Subgame perfect equilibrium
Cournot Walras equilibrium as a subgame perfect equilibrium
... a subgame perfect equilibrium notion characterized by the fact that, in the second stage, the atomless sector always uses the same strategies when the atoms send out bids which sum to the same total ...
23
Equilibria Immune to Deviations by Coalitions in Infinite Horizon Non Cooperative Games
... A subgame perfect equilibrium is a standard solution concept for ...strong perfect equilibrium that requires immunity to all deviations by all coalitions in all ...
7
Games With Possibly Naive Hyperbolic Discounters
... perception-perfect equilibrium essentially requires each player to take an action consistent with the subgame perfect equilibrium, given her perceptions concerning future types, and ...
35
Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs
... of subgame perfect equilibrium and even if no players believe that other players are al- truists, they still do not follow the SPE strategies when playing the centipede ...“behavioral ...
11
The Mixed Berge Equilibrium in Extensive Form Games
... among players and extends the BE to mixed strategies. In this paper, we ex- tended extensive form games to include players acting altruistically. In particular, we applied the concept of an MBE to finite n -person games ...
9
Dynamic price competition with price adjustment costs and product differentiation
... the subgame perfect equilibrium approaches a limit that is di¤erent from the Nash equilibrium of the cor- responding static ...the equilibrium has been characterised only for the case ...
24
Subgame perfect implementation: A new result
... This paper follows the series of papers on quantum mechanism [5,7–9]. In this paper, the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms in Refs. [5,7] are generalized to subgame perfect implementation. In Example 1, we ...
17
Social power as a solution to the Bertrand Paradox
... price subgame-perfect equilibrium with positive profits for both firms exists, and even in the case products are not di ff erentiated, asymmetric pure price equi- libria always ...
48
Reliable Multi path Routing in Selfish Networks with Hidden Information and Actions
... In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretical solution to the multi-path routing problem in wireless ad hoc net- works comprising selfish nodes with hidden information and actions. By incorporating a suitable ...
6
Unilateral Commitments
... Nash equilibrium exists or ...other equilibrium concept is defined ...Nash equilibrium, but we do not care about this for subgames outside the essential collection associated with ...virtual ...
159
Equilibrium Vengeance
... We may summarize the argument as follows. Economists need to come to grips with human motives such as vengeance. Since vengeance generally reduces own material payoff or fitness, its persistence is an evolutionary ...
43
Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics
... a dynamics adjustment process in a large society where agents make irre- versible decisions (e.g., career or sector choices as considered in Matsuyama (1991)) and instantaneous payoffs are given by a normal form ...
58
Two sided Intergenerational Transfer Policy and Economic Development: A Politico economic Approach
... ) > 0. A decline in population growth has a positive effect on public education as it allows each child to obtain more education. Hence, the benefit of increas- ing the current lump-sum tax becomes higher, and the ...
19
Stackelberg type dynamic symmetric three players zero sum game with a leader and two followers
... We study a Stackelberg type symmetric dynamic three-players zero-sum game. One player is the leader and two players are followers. All players have symmetric payoff functions. The game is a two-stages game. In the first ...
11
Analysis of dynamic symmetric three players zero sum game with a leader and two followers without differentiability of payoff functions
... the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic game and that of the static game are equivalent in a two-person zero-sum ...the equilibrium of the Stackelberg type dynamic zero-sum game and that of the ...
12
Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example
... Empirical studies have shown that reputation mechanism works in air transport services markets, and the revealed mechanism is similar to recursive belief equilibrium descripted in our paper. For example, (i) ...
29
Organizing competition for the market
... With entry scale economies (S + s rather than 2S) under synchronous tenders, the entrants exert more pressure on the incumbent in the monopoly state, which tends to lower the monopoly price; indirectly, this reduces the ...
67
Signaling the Strength of a Market Entrant
... separating equilibrium with full information capacities is not possible, the incumbent and the entrant can play a pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium with the capacity and production equal to the ...
15
Interdomain routing and games
... In [11] the notion of collusion-proofness in ex-post Nash is defined. Informally, collusion- proofness in ex-post Nash means that a group of agents cannot collaborate to improve the outcome of any player in the group ...
18
Efficiency Gains in Repeated Games at Random Moments in Time
... pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s if the repetitions of the stage game are unknown to the ...pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria payo¤s that can be sustained only under ...
26