[PDF] Top 20 Practical Attacks on the Round-reduced PRINCE

... 2. Borghoff, J., Canteaut, A., G¨ uneysu, T., Kavun, E.B., Knezevic, M., Knudsen, L.R., Leander, G., Nikov, V., Paar, C., Rechberger, C., Rombouts, P., Thomsen, S.S., Yal¸ cin, T.: PRINCE - A Low-Latency Block ... See full document

... nding practical attacks on the block cipher they designed, ...using attacks which are usually impractical despite being faster than brute-force, the challenge invites cryptographers to nd ... See full document

... preimage attacks on SM3 reduced to 30 steps out of 64 steps starting from step 6, and 28 steps starting from step ...preimage attacks on SM3 reduced to 29/30 steps and pseudo-preimage ... See full document

... More recently, Derbez, Fouque and Jean presented a significant improvement to Dunkelman et al.’s attacks at EUROCRYPT 2013 [6]. Combined with the rebound-like view of the cipher, they showed that the number of ... See full document

... Application of the internal differential boomerangs. The impact of this kind of boomerangs depends on the analyzed framework. When the subject of analysis is a block cipher, then the impact of the internal differential ... See full document

... single-key attacks on full rounds of three variants of AES with a significant advantage over exhaustive ...be reduced to a single plaintext-ciphertext pair, is first to use this kind of attack on ... See full document

... and fulfill certain constraints explained later. By using this technique, we are able to attack versions of ICEPOLE-128 where the last permutation is reduced to 4 out of 6 rounds. As far as we know, no forgery ... See full document

... key attacks on round-reduced LED-64 and ...slidex attacks [7], one immedi- ately improves the complexity of the previous single-key 4-step attack on ...single-key attacks on 6 steps of ... See full document

... First, we note that for 6 rounds the degree of the output bits is generally 2 6 = 64, and thus the preprocessing phase of the standard cube attack is too expensive to perform (without exploiting some internal ... See full document

... meet-in-the-middle attacks on some byte-oriented symmetric ...new attacks on round-reduced AES with very low data complexity, and to find improved attacks on the AES-based MACs ... See full document

... The latest such development happened in 2017, when Grassi et al. [21] pub- lished a new property of AES, called multiple-of-8 , which had not been observed before by other researchers. At first, it was not clear whether ... See full document

... whitening round that deviates the chaining value (key) from the message by one ...nonlinear round on finding free-start collision has been ...the practical security of the Stribog hash ... See full document

... PRINCE algorithm is practically implemented and executed for 30,000 random plaintext with fixed key K0 = [DF 8B A07C 946B 5E13] and K1 = [698B 31E5 F06B 4629]. The power traces are captured, with 4000 trace points ... See full document

... 16-round attacks against SKINNY-n-n (n = 64 or 128) in the single-tweakey model utilizing 11-round impossible dif- ferential ...these attacks are in the arguably weaker attack model, the ... See full document

... Keystream Correlation. We emphasize that the correlation we uncover between plaintext and cipher- text bits is absolute, in the sense that it does not depend on the encryption key, or on the nonce. This is the same ... See full document

... In this paper, we present the first analysis on GOST R. More precisely, by applying the rebound attack techniques similar as in [6], we give collision attacks on 4.5, 5.5, 7.5 and 9.5 rounds GOST R compression ... See full document

... First, we describe the preimage attack on 3-round Keccak -512 which is based on the rotational distinguisher given in the previous section. Then we show how to extend the attack to 4 rounds. To have the attack ... See full document

... In this paper, we investigate the security of SIMON32, SIMON48/72 and SIMON48/96 by using integral, zero-correlation linear and impossible differential cryptanalysis. We firstly evaluate these SIMON variants by means of ... See full document

... ASR attacks on the 7-, 7-, 119-, 105-, 99-, and 42-round reduced FOX64, FOX128, KATAN32, KATAN48, KATAN64 and ...best attacks. We emphasize that our attacks work independently from the ... See full document

... To calculate the differential path by our algorithm using the pDDT table, we are using the main function in Algorithm 6. The calculated weight from round 1 to the current round is represented by weight ... See full document