ROMAN R. VILLALON, et al, Petitioners, vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE COURT (Fourth Special Cases Division), HON. INOCENCIO D.
MALIAMAN (Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch XXIX at San Fernando, La Union), CATALINA NEVAL VDA. DE EBUIZA, et al, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-73751, September 24, 1986
FACTS:
Atty. Roman R. Villalon served as the counsel for private respondents’ parents in the case entitled
“Paulino Ebuiza, et al. v. Patrocinio Ebuiza, et al.” As contingent fee for successfully handling the case, Atty. Villalon caused the transfer of the land owned by the Ebuiza’s in his and his sons’ favor. This resulted to the filing of a disbarment case, Administrative Case No. 1488, by the Ebuiza’s against Atty.
Villalon which was also coupled by the filing of Civil Case No. 2799, for the annulment of a Deed of Absolute Sale together with recovery of possession and damages over the subject property located in San Juan, La Union.
During the trial of the civil case, petitioners Villalon presented as evidence the testimonies of some of the members of the Ebuiza’s namely Catalina NevalVda. De Ebuiza, Francisco Ebuiza, and Justina Ebuiza San Juan, which were given in the disbarment case in order to impeach their testimonies for being utterly inconsistent. Private respondents moved to strike all the matters related with the disbarment proceedings so as not to be part of the records of the civil case. The trial court granted such motion. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition and said that petitioners should have made a formal offer of those testimonies for it to be considered in the hearing of the civil case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements made by some of the members of the Ebuiza’s in the disbarment caseshould be admitted to be part of the records of the civil case in order to impeach their inconsistent testimonies.
RULING:
Yes, the statements made by some of the private respondents in the disbarment case should be made part of the civil case for the purpose of impeaching the latter’s inconsistent testimonies.
As stated under Sections 15 and 16 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a witness of the adverse party may be impeached by contradictory evidence or by evidence that the witness had made prior testimonies inconsistent with his present testimony, provided that such statement must be related to him.
In the case at bar, by striking the testimonies made by private respondents in the disbarment case from the records of the civil case, the trial court deprived the petitioner of its right to impeach the credibility of the adverse party’s witnesses notwithstanding the fact that such statements were material to the issues in the civil case as the two cases were rooted from the same cause of action, the alleged falsification of the Deed of Sale in favor of petitioner Villalon.
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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
ALEJO RESABAL,Defendant-Appellant
G.R. No. 26708 September 29, 1927
FACTS:
Primo Ordiz died at his own home in the barrio of Bogo, municipality of Maasin, Leyte from the effects of an internal hemorrhage caused by a sharp wound in the left lung.
Glicerio Orit testified that the accused, armed with a revolver, invited him to Primo Ordiz's house in order to kill the latter. And on arriving at said house, the accused went into the ground, approached one of the windows of the house less than a meter and a half in height, opened it and looked in. At that moment the witness left the place, and at a distance of 15 brazas heard an explosion.
Glicerio Orit's testimony as to the explosion is corroborated by the declaration of the boy Jose Ordiz, who slept with his uncle Primo Ordiz. Jose Ordiz was awakened by the noise of an explosion and saw his uncle Primo Ordiz vomiting blood and unable to speak.cha
Glicerio testified, furthermore, that the accused believing him to be still an enemy of the deceased Primo Ordiz, the accused showed the revolver to him. The accused invited him to accompany him to do away with Primo Ordiz. Vicente Ambalong corroborates Glicerio Orit’s testimony to the effect that early in the morning, the accused went to the house where the latter was sleeping to awaken him, and that he then saw the accused on the staircase, calling Glicerio Orit. Nroblesvirtu
The defense argues that Glicerio Orit is not a credible witness, because of his having been excluded from the information to be used as a witness for the prosecution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Glicerio Orit is a credible witness because of the contradiction in his testimony at the preliminary investigation and during the trial.
RULING:
The apparent contradiction which may be noted in his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, and before the court of first instance sufficient to discredit his testimony, for the simple reason that this witness was not given ample opportunity, by a reading to him of his declarations before the court of the justice of the peace, to explain the discrepancies noted by counsel for the accused. The mere presentation of Exhibit 1, without said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified in the Court of First Instance, is no ground for impeaching his testimony. (U. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385, 406.)
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HOW THE WITNESS IS IMPEACHED BY EVIDENCE OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS (LAYING THE PREDICATE)
• Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony:
a) the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and
b) he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
• A witness cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or predicate has been laid by the party against whom said witness was called.
• Laying the predicate means that it is the duty of a party trying to impugn the testimony of a witness by means of prior or subsequent inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the witness a change to reconcile his conflicting declaration.
• Where no predicate is laid during the trial by calling the attention of a witness to alleged inconsistent statements and asking him to explain the contradiction, proof of alleged inconsistent statements of the witness, whether verbal or written, cannot be admitted on objection of the adverse party, or be pointed out on appeal for the purpose of destroying the credibility of the witness.
United States v. Webster,
734 F.2d 1191, 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22641 (7th Cir. Ill. May 9, 1984)
FACTS:
Defendant, Webster, was convicted of aiding and abetting in a bank robbery and for receiving stolen funds. He was sentenced to nine years. The prosecution had the co-defendant, King, testify against the Defendant. However, King gave testimony that exculpated the Defendant. The prosecution was allowed to introduce prior inconsistent statements by King that were incriminating against the Defendant.
