evidence required by law. (Sec. 1 Rule 131)
Hacienda Bigaa Incorporated, petitioner vs.
Epifanio Chavez (deceased) substituted by Santiago Chavez, respondent
G.R. No. 174160 April 20, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment case and damages against respondent. The complaint alleged that respondent Chavez entered the premises by force, stealth and strategy by cutting of the barbed wire fence and destroying the lock of one of the gates and subsequently built a house on the premises against the will of the Hacienda Bigaa as successor-in-interest by Ayala and Zobel. Respondent contention that he is the successor-interest of his late mother Zoila de Chavez who is a lessee of a fishpond and had a permit for it issued by the Bureau of Fisheries. After trial, the court found out that the subject parcels of land is under the Public domain and the Subdivision Titles of the land covering that area of the respondent are null and void.
ISSUE:
Who was the burden of proof to prove ownership over the land which is the subject matter of the case.
RULING:
The Supreme Court took cognizance of the fact that Zoilas de Chavez’s fishpond permit is within the land covered by the decision. Moreover, the Supreme Court has shifted the burden of proof in this regard to Zobel or Ayala when it declared that, clearly the burden of proof lies on Zobel and other transferees to show that his Subdivision Titles are not among the unlawful expanded subdivision titles declared null and void by the said 1965 judgment.
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HUBERT NUÑEZ, petitioner vs
SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC., through its representative, CESAR SYLIANTENG, respondent
G.R. No. 180542 April 12, 2010
FACTS:
The spouses Sylianteng executed a deed of assignment over their parcel of land in favor of SLTEAS.
The land remained idle and unguarded for some time.
In 2003, SLTEAS found out that Nuñez and other individuals were occupying the land and refused to vacate despite several demands. SLTEAS filed a complaint for forcible entry against Nuñez. The latter interposed the defense that he has a subsisting lease agreement over the land with Maria.
ISSUE:
Whether there is an existing lease contract between petitioner and certain Maria.
RULING:
NO. According to the Rules, when a party successfully proved his claim, the burden of evidence shifts to the adverse party. In this case, the respondent successfully proved that indeed there was forcible entry. The burden now shifts to the petitioner to prove the existence of a lease contract. Since petitioner failed to prove its claim, the defense raised by him should fail.
SEGUNDA PORNELLOSA & JOSE ANGELES, Petitioners, vs
THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION & HERMINIO GUZMAN, Respondents,
G.R. No. L-14040 January 31, 1961
FACTS:
The lot in controversy is a part of the Santa Clara Estate on which many families have settled through the consent of its owner, each paid a rental. In May 1941, the said Estate was acquired by the Government & was entrusted to an office known as the Rural Progress Admin., which was later abolished
& its functions was transferred to the Bureau of Lands. Recently, such duties were given to the Land Tenure Administration.
The plaintiff acquired by purchase the right of occupation of the lot in question from Vicente San Jose, predecessor-in-interest. After the purchase of the Santa Clara Estate by the Government, the plaintiffs were allowed to make payments on account of the purchase price of the lot as fenced, included (200) square-meters. Thereafter, the plaintiffs found out that the lot had been subdivided into two (2) smaller lots, No. 44 and 78. Lot No. 44 had been sold to Herminio Guzman. The plaintiffs then filed a complaint to compel the Director of Lands to execute a Deed of Sale in their favor & declare null and void the Deed of Sale of Lot No. 44, executed in favor of respondent Herminio. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petitioner’s complaint. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to purchase from the Government the lot, allegedly includes 200 square –meters.
RULING:
The judgment under review was affirmed.
The lot on which San Jose’s house stood had not been specified, nor had the boundaries thereof been mentioned. Significantly, the plaintiff cannot show a contract whereby the Rural Progress Admin., has sold or promised to sell them a lot of 200 square meters. A party claiming a right granted or created by law must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of that of his opponent.
Moreover the Deed of Sale allegedly executed by Vicente San Jose in favor of Pornellosa is a mere private document and does not conclusively establish their right to the parcel of land. Acts and contracts which have for their subject the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public document.
