Severino Haro was of a quarrelsome disposition, provoking, irascible, and fond of starting quarrels in the municipality of Oton, but the trial judge would not permit it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presentation of evidence that the victim was of quarrelsome disposition admissible.
RULING:
While it is true that when the defense of the accused is that he acted in self-defense, he may prove the deceased to have been of a quarrelsome, provoking and irascible disposition, the proof must be of his general reputation in the community and not of isolated and specific acts (Underhill Criminal Evidence, par. 325, p.570), such as the accused Clemente Babiera tried to prove, and hence the lower court did not err in not admitting such proof. But even if it had been proved by competent evidence that the deceased was of such a disposition, nevertheless, it would not have been sufficient to overthrow the conclusive proof that it was the said accused who treacherously attacked the deceased.
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THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PIO MERCADO, TOMAS MERCADO, and CATALINO MERCADO, defendants-appellants
26 PHIL. 127 (1913)
FACTS:
These defendants Pio Mercado, Tomas Mercado, and Catalino Mercado were charged with the crime of coaccion in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bulacan for using force and violence on the person of Claro Mercado to prevent him from rendering aid to Maria Mateo, who was being maltreated by Santiago Mercado. During trial, Santiago Mercado was presented as a witness. He was asked how many times had he been convicted for assault. Tomas Mercado objected on the ground that the question was impertinent. The only argument which the appellant presents in support of his assignment of error is that the question had no relation to the question which was being discussed by the court and did not tend to show that the defendants were either guilty or not guilty of the crime charged; that questions tending to disclose the character of a witness are immaterial.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in allowing the question to impugn the witness credibility.
RULING:
YES. Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party against whom he has been called, except by showing a) that he has made contradictory statements or b) that his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.
In this case, the question propounded by the prosecution neither attempted to show that the witness made contradictory statements nor that his general reputation for honesty, truth or integrity is bad.
Evidence may be presented that the witness had been convicted of a high crime. However, in this case, the offense Santiago Mercado was convicted of (assault and battery) is not a high crime. The objection of the defense should have been sustained. Whether the witness had been convicted of other crimes is of no matter to the present case.
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CHARACTER EVIDENCE
• Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions. –
In Criminal Cases:
• The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
• Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
• Note that in criminal cases, the prosecution goes first. Hence, it cannot present evidence on the bad moral character of the accused on its evidence in chief.
• The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged.
In Civil Cases:
• Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.