The court instructed the jury that it could consider the statements only as impeachment evidence.
Defendant appeals contending that the prosecution should not have been able to use the out of court statements by King.
ISSUE:
Was it improper to allow the out of court statement by King to be admitted?
RULING:
Justice Posner issued the opinion for the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in affirming the conviction and holding that he impeachment evidence was not used to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury because the prosecution did not know that the co-defendant would not give useful evidence. In the case, the Court of Appeals found that prosecution acted in good faith in putting the co-defendant on the stand. Thus, the evidence was not offered to intentionally place inadmissible evidence before the jury. The prosecution first sought to question the co-defendant out of the presence of the jury to find out what information, if any, he would offer. Defendant’s counsel objected and the questioning was not allowed.
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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RUDY BUDUHAN y BULLAN and ROBERT BUDUHAN y BULLAN, defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. 178196 August 6, 2008
FACTS:
Defendants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan were found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide with respect to the deceased Larry Erese, and of the crime of homicide with respect to the deceased Romualde Almeron.
Principal witness Cherry Rose Salazar (Cherry Rose), narrated the incident as follows: She was working as a guest relations officer at the RML Canteen, a beerhouse and a videoke bar, there were only two groups of men inside the beerhouse. The group that went there first was that of the appellants with two others. The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding). While Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese, Robert approached them and poked a gun at Larry. Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose’s Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the counter. The man in blue poked a gun at Romualde and announced a hold-up. Larry then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from Robert’s group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them to fall down. Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the table. Responding policemen later apprehended the first group. The lower court convicted the defendants.
ISSUE.
Whether or not the conflicting testimony of the witness may be impeached.
RULING:
No. As between statements made during the preliminary investigation of the case and the testimony of a witness in open court, the latter deserves more credence. Preliminary investigations are commonly fairly summary or truncated in nature, being designed simply for the determination, not of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but of probable cause prior to the filing of an information in court. It is the statements of a witness in open court which deserve careful consideration.
In any event, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent statements by a witness, is revealing:
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enable him to explain the statements referred to and to show that they were made by mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.
In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose during the preliminary investigation with respect to the identities of the accused were not related to her during the trial. Indeed, it is only during the appeal of this case that appellants pointed out the supposed inconsistencies in Cherry Rose’s identification of the appellants in order to destroy her credibility as a witness. No opportunity was ever afforded her to provide an explanation. Without such explanation, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility, on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling her conflicting declarations that she should be deemed impeached.
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EDUARDO LEYSON, et al, Petitioners, vs.
PEDRO LAWA, et al, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 150756 October 11, 2006
FACTS:
On February 28, 1997, an Information charging petitioners with arson was filed before the RTC of General Santos City. Petitioners aver that respondents failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for arson. The testimonies of respondent Romeo Jarmin and Bonifacio Batata were inconsistent with the affidavits given to the police investigators. While Jarmin pointed to and identified petitioner Eduardo Leyson during the trial as one of those who burned the houses, in his affidavit, Jarmin failed to mention Leyson, and even erroneously declared that the men were “cowboys.” Petitioners further point out that Jarmin had admitted that he returned to the farm only on September 2, 1996; hence, it was impossible for him to have seen the burning of the houses on September 11, 1996.
Bonifacio Batata admitted when he testified that even before the burning of the houses on September 7, 1996 he already knew petitioner Leyson, yet, never identified him as one of the perpetrators in the affidavit which he gave to the police investigators. In fact, Batata, in his affidavit, never identified any of petitioners as the perpetrators. Moreover, Batata and Jarmin could not have seen the burning of the houses so as to properly identify the culprits, considering that the surface of the canal where they claim to have hidden was covered by three feet cogon grass, and Jarmin and Batata were only 5 feet and four inches tall. While Batata declared that he saw petitioners burn the houses of private respondents, he later changed his testimony and declared that he saw only one of them setting the houses on fire. Batata even admitted that he did not see the face of the arsonist. And contrary to the ruling of the CA, Lino Mendi did not see the burning of the houses.
Petitioners conclude that conformably with the aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the testimonies of Jarmin and Batata have no probative weight.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner, except petitioner Leyson, of the crime of arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code.
RULING:
The general rule is that inconsistencies and discrepancies between the testimony of a witness in contrast with what he stated in an affidavit do not necessarily discredit him. Affidavits given to police and barangay officers are made ex parte and often incomplete or incorrect for lack or absence of sufficient inquiries by the investigating officer. It is of judicial knowledge that sworn statements are almost incomplete and often inaccurate and are generally inferior to the testimony of a witness in open court.
Inconsistencies or discrepancies in the testimony of the witness relative to minor or peripheral matters and not to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused from the crime charged or the elements of such crime are not grounds for the acquittal of the accused.
It is not correct for petitioners to claim that Jarmin in his affidavit, did not implicate petitioner Leyson for the burning of the houses. In fact, Jarmin declared therein that petitioner Leyson conspired with his co-petitioners to burn the houses of private respondents because they refused to vacate the ranch. Moreover, petitioner Leyson, with his co-petitioners, was present when the houses were burned on September 7, 1996, as he was even armed with a long firearm. Petitioner Leyson even assured Sumog-oy later that he would pay for the damages sustained by private respondents.
The testimony of a witness must be considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and anchor a conclusion on the basis of said parts. In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered.
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