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INDUSTRIAL FINANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
CASTOR TOBIAS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-41555 July 27, 1977
FACTS:
Tobias bought on installment 1 Dodge truck from Leelin Motors, Inc. To answer for his obligation he executed a promissory note in favor of the latter. To secure payment of the promissory note, respondent Tobias executed in favor of Leelin Motors, Inc. a chattel mortgage on the Dodge truck. Leelin Motors, Inc. indorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel mortgage to Industrial Finance Corporation. As a consequence respondent Tobias paid 6 installments on the promissory note directly to the petitioner Industrial Finance Corporation. IFC’s counsel wrote to Tobias stating that IFC has referred Tobias account for appropriate legal action. Tobias replied saying that he was willing to surrender the truck and the truck has been with Leelin motors ever since it met an accident and that he is not satisfied with the repair of the finished portions. Upon learning that the truck had been in an accident, IFC decided not to get the truck anymore and instituted this action to recover the unpaid balance on the promissory note.
ISSUE:
Whether or not IFC can still choose to exact payment for the obligation, instead of foreclosing the truck (because Tobias insists that IFC is now estopped from claiming balance when it demanded the surrender of the truck securing the obligation)?
RULING:
NO. To hold the petitioner in estoppel, it must be shown that when it gave the respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the purchase price or of surrendering the truck, it had already knowledge of the accident and the consequent damage to the truck. Petitioner claims it had no knowledge of the accident when it gave the respondent the choice of either paying the balance of the promissory note or of surrendering the truck. Besides the allegation of petitioner that it had no knowledge of the accident is a negative allegati on and needs no evidence to support it, not being an essential part of the statement of the right on which the cause of action is founded. It is therefore the respondent Tobias who has the burden of disproving the claim of petitioner that he has no knowledge of the accident when it made the offer to respondent either to pay the balance on the promissory note or to surrender the truck.
Respondent failed in this. Aside from the fact that the truck being surrendered met an accident petitioner was not satisfied with the repair of the finished portion of the truck in question. Petitioner therefore was justified refusing to accept such surrender and in bringing suit to recover the balance of the purchase price. A negative averment only needs to be proved by the party alleging it if it is an element of a criminal offense charged. Averment of having no knowledge in civil cases need not be proved by the party asserting it. Under the proposed revised rules, the burden of going forward with the evidence will still fall on the party alleging the positive of a fact, in this case, one asserting presence of knowledge.
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PERFECTA CAVILE, JOSE DE LA CRUZ & RURAL BANK OF BAYAWAN, INC., Petitioners,
vs
JUSTINA LITANIA-HONG ET AL, Respondents,
G.R. No. 179540 March 13, 2009
FACTS:
A deed of partition was entered into by the heirs of the spouses Bernardo Cavile and Tranquilina Galon. Subject of the Deed of partition were several parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Tolong, Negros Occidental, which were then covered by Tax declarations No. 5615, No. 2729, No. 7143, No. 7421 and No. 7956, all under the name Bernardo.
In accordance with the Deed of partition, the conjugal properties of Bernardo and Tranquiliana were divided into two parts. The first part, corresponding to Bernardino’s share was further divided into six equal shares.
The second part, corresponding to Tranquiliana’s share, was subdivided only into three shares.Also stated in the deed of partition was the sale by the other aforementioned legal heirs to their co-heir, thus making Castor the sole owner of the said properties.
Fourteen years after respondents filed on December 23, 1974 a complaint for reconveyance and recovery of property with damages before the RTC against Perfecta Cavile. In 1962, Castor sold to petitioner Perfecta the lots covered by tax declarations No. 7421 and No. 7956 which corresponded to the subject lots in the complaint.
Following the sale, petitioner Perfecta took possession of the subject lots and filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for the issuance of the title over the same. The RTC further subscribed to the testimony of perfecta that the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition was executed by Castor solely to accommodate Susana, enabling her to obtain a bank loan using the subject lots as collateral.
It noted that Susana did not bother to apply for the issuance of title to the subject lots in her name.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA agreed in the respondent’s contention that the confirmation of extrajudicial partition was not simulated document.
The said document should be entitled to utmost respect, credence, and weight as it was executed by and between parties who had firsthand knowledge of the Deed of Partition of 1937.
Moreover, the confirmation of extrajudicial partition constituted evidence that was of the highest probative value against the declarant, Castor, because it was a declaration against his proprietary interest.
Perfecta herself admitted that she only started paying real estate taxes for the subject lots in 1993. It was Susana and later, her children, respondents Justina and genoveva, who had been paying for the realty taxes on the subject lots since 1937.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners has the better right to the property.
RULING:
Yes, it is the petitioners. There being no issue raised on the matter, that the subject lots covered by tax declarations No. 07408 and No. 07409 described in the complaint in Civil Case No. 6111 are the very same lots covered by the tax declarations No. 7956 and No. 7421 included in the deed of partition.
The confirmation of extrajudicial partition is just one piece of evidence against petitioner spouses.
The court is still convinced that the evidence adduced by the petitioner spouses preponderated over that of the respondents.
In analyzing the two vital documents in this case, the court discerns that while the Deed of Partition clearly explained how Castor came to fully own the subject lots, the Confirmation of Extrajudicial Partition, even though confirming Susana’s ownership of the subject lots, failed to shed light on why or how the said properties wholly pertained to her when her parents, Bernardino and Tranquilina clearly had other heirs who also had shares in the inheritance.
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LOLITA REYES doing business under the name and style, SOLID BROTHERS WEST MARKETING, petitioner
vs.
CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 165377, February 16, 2010
FACTS:
Lolita Reyes had applied for and was granted a credit line from the respondent allowing the latter to obtain and secure Century tuna canned goods. And when the defendant's obligation to pay became due and demandable, the same failed to pay as she refused to pay her unsettled accounts in the total amount of P787,191.27. However, due to the constant and diligent efforts exerted by the representatives of the plaintiff to collect the alleged unpaid obligations of the defendant, the latter returned some unsold Century tuna canned goods, the value of which at P323,697.64 was deducted from the principal obligation thereby leaving the amount of P463,493.63 as the unsettled account of defendant Reyes. That because of the refusal of the defendant to satisfactorily and completely settle her unpaid account, the plaintiff was constrained to refer the matter to its legal counsel, who consequently sent a demand letter, and accordingly filed the instant case in Court after the defendant failed to comply and satisfy the demand letter to pay.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, defendant averred that she had no transaction with the plaintiff for the purchase of the alleged canned goods in question, inasmuch as she is not engaged in the canned goods business but in auto airconditioning, parts and car accessories in Banaue, Quezon City ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly found that petitioner was liable to pay respondent's claim.
RULING:
Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence that is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on
one side than on the other. The testimonies of respondent's witnesses were further bolstered by the absence of any motive on their part to falsely testify against petitioner; thus, their testimonies are hereby accorded full faith and credit.
Petitioner's defense consists of denial. The Court held that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence that has no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters.
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ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, et al, Petitioners, vs.
ISMAEL VELOSO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 171365 October 6, 2010
FACTS:
This case is an off-shoot of an unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioners against respondent. In said complaint for unlawful detainer, it was alleged that they are the lessors of a residential house located at No. 42 Big Horseshoe Drive, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City which was leased to respondent at a monthly rental of ₱17,000.00. The action was instituted on the ground of [respondent's]
failure to pay rentals from May 23, 1997 to December 22, 1998 despite repeated demands. Respondent denied the non-payment of rentals and alleged that he made an advance payment of ₱825,000.00 when he paid for the repairs done on the leased property.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) [Branch 88, Quezon City], the MeTC decision was reversed. Respondent was ordered to pay arrearages from May 23, 1997 up to the date of the decision but he was also given an option to choose between staying in the leased property or vacating the same, subject to the reimbursement by [petitioners] of one-half of the value of the improvements which it found to be in the amount of ₱120,000.00. [Respondent] was also given the right to remove said improvements pursuant to Article 1678 of the Civil Code, should [petitioners] refuse to pay ₱60,000.00.
When both parties moved for the reconsideration of the RTC decision, the RTC issued an Order dated February 23, 2001 modifying its previous ruling by increasing the value of the improvements from
₱120,000.00 to ₱800,000.00.
After successive appeals to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, the decision of the RTC dated November 29, 2000 which reversed the decision of the MeTC, became final and executory.
Petitioners reason that respondent has no cause of action against them since the MTC decision in the unlawful detainer case was part of public records. On appeal, the CA decreed that although court decisions are public documents, distribution of the same during the pendency of an appeal was clearly intended to cause respondent some form of harassment and/or humiliation so that respondent would be ostracized by his neighbors.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented is merely an allegation.
RULING:
The finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
We cannot subscribe to respondent's argument that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties since petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent's complaint for damages, hypothetically admitted respondent's allegations. The hypothetical admission of respondent's allegations in the complaint only goes so far as determining whether said complaint should be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the parties.