PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
JUAN BRIOSO and MARIANO TAEZA, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-28482 January 30, 1971
FACTS:
Defendants Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza, were charged with the crime of murder of Silvino Daria under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of dogs. She peeped through a crack in the wall of her house and saw appellants herein pass southward in the direction of the house of Silvino Daria that was six meters away. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Her suspicions awakened, she went downstairs and, shielded by the fence, witnessed each appellant point a gun at the bamboo wall of Daria's house. Two detonations followed, and thereafter she heard Daria moaning and his wife call for help, saying her husband had been shot. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded and unable to speak. The widow, however, testified that right after being shot, she rushed to her husband's side and he told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Silvino Daria expired one hour later as a result of gunshot wounds in the abdomen and leg. A few days later, Cecilia Bernal and the widow, Susana Tumalip, executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimonial knowledge of the witness is sufficient to establish the facts of the case.
RULING:
Yes. We find no discrepancy in the testimony of Cecilia Bernal on the material points.
The house of Cecilia Bernal was only six meters away from that of Silvino Daria's. The night was brightly illuminated by the moon. Cecilia Bernal had known both accused for a long time and it is admitted that they also know her. There could have been no difficulty in identifying the accused under the circumstances.
Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely this heinous charge of murder against the above-said accused, considering that Mariano Taeza is a nephew of the deceased by a first degree cousin. Even Juan Brioso specifically said that he knew of no reason why she should testify against him. Hence, her statement that she came to court only to tell the truth should be believed.
Moreover, the testimony of Cecilia Bernal finds corroboration in the declaration of the victim, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement does satisfy the requirements of an ante mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of impending death, considering that he died only one hour after being shot.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI JR., Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of Davao, ARCADIO PUESCA alias Big Boy, et al, respondents.
14 SCRA 944 1965
FACTS:
Puesca, Apa, Gustilo, Macalinao, Dairo, and Montano were charged with robbery in band with homicide, to which they pleaded not guilty.
While Sgt. Bano was testifying as prosecution witness regarding the extrajudicial confession made to him by Puesca, he said that the latter, aside from admitting his participation in the commission of the offense charged, revealed that other persons conspired with him to commit the offense, mentioning the name of each and every one of them.
The prosecuting officer asked the witness to mention in court the names of Puesca's alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo and Dairo objected to this, upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned.
The respondent judge resolved the objection directing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning or giving the names of the accused who had interposed the objection. The witness was allowed to answer the question and name his co-conspirators except those who had raised the objection. The prosecuting officer's motion for reconsideration of this ruling was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sgt. Bano have been allowed to answer the question in full.
RULING:
Yes. Hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement (People vs. Lew Yon).
In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt.
Bano would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca.
The question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense.
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People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee vs.
Nerio Gaddi y Catubay, defendant-appellant
G.R. No. 74065 February 27, 1989
FACTS:
The accused with intent to kill without any justifiable cause qualified with treachery and evident-premeditation attack and employ personal force upon the person of one Augusto Esguerra y Navarro by stabbing him several times with a knife hitting him in the different parts of the body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death. After arraignment, wherein Gaddi pleaded not guilty, and Trial Judge Maximo Asuncion handed down a verdict of guilt for the crime charged.
On appeal to this court, Gaddi assigns error of giving credence to the testimony of Guzman.
Guzman testified that he saw Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, appellant told Ernesto Guzman that he killed his drinking partner Augusto Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet pit. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police. After work, Guzman went to the police and reported what the appellant told him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Guzman.
RULING:
No. Proof that a person confessed to the commission of the crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule which only prohibits testimonies as to those facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as those facts which he knows of his own knowledge that is which are derived from his own perception.
A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would knowingly and deliberately confessed to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. While a testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the records is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. When Guzman testified that the appellant who, probably bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his personal knowledge.
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Leake, plaintiff-appellant vs
Hagert, defendant-respondent
175 N.W.2d 675 1970
FACTS:
Leake was driving his tractor when Hagert bumped the rear of his tractor hitting the plow being towed. Leake sued Hagert for negligence. Hagert filed a counter-claim alleging that it was Leake who was negligent. During the trial, the Court admitted the testimony of Gros, an investigator who claims that he spoke to the son of Leake and told him that the rear red light of the tractor was broken for some time already.
ISSUE:
Whether the testimony given by Gros is admissible as evidence.
RULING:
No. According to the rules, any person who offers his testimony must have personal knowledge of the same. In this case Gros did not have personal knowledge of the alleged broken red light of the tractor.
He merely relied on the alleged testimony given by the son of Leake. Thus the testimonial evidence given by Gros constitute as hearsay and is not admissible as evidence.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs
ALBERT CHARLES ZENNI, JR., ET AL., Defendants,
492 F. Supp. 464 July 3, 1980
Brief Fact Summary. During a lawful search for evidence of illegal bookmaking activity, conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, law enforcement answered the phone several times.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Implied assertions, though they were considered hearsay at common law, are not considered hearsay under F.R.E 801 because they are not assertions, but non-assertive verbal conduct.
FACTS:
During a lawful search for evidence of illegal bookmaking activity, conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, law enforcement answered the phone several times. They seek to introduce evidence that individuals who called during that time placed bets, and thus believed that the premises was used for such purposes, and was thus likely used for such a purpose.
ISSUE:
Whether implied assertions are hearsay?
RULING:
No. To be hearsay an assertion must be made, and in this case the statements made by the gamblers on the telephone were non assertive verbal conduct. They were not made to prove that the place they were calling was a bookmaking establishment, but simply made to place bets.
DISCUSSION:
The dangers inherent in hearsay do not exist in the context of non-assertive verbal conduct, or implied assertions. The declarant’s veracity is not at issue, and so one of the reasons that it is so important to have an out of court declarant available for cross examination is not present. The statement was not made to show the truth or falsity of something, and so the veracity is not in issue.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee, vs.
ROLANDO "Botong" MALIBIRAN Accused, and BEVERLY TIBO-TAN, Accused/Appellant.
G.R. No. 178301 April 24, 2009
FACTS:
In 1995 Reynaldo Tan and Beverly Tan were Greenhills with their children for their usual Sunday gallivant. Later the family stepped out of the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind and waited. An explosion was heard, in the direction where Reynaldo car was park. They saw the car was burning, and Reynaldo badly injured, which later died because of the injuries sustained in the explosion. A case was filed against Beverly Tan, Rolandon Malibaran and 3 others of a crime of Parricide and murder respectively. One of the co accused Oswaldo Banaag was later discharged and utilized as one of the prosecution witnesses. Which he stated that, he overheard a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle. Janet Pascual a friend of Beverly tan also testified that as to when the killing would take place, she heard that they will do it during the baptism of the child of Gloria, Rolando Malibiran’s sister. The RTC convicted the accused of the crime charged and impose the maximum penalty, which is Death sentence. The CA affirmed the decision with Modification in that the supreme penalty of death imposed on both accused-appellants is hereby reduced to RECLUSION PERPETUA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Oswaldo Banaag and Janet Pascual should be classified as hearsay and should not be accepted as Evidence.
RULING:
NO. Contrary to the claim of appellant, the testimonies of Oswaldo and Janet are not covered by the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule states that a witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read or heard the same. This is derived from Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, which requires that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, that are derived from his perception. The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of independently relevant statements, where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overhead a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor thereof. Likewise, Janet may testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be considered as independently relevant
statements, but also personally conveyed to her by appellant and Rolando. The testimony of Janet as corroborated by Oswaldo, though circumstantial, leaves no doubt that appellant had in fact conspired with Rolando in bringing about the death of her husband Reynaldo. Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict, only if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
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RESORTS HOTEL CORPORATION, RODOLFO M. CUENCA & CUENCA INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES & SM INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Respondents,
G.R. No. 180439
FACTS:
Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC) was the previous owner and operator of several hotels located outside Metro Manila; namely Baguio Pines Hotel in Baguio City, Taal Vista Lodge Hotel in Tagaytay City, and Hotel Mindanao in Cagayan de Oro City. Among RHC’s stockholders were Cuenca Investment Corporation and Rodolfo Cuenca, who was also the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the said Corporation. On the other hand, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was RHC’s major creditor that eventually foreclosed the disputed hotels upon the latter’s default. SM Investment Corporation (SMIC) was the subsequent owner of Taal Vista Lodge Hotel and Baguio Pines Hotel.
It appears that from 1969 up to 1981, RHC obtained from DBP several loans, aggregating approximately P157 million, for the purpose of expanding hotel capacities, operations and services nationwide. To secure payment of these loans, RHC executed real estate mortgages in favor of DBP covering all the properties mentioned herein. When the loans become due and demandable, RHC failed to pay. RHC proposed to DBP that part of its obligations be converted into equity inasmuch as it was experiencing financial difficulties. DBP subsequently acceded.
With the approval of the Board of Directors of RHC, which was then headed by its Chairman, Rodolfo Cuenca, DBP obtained shareholdings, equivalent to 55% of RHC’s total stockholders’ equity, in exchange for the reduction of RHC’s obligation to DBP by as much as P47 million. As a result of the debt-to-equity conversion, DBP acquired two board seats in the eleven-member Board of Directors of RHC. Then DBP applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate and chattel mortgages pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 385, intending to block the impending foreclosure, RHC filed a complaint against DBP. During the hearing, RHC presented as witnesses Bayani Santos, the Senior Manager of DBP, Roberto Cuenca and his father, Rodolfo Cuenca they testified against the invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies of both Rodolfo and Roberto Cuenca sufficient to successfully challenge the validity of the foreclosure proceedings for alleged non-compliance with the notice, posting and publication requirements provided in Act No. 3135.
RULING:
No. We are in complete accord with the appellate court’s ruling that the dearth of evidence presented by petitioners inevitably failed to establish their claim that DBP did not comply with the statutory requirements on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages.
The CA had ruled and agreed that the testimonies of Rodolfo and Roberto Cuenca with respect to the absences of posting and publication of notices of foreclosure sale, consisting in the words I don’t believe, I don’t remember, I don’t think and If I recall, without being supported by any convincing and substantial evidence, were not sufficient to prove lack of compliance on the part of DBP with the requirements of notice, posting and publication prescribed in Act. No. 3135.