BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA VERA-PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar, are the children and heirs of the late MarcosaBernabe who died on May 10, 1960. In her lifetime, MarcosaBernabe owned the disputed parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No.
3621, Cad. 337, Case No. 4, MeycauayanCadastre. The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn MarcosaBernabe sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11, 1956.
On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of MarcosaBernabe and the issuance of another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present, the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land. Respondent Mariano Aguilar was then issued a free patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M) was issued in his name.
On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents claiming that as children of MarcosaBernabe, they were co-owners of the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property to MarcosaBernabe on April 28, 1959. The respondents wrote in reply to the petitioners that they were the sole owners of the disputed parcel of land and denied that the land was resold to MarcosaBernabe. True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the respondents. However, on March 31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of a prima facie case. On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M).
Trial Court rendered decision in favor with the petitioners. Not contented with the decision, respondents contended that since the petitioners have failed to produce the original of the alleged deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the best evidence of the alleged sale hence it should have been excluded and should not have been accorded any evidentiary value. On the other hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the document of sale dated April 28, 1959 had been duly established by the testimony of the notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by Luis de Vera who was present during its execution and that the loss of the original document had been proven by the testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan.
On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the trial court's decision. It found that the loss or destruction of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.
RULING:
No. The petitioners didn’t sufficiently satisfy the court that the original deed of sale was lost.
In accordance with the Rules of Court, secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of the instrument which the petitioners failed to do. Also, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using photocopies. For, since all the duplicates
or multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are unavailable.
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.
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MANILA MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.
MIGUEL TAN, doing business under the name and style of MANILA MANDARIN MARKETING, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171702 February 12, 2009
FACTS:
Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in the business of selling electrical materials. Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorney’s fees equal to 25% of the claim. MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices. Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC. After Tan completed presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC denied. RTC further directed MMC to present evidence. MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to present the original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMC’s representatives.
On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMC’s account. De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the invoices and purchase orders to MMC’s accounting department. As proof, he showed three customer’s acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation:
“I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the period and the amount stated below, together with the corresponding original copies of the invoices, purchase order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods”.
The RTC ruled for Tan and ordered defendant to pay the principal amount with interest and liquidated damages. MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s decision, hence the present petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends, among others, that respondent’s claim for payment was premature inasmuch as the original invoices and purchase orders were not sent to its accounting department. Consequently, Tan’s claims were not verified and processed. MMC believes that mere delivery of the goods did not automatically give rise to its obligation to pay, in light of Article 1545 of the Civil Code, which provides that, “where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition.…”
Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial, claiming that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule and that by Tan’s failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section 3(e),15 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue.
RULING:
As regards respondent’s failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in proof. MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale between the parties.
Neither is there merit to petitioner’s contention that respondent was guilty of delay in filing the collection case. A careful examination of the records shows that Tan brought suit against MMC less than a year after the latter stopped making partial payments. Tan is, therefore, not guilty of laches.
Laches is the neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in a court of equity.21 Here, Tan had no reason to go to court while MMC was paying its obligation, even if partially, under the contracts of sale.
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EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND G.R. No. 145842 RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO, RUFINO L. SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOON TSEN, Petitioners, vs.
BF CORPORATION, Respondent.
GR No. 145873 June 27, 2008
FACTS:
Petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as Agreement for the Execution of Builders Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project that ESHRI and BF executed for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the contract stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month’s progress billing.
After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages. The trial court rule in favor of BF, which was affirmed by the CA.
On appeal, petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 for being contrary to the best evidence rule.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the photocopies are admissible in evidence.
RULING:
The photocopies are admissible. BF complied with the laying-the-basis requirement.
The only actual rule that the term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
“SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;”
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
“SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. If the document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If
after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.”
Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original documents execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original documents unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.
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PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 142641, July 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner, Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr., obtained a loan from JosefinoCenizal. He issued a postdated check to secure the payment of the loan but promised the latter that he would replace the check with cash.
Arceo reneged on his promise. Thus, Cenizal brought the check to the bank for encashment but only to find out that it does not have sufficient funds. Cenizal informed Arceo of the dishonor of the check through a demand letter executed by his lawyer. However, Arceo still did not pay. Therefore, Cenizal filed a complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22 before the city prosecutor of Quezon City.
During the preliminary investigation, he presented the original of the check, the return slip, and other pertinent documents in support of his complaint. But the said check and return slip were lost in a fire which happened near the residence of Cenizal. Thus, he executed an Affidavit of Loss in lieu of the lost documents.
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in its resolution dated April 28, 1999. His reconsideration was also denied.Thus, he filed this petition invoking the Best Evidence Rule and insisting that the presentation of the check in evidence is a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Best Evidence Rule shall apply in this case.
RULING:
No, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply in this case. Thus, testimonial evidence may be admitted in order to prove the issuance of the subject check.
It is a well-settled principle that the Best Evidence Rule applies only where the subject of the inquiry is the content of the document. But when the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the rule will not apply and in that case, testimonial evidence may be admitted.
In cases involving violation of BP 22, the gravamen is the act of drawing or issuance of the worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of the issuance or execution of the check, and not its content.
In the case at bar, Cenizal already presented the original of the check during preliminary investigation. And after its loss, he was able to adequately establish its due execution in the Affidavit of Loss as well as his testimony during trial.
Furthermore, Arceo himself admitted that he issued the check. He did not deny that the same was presented for payment and that it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
All other elements of the crime being present, the check being issued in consideration of a loan, the issuance of notice of dishonor to petitioner satisfied, and petitioner’s knowledge of insufficiency of his funds at the time he issued the check as well as its subsequent dishonor sufficiently established , the Court has no reason to rule otherwise.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 170633 October 17, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent, again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules.
Respondent further claims that the photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.
ISSUE:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions admissible under the best evidence rule.
RULING:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law