PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO and DIONISIO CERBO, petitioners,
vs.
HON NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and GREGORIO OJOY, respondents.
72 SCRA 428 (1976)
FACTS:
In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy, accused", of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in his defense, his counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and material to the case.
Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted the present petition.
ISSUE:
Did the judge’s orders violate Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which requires that testimony of witnesses be given orally in open court?
RULING:
Yes. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. The essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. Cross-examination cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. Personal appearance of the witness before the judge also enables the judge as the trier of facts, to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses.
Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence on the issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the "witness manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony orally in open court". If a trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct result than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.
SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE MANUEL PAMARAN, et al., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 71208-09 August 30, 1985
FACTS:
On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was committed inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City. Former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to the country after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death. The assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country which reverberated beyond the territorial confines of this Republic. The after-shocks stunned the nation even more as this ramified to all aspects of Philippine political, economic and social life.
UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other members of the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon.
Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary investigation, the TANODBAYAN filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2) Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was docketed as Criminal Case No.
10010 and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one accomplice.
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion. On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886.
The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies given by the eight (8) private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidences offered may be admissible.
RULING:
No. Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity";
and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity"
grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates."
Examining Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying, nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immune from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us by the petitioners that the right against self incrimination must be invoked before the Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of admissibility. It reads:
“No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence”.
With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the temper of the times, we run the risk of being consigned to unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but undaunted by, the frightening consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of law finding solace in the view very aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and admired defender of human rights of this Court, Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs.
Manalang and we quote:
“I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the individuals. I have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in situations which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being”.
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ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
161 SCRA 122 1988
FACTS:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items.
Based on the said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine.
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.
Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner guilty of malversation?
RULING:
YES. There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. They are: (a) That the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance.
An accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion. Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or control.
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