GUILLERMO VIACRUCIS, LUISA DE VIACRUCIS, CLAROS MARQUEZ, and RUSTICA AREVALO MARQUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ANASTACIO ORAIS and CELESTINA MALAZARTE, respondents.
44 SCRA 176 1972
FACTS:
Spouses Orais filed a suit against Viacrucis to establish their title to a land in Leyte. They alleged that it is part of a bigger lot sold to them by its registered owner, Sanchez, by virtue of a deed of sale.
Viacrucis claims that the deed of sale was simulated.
The lower court and the appellate court ruled in favor of Orais, considering, among others, the admission of one Mrs. Costelo. Mrs. Costelo stated that although the land in dispute was physically in the possession of her deceased husband, they still recognized Orias as the owner of the land.
The court also considered the admission of Mr. Costelo which is in a public document. Viacrucis assails the court’s use of the Costelo spouses’ admissions, claiming that he cannot be prejudiced by an act or declaration of another.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the admission of Mrs. Costelo was binding on Viacrucis.
RULING:
The testimony and the public document constitute declarations of the Costelos adverse to their interest which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to the rule on declarations against interests.
Viacrucis has no reason whatsoever to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the same having been made in 1936, more than 5 years before Viacrucis’ predecessors in interest entered the picture.
Such admission may be received in evidence, not only against the party who made it or his successor’s interest, but also against third persons.
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Edward Keller and Corporation Limited, petitioner-appellant vs.
COB Group Marketing Incorporated, Jose E.Bax, respondents-appellees
141 SCRA 86 (1986)
FACTS:
Edward Keller and Corporation Limited appointed COB Group marketing as distributor of its household products, Brite and Nuvan in Panay and Negros as shown in the agreement dated March 14, 1970. As security for COB Group marketing’s credit purchases up to the amount of P35, 000 one Asuncion Manahan mortgaged her land to Keller. Manahan assumed solidarity with COB Group the faithful performance of all terms and conditions of the sales agreement. In July 1970 the parties executed a second sales agreement whereby COB Group Marketing’s territory was extended to Northern and Southern Luzon. As security for the credit purchases up to P25, 000 of COB Group marketing for that area Tomas Lorenzo Jr. and his father executed a mortgaged on their land on Nueva Ecija. Like Manahan, the Lorenzo’s were solidarily liable with COB. On May 8, the Board of Directors of COB Group where appraised by Jose Bax, the firm’s president and general manager that the firm owed keller about P179, 000. Bax was authorized to negotiate Keller for the settlement of his firm’s liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents are solidarily liable on the credit.
RULING:
Yes, the respondents are solidarily liable. Section 26 of the Rules of Court provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him as
admissions of a party. The admissions of the respondent are supported by documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that all the invoices with delivery receipts were presented by Keller together with tabulation thereof.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs
BIENVENIDO PARAGSA, alias "BENBEN", defendant-appellant
G.R. No. L-44060 July 20, 1978
FACTS:
The accused was charge of rape committed against a 12 year old victim. The victim was alone in their house when suddenly the accused entered and intimidated her with a knife. After the rape was committed, the accused heard someone knocking at the door, it was the victim’s Aunt Lita. Incidentally, she saw the accused exiting from the house. When she asked Mirasol(victim) what the accused did to her, she did not say anything. It was only after a few days she revealed what the accused did to her.
The accused interposed the defense that they are “sweethearts”
ISSUE:
Whether the defense of sweetheart is more credible than the testimony of complainant.
RULING:
YES. - A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. Certain circumstances negate the commission by the appellant of the crime charged and point to the conclusion that the sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complaining witness was voluntary. Force and intimidation were not proven. Mirasol did not offer any resistance or vocal protestation against the alleged sexual assault. She could have easily made an outcry or resisted the appellant's advances without endangering her life. But she did not. If, indeed, she was raped under the circumstances narrated by her, she could have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita.
Another circumstance is the fact that Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous sexual communications before.
The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue.
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO ET AL., Defendant-Appellants,
G.R. No. L-30423 November 7, 1979
FACTS:
This case is an automatic review after the accused Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four (4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to be carried out pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the amount of P12,000.00., and to pay the costs.
During the pendency of the appeal, Melecio Cudillan died. The basis for the conviction of the rest of the accused turned guilty of the crime in the lower court was an extra judicial confession by Melencio Cudillan during the custodial investigation when he was apprehended by police officers while in the act of pawning a bracelet which was a product of the robbery to which they were convicted and appealing from.
Alegre et. al., kept quiet and did not rebut the confession of Cudillan.
ISSUE:
Whether the extrajudicial confession of an accused implicating other co-accused absent independent evidence of conspiracy admissible in evidence against the others?
RULING:
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory. The leading case of Miranda v.
Arizona held that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation.
Prior to Miranda, it was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament. Other courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses.
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime.
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants' silence while under police custody, in the face of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.
Griffin vs California
380 U.S. 609 (1965)
FACTS:
Edward Dean Griffin was convicted of the murder of Essie Mae Hodson before a jury in a California court. Griffin had been invited into an apartment shared by Hodson and her boyfriend, Eddie Seay. After going to bed, Seay was awakened by noise; he saw Griffin and Hodson struggling, and Hodson said Griffin had tried to force her to have sex. After Seay locked Griffin outside the apartment, Griffin broke back into the apartment and struck Seay, who ran to a bar for help. Upon returning, Griffin and Hodson were gone. In the morning, a witness saw Griffin, buttoning up his pants, coming out of a very large trash box in an alley about 300 feet from Hodson's apartment. The witness found Hodson in the trash box, bleeding and apparently in shock. She died at a hospital the next day from her injuries. Griffin, who already had multiple felony convictions, did not testify at the trial. He chose to invoke his Fifth Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination and remained silent throughout the trial. At the closing of trial, the court instructed the jury that it may infer that the defendant’s silence was a probable indication of guilt. The death penalty was imposed, and it was upheld by the California Supreme Court. Under a writ of certiorari, the United States’ Supreme Court decided to take the case at hand.
ISSUE:
Whether a jury instruction on the accused’s silence is reversible error.
RULING:
The Court that a prosecutor's or judge's comment to the jury about a defendant's refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system of criminal justice', which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." The Court then noted that an objection to this logic might be that a jury might find it "natural and irresistible" to infer the guilt of a defendant who refused to testify while possessing facts about the evidence against him, and so a judge's commenting upon the refusal did not magnify that inference into a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege; but went on to state that a judge's comment on the refusal "solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence against him.
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ALEJANDRO S. LAZARO ET AL., Petitioners, vs
MODESTO AGUSTIN ET AL, Respondents,
G.R. No. 152364 April 15, 2010
FACTS:
The petitioners (plaintiffs) filed a complaint against the respondents for claiming as one of the co-owners of a parcel. They alleged that Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, all surnamed Santos consented that the parcel of land which is the subject of the controversy be titled in the name of Basilisa, the latter being the eldest of the children of Simeon Santos.
Thus the original certificate of title No. 20742 in the name of Basilisa Santos was acquired although the children of the late Simeon Santos agreed collectively that it did not and does not necessarily mean that Basilisa Santos is the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel land.
The title of the lot with Original Certificate of Title No. 20742 was transferred into another title which is now TCT No. T-20695 in the names of the respondents without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs.
The during the lifetime of Basilisa Santos-Agustin, plaintiff Alejandra Santos-Lazaro informed the former, who are sisters, that the transfer of the title in the of Basilisa Santos into the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lost is solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa Santos-Agustin’s children, the latter then told her sister not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto Santos and Leoncio Santos and her sister Alejandra Lazaro would each get ¼ share of the lot.
The MTCC ruled that among others that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand such that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay.
The RTC affirmed the decision with modification. The CA affirmed also the decision of the MTCC with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sworn statement of Basilisa Agustin is a declaration against interest.
RULING:
No, it is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest. Admission against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.
Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule.
They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. In the present case, since Basilisa is the respondents’ predecessor-in- interest and is, thus, in privity with the latter’s legal interest.
The former’s sworn statement, if proven to be genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an admission against interest.
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People of the Philippines vs. Renato Espanol
GR. No. 175603 February 13, 2009
FACTS:
At about 2:00 a.m. of February 2, 2000, Domingo Petilla was waiting for his companions at Pantal Road, Dagupan City. They were on their way to Manila. All of a sudden, he heard two successive gunshots. A few moments later, a yellow tricycle sped past him along Pantal Road headed towards SitioGuibang, Dagupan City. The tricycle was driven by a man wearing a dark-colored long-sleeved shirt.
Petillas companions arrived shortly thereafter on board a van. As they started loading their things, they saw, through the lights of their vehicle, a person lying on the pavement along Pantal Road. Upon closer scrutiny, they discovered the lifeless body of Gloria Espaol. They immediately reported the matter to the police. The gunshots were also heard by Harold Villanueva, a boatman working at the Pantal River, while he was waiting for passengers at the dock about 100 meters away from the crime scene. The shots were followed by the sound of a motorcycles revving engine. He then saw a speeding yellow tricycle. The tricycle bore the name Rina in front of its cab. Its driver was wearing a dark jacket and blue pants. The boatman was later told by a tricycle driver that there was a dead body nearby. Out of curiosity, he (the boatman) went there and recognized the victim as one of his regular passengers.
Felicidad Pascua Ferrer, sister of the victim, was told by the police and neighbors that her sister was dead. She immediately proceeded to the place. Upon confirming that it was indeed her sister, she asked bystanders to inform appellant about the death of his wife. A few minutes later, appellant arrived. Meanwhile, Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as those worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle he saw along Pantal Road right after he heard the gunshots. At around 3:00 a.m., appellant went to the house of Mateo Pascua, brother of Gloria, to inform him that Gloria was held up and killed. They then proceeded to the scene of the crime using the yellow tricycle of their brother-in-law, Federico Ferrer. The tricycle had the name Rina emblazoned in front. On the way, Mateo noticed that the seats and floor of the tricycle were wet. When asked about it, appellant did not
Felicidad Pascua Ferrer, sister of the victim, was told by the police and neighbors that her sister was dead. She immediately proceeded to the place. Upon confirming that it was indeed her sister, she asked bystanders to inform appellant about the death of his wife. A few minutes later, appellant arrived. Meanwhile, Villanueva noticed that the appellant seemed to be wearing the same clothes as those worn by the driver of the speeding tricycle he saw along Pantal Road right after he heard the gunshots. At around 3:00 a.m., appellant went to the house of Mateo Pascua, brother of Gloria, to inform him that Gloria was held up and killed. They then proceeded to the scene of the crime using the yellow tricycle of their brother-in-law, Federico Ferrer. The tricycle had the name Rina emblazoned in front. On the way, Mateo noticed that the seats and floor of the tricycle were wet. When asked about it, appellant